kernel-hardening.lists.openwall.com archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>, "tytso@mit.edu" <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 15:29:39 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jL=uPyP=eG296oTixkto83LqVyasvo9qaNEn2P6bAtufQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+833Rv5dnsNth522WGirAjysipPo2gecSX2HC5y-MkUg@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 2:53 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> BTW, the attack that inspired grsecurity's RANDKSTACK is described in
> these slides (lots of steps, see slide 79):
> https://www.slideshare.net/scovetta/stackjacking

Sorry, as PaX Team reminded me, I misremembered this. RANDKSTACK
already existed. It was STACKLEAK that was created in response to this
particular attack. I still think this attack is worth understanding to
see what hoops must be jumped through when dealing with stack
randomization (and other defenses).

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2019-02-21 23:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-08 12:15 [RFC PATCH] Early version of thread stack randomization Elena Reshetova
2019-02-08 12:15 ` [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call Elena Reshetova
2019-02-08 13:05   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-08 13:20     ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-08 14:26       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-09 11:13         ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-09 18:25           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-11  6:39             ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-11 15:54               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-12 10:16                 ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-14  7:52                   ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-19 14:47                     ` Jann Horn
2019-02-20 22:20                     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21  6:37                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-21 13:20                         ` Jann Horn
2019-02-21 15:49                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-20 22:15                   ` Kees Cook
2019-02-20 22:53                     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 23:29                       ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-02-27 11:03                         ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-21  9:35                     ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-21 17:23                       ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 17:48                         ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-21 19:18                           ` Kees Cook
2019-02-20 21:51         ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 15:15       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-09 11:38         ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-09 12:09           ` Greg KH
2019-02-11  6:05             ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-08 16:34   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-20 22:03     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 21:28   ` Kees Cook
2019-02-11 12:47     ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-20 22:04   ` Kees Cook

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='CAGXu5jL=uPyP=eG296oTixkto83LqVyasvo9qaNEn2P6bAtufQ@mail.gmail.com' \
    --to=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=elena.reshetova@intel.com \
    --cc=enrico.perla@intel.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    --subject='Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call' \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).