From: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>, "tytso@mit.edu" <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 11:03:42 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BDC35E@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jL=uPyP=eG296oTixkto83LqVyasvo9qaNEn2P6bAtufQ@mail.gmail.com>
> On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 2:53 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > BTW, the attack that inspired grsecurity's RANDKSTACK is described in
> > these slides (lots of steps, see slide 79):
> > https://www.slideshare.net/scovetta/stackjacking
>
> Sorry, as PaX Team reminded me, I misremembered this. RANDKSTACK
> already existed. It was STACKLEAK that was created in response to this
> particular attack. I still think this attack is worth understanding to
> see what hoops must be jumped through when dealing with stack
> randomization (and other defenses).
Yes, I actually went through a number of stack-based attacks, including above,
in order to understand what we are trying to protect against.
If you are interested, I wrote some notes here mainly for organizing my own
thoughts and understanding:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1h1gRuZpOjVxaaDag-MxOrASka0OEBeApQOl8OK2GIVY/edit?usp=sharing
It also has references to slidedecks of relevant attacks.
I am going to update them now based on our good discussion here.
Anyhow, I am glad that we arrived to conclusion here and I know how to proceed.
So, I will start working on randomizing after pt_regs in direction that Andy outlined.
With regards to disabling iopl(), this is pretty separate thing. If anyone wants to run
with this and submit a patch, please go ahead, I can also do it a bit later (after a study of it
since I never used it before) if noone finds bandwidth in the meantime.
Best Regards,
Elena.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-27 11:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-08 12:15 [RFC PATCH] Early version of thread stack randomization Elena Reshetova
2019-02-08 12:15 ` [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call Elena Reshetova
2019-02-08 13:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-08 13:20 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-08 14:26 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-09 11:13 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-09 18:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-11 6:39 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-11 15:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-12 10:16 ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-14 7:52 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-19 14:47 ` Jann Horn
2019-02-20 22:20 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 6:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-21 13:20 ` Jann Horn
2019-02-21 15:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-20 22:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-20 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 23:29 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-27 11:03 ` Reshetova, Elena [this message]
2019-02-21 9:35 ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-21 17:23 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 17:48 ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-21 19:18 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-20 21:51 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 15:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-09 11:38 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-09 12:09 ` Greg KH
2019-02-11 6:05 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-08 16:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-20 22:03 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 21:28 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-11 12:47 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-20 22:04 ` Kees Cook
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