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From: "Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Tamas K Lengyel" <tamas@tklengyel.com>,
	"Mathieu Tarral" <mathieu.tarral@protonmail.com>,
	"Samuel Laurén" <samuel.lauren@iki.fi>,
	"Patrick Colp" <patrick.colp@oracle.com>,
	"Jan Kiszka" <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>,
	"Stefan Hajnoczi" <stefanha@redhat.com>,
	"Weijiang Yang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Zhang@kvack.org, "Yu C" <yu.c.zhang@intel.com>,
	"Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>,
	"Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com>,
	"He Chen" <he.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	"Zhang Yi" <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 35/92] KVM: VMX: Add control flags for SPP enabling
Date: Fri,  9 Aug 2019 18:59:50 +0300
Message-ID: <20190809160047.8319-36-alazar@bitdefender.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190809160047.8319-1-alazar@bitdefender.com>

From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>

Check SPP capability in MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2, its 23-bit
indicates SPP support. Mark SPP bit in CPU capabilities bitmap if
it's supported.

Co-developed-by: He Chen <he.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: He Chen <he.chen@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20190717133751.12910-3-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Adalbert Lazăr <alazar@bitdefender.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h         |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c        |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h    |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c             | 10 ++++++++++
 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 6d6122524711..183b4fd864c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_FLEXPRIORITY	( 8*32+ 2) /* Intel FlexPriority */
 #define X86_FEATURE_EPT			( 8*32+ 3) /* Intel Extended Page Table */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VPID		( 8*32+ 4) /* Intel Virtual Processor ID */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPP			( 8*32+ 5) /* Intel EPT-based Sub-Page Write Protection */
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL		( 8*32+15) /* Prefer VMMCALL to VMCALL */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XENPV		( 8*32+16) /* "" Xen paravirtual guest */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 4e4133e86484..a2c9e18e0ad7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES			0x00100000
 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA		0x01000000
 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC	0x00400000
+#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_SPP		0x00800000
 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING              0x02000000
 
 #define PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK                 0x00000001
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index fc3c07fe7df5..b55156ce16da 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ static void detect_vmx_virtcap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 #define X86_VMX_FEATURE_PROC_CTLS2_EPT		0x00000002
 #define X86_VMX_FEATURE_PROC_CTLS2_VPID		0x00000020
 #define x86_VMX_FEATURE_EPT_CAP_AD		0x00200000
+#define X86_VMX_FEATURE_PROC_CTLS2_SPP		0x00800000
 
 	u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high, msr_ctl, msr_ctl2;
 	u32 msr_vpid_cap, msr_ept_cap;
@@ -486,6 +487,7 @@ static void detect_vmx_virtcap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EPT);
 	clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VPID);
 	clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD);
+	clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPP);
 
 	rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high);
 	msr_ctl = vmx_msr_high | vmx_msr_low;
@@ -509,6 +511,8 @@ static void detect_vmx_virtcap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		}
 		if (msr_ctl2 & X86_VMX_FEATURE_PROC_CTLS2_VPID)
 			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VPID);
+		if (msr_ctl2 & X86_VMX_FEATURE_PROC_CTLS2_SPP)
+			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPP);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
index 854e144131c6..8221ecbf6516 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -239,6 +239,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_pml(void)
 	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
 }
 
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept_spp(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_SPP;
+}
+
 static inline bool vmx_xsaves_supported(void)
 {
 	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 97cfd5a316f3..f94e3defd9cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ static u64 __read_mostly host_xss;
 bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1;
 module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO);
 
+static bool __read_mostly spp_supported = 0;
+
 #define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC		1
 #define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV	2
 
@@ -2247,6 +2249,7 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
 			SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING |
 			SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING |
 			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_SPP |
 			SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING |
 			SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA |
 			SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX |
@@ -3901,6 +3904,9 @@ static void vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 	if (!enable_pml)
 		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
 
+	if (!spp_supported)
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_SPP;
+
 	if (vmx_xsaves_supported()) {
 		/* Exposing XSAVES only when XSAVE is exposed */
 		bool xsaves_enabled =
@@ -7570,6 +7576,10 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
 	if (!cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority())
 		flexpriority_enabled = 0;
 
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_spp() && enable_ept &&
+	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPP))
+		spp_supported = 1;
+
 	if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis())
 		enable_vnmi = 0;
 


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 168+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-09 15:59 [RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/92] kvm: introduce KVMI (VM introspection subsystem) Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 20:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13  9:11     ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 11:57     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d52a5ae.1c69fb81.5c260.1573SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-13 12:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 15:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13 21:03           ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-14  9:48           ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]           ` <5d53d8d1.1c69fb81.7d32.0bedSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-14 10:37             ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/92] kvm: introspection: add basic ioctls (hook/unhook) Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:44   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 14:24     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/92] kvm: introspection: add permission access ioctls Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/92] kvm: introspection: add the read/dispatch message function Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VERSION Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_CMD_RESPONSE Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:15   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 17:08     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/92] kvm: introspection: honor the reply option when handling the KVMI_GET_VERSION command Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:16   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CHECK_COMMAND and KVMI_CHECK_EVENT Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_GUEST_INFO Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_VM_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/92] kvm: introspection: add vCPU related data Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/92] kvm: introspection: add a jobs list to every introspected vCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/92] kvm: introspection: make the vCPU wait even when its jobs list is empty Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:43   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 14:19     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/92] kvm: introspection: handle introspection commands before returning to guest Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:26   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 13:54     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d52c10e.1c69fb81.26904.fd34SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-13 14:45       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-14  9:39         ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/92] kvm: introspection: handle vCPU related introspection commands Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/92] kvm: introspection: handle events and event replies Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:55   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 15:25     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/92] kvm: introspection: introduce event actions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_UNHOOK Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_CREATE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VCPU_INFO Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/92] kvm: page track: add track_create_slot() callback Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/92] kvm: x86: provide all page tracking hooks with the guest virtual address Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/92] kvm: page track: add support for preread, prewrite and preexec Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/92] kvm: x86: wire in the preread/prewrite/preexec page trackers Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/92] kvm: x86: intercept the write access on sidt and other emulated instructions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_mmu_nested_pagefault() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 27/92] kvm: introspection: use page track Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 28/92] kvm: x86: consult the page tracking from kvm_mmu_get_page() and __direct_map() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 29/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 30/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_spt_fault() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 31/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_PF Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 32/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_PAGE_ACCESS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 33/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_PAGE_ACCESS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 34/92] Documentation: Introduce EPT based Subpage Protection Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` Adalbert Lazăr [this message]
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 36/92] KVM: VMX: Implement functions for SPPT paging setup Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 37/92] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP access bitmap and operation functions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 38/92] KVM: VMX: Add init/set/get functions for SPP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 39/92] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP user-space IOCTLs Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 40/92] KVM: VMX: Handle SPP induced vmexit and page fault Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 41/92] KVM: MMU: Enable Lazy mode SPPT setup Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 42/92] KVM: MMU: Handle host memory remapping and reclaim Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 43/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_SPP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 44/92] kvm: introspection: extend the internal database of tracked pages with write_bitmap info Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 45/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_PAGE_WRITE_BITMAP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 46/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_PAGE_WRITE_BITMAP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 47/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_READ_PHYSICAL and KVMI_WRITE_PHYSICAL Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 48/92] kvm: add kvm_vcpu_kick_and_wait() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 49/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_PAUSE_VCPU and KVMI_EVENT_PAUSE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 50/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 51/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 52/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_CPUID Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 53/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_INJECT_EXCEPTION + KVMI_EVENT_TRAP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 54/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_CR and KVMI_EVENT_CR Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 55/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_MSR and KVMI_EVENT_MSR Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 21:05   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-15  6:36     ` Nicusor CITU
2019-08-19 18:36       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-20  8:44         ` Nicusor CITU
2019-08-20 11:43           ` Mihai Donțu
2019-08-21 15:18             ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-19 18:52   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 56/92] kvm: x86: block any attempt to disable MSR interception if tracked by introspection Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 57/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_XSAVE Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 58/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_MTRR_TYPE Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 59/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_XSETBV Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 60/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_arch_vcpu_set_guest_debug() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 61/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_BREAKPOINT Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 62/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_HYPERCALL Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 63/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_DESCRIPTOR Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 64/92] kvm: introspection: add single-stepping Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 20:50   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13 12:51     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-14 12:36     ` Nicusor CITU
2019-08-14 12:53       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 65/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_SINGLESTEP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 66/92] kvm: introspection: add custom input when single-stepping a vCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 67/92] kvm: introspection: use single stepping on unimplemented instructions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 68/92] kvm: x86: emulate a guest page table walk on SPT violations due to A/D bit updates Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 69/92] kvm: x86: keep the page protected if tracked by the introspection tool Adalbert Lazăr
2019-09-10 14:26   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-09-10 16:28     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 70/92] kvm: x86: filter out access rights only when " Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:08   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 16:06     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 71/92] mm: add support for remote mapping Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:24   ` DANGER WILL ROBINSON, DANGER Matthew Wilcox
2019-08-13  9:29     ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 11:24       ` Matthew Wilcox
2019-08-13 12:02         ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 11:01     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-15 19:19       ` Jerome Glisse
2019-08-15 20:16         ` Jerome Glisse
2019-08-16 17:45           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-08-23 12:39           ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-09-05 18:09             ` Jerome Glisse
2019-09-09 17:00               ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-09-10  7:49                 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-10-02 19:27                   ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-02 13:46                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-02 14:15                       ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-02 16:18                         ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-02 17:04                           ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-02 20:10                             ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-03 15:42                               ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-03 15:50                                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-03 16:42                                   ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-10-03 18:31                                     ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-03 19:38                                       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-04  9:41                                         ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-10-04 11:46                                           ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-03 16:36                               ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 72/92] kvm: introspection: add memory map/unmap support on the guest side Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 73/92] kvm: introspection: use remote mapping Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 74/92] kvm: x86: do not unconditionally patch the hypercall instruction during emulation Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:20   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-14 12:07     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d53f965.1c69fb81.cd952.035bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-14 12:33       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 75/92] kvm: x86: disable gpa_available optimization in emulator_read_write_onepage() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:47   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 14:33     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d52ca22.1c69fb81.4ceb8.e90bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-13 14:35       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 76/92] kvm: x86: disable EPT A/D bits if introspection is present Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:18   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 77/92] kvm: introspection: add trace functions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 78/92] kvm: x86: add tracepoints for interrupt and exception injections Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 79/92] kvm: x86: emulate movsd xmm, m64 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 80/92] kvm: x86: emulate movss xmm, m32 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 81/92] kvm: x86: emulate movq xmm, m64 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 82/92] kvm: x86: emulate movq r, xmm Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 83/92] kvm: x86: emulate movd xmm, m32 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 84/92] kvm: x86: enable the half part of movss, movsd, movups Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 85/92] kvm: x86: emulate lfence Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 86/92] kvm: x86: emulate xorpd xmm2/m128, xmm1 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 87/92] kvm: x86: emulate xorps xmm/m128, xmm Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 88/92] kvm: x86: emulate fst/fstp m64fp Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 89/92] kvm: x86: make lock cmpxchg r, r/m atomic Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 90/92] kvm: x86: emulate lock cmpxchg8b atomically Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 91/92] kvm: x86: emulate lock cmpxchg16b m128 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 92/92] kvm: x86: fallback to the single-step on multipage CMPXCHG emulation Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection Sean Christopherson
2019-08-12 21:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13  9:34 ` Paolo Bonzini

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