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From: "Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Tamas K Lengyel" <tamas@tklengyel.com>,
	"Mathieu Tarral" <mathieu.tarral@protonmail.com>,
	"Samuel Laurén" <samuel.lauren@iki.fi>,
	"Patrick Colp" <patrick.colp@oracle.com>,
	"Jan Kiszka" <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>,
	"Stefan Hajnoczi" <stefanha@redhat.com>,
	"Weijiang Yang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Zhang@kvack.org, "Yu C" <yu.c.zhang@intel.com>,
	"Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>,
	"Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com>,
	"Nicușor Cîțu" <ncitu@bitdefender.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 67/92] kvm: introspection: use single stepping on unimplemented instructions
Date: Fri,  9 Aug 2019 19:00:22 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190809160047.8319-68-alazar@bitdefender.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190809160047.8319-1-alazar@bitdefender.com>

From: Mihai Donțu <mdontu@bitdefender.com>

On emulation failures, we notify the introspection tool for read/write
operations if needed. Unless it responds with RETRY (to re-enter guest),
we continue single stepping the vCPU.

Signed-off-by: Mihai Donțu <mdontu@bitdefender.com>
Co-developed-by: Nicușor Cîțu <ncitu@bitdefender.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicușor Cîțu <ncitu@bitdefender.com>
Signed-off-by: Adalbert Lazăr <alazar@bitdefender.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  5 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h      |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c             | 21 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c              |  5 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              |  8 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          | 13 ++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/kvmi.h            |  4 +++
 virt/kvm/kvmi.c                 | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h             |  1 +
 10 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 60e2c298d469..2392678dde46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -770,6 +770,9 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
 	/* set at EPT violation at this point */
 	unsigned long exit_qualification;
 
+	/* #PF translated error code from EPT/NPT exit reason */
+	u64 error_code;
+
 	/* pv related host specific info */
 	struct {
 		bool pv_unhalted;
@@ -1016,6 +1019,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	void (*msr_intercept)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int msr,
 				bool enable);
 	bool (*desc_intercept)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable);
+	u64 (*fault_gla)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 	void (*set_mtf)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable);
 	void (*cr3_write_exiting)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable);
 	bool (*nested_pagefault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -1627,6 +1631,7 @@ static inline int kvm_cpu_get_apicid(int mps_cpu)
 
 void kvm_arch_msr_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int msr,
 				bool enable);
+u64 kvm_mmu_fault_gla(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 bool kvm_mmu_nested_pagefault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 bool kvm_spt_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_set_mtf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 11ca64ced578..bc0f5bbd692c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry {
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_READABLE_BIT	3
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_WRITABLE_BIT	4
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_EXECUTABLE_BIT	5
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_GLA_VALID_BIT	7
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED_BIT 8
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ		(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ_BIT)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE		(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE_BIT)
@@ -545,6 +546,7 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry {
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_READABLE		(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_READABLE_BIT)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_WRITABLE		(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_WRITABLE_BIT)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_EXECUTABLE	(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_EXECUTABLE_BIT)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_GLA_VALID		(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_GLA_VALID_BIT)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED	(1 << EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED_BIT)
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c b/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c
index f0ab4bd9eb37..9d66c7d6c953 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c
@@ -759,6 +759,27 @@ int kvmi_arch_cmd_control_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+bool is_ud2_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *emulation_type)
+{
+	u8 ud2[] = {0x0F, 0x0B};
+	u8 insn_len = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt.fetch.ptr -
+		      vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt.fetch.data;
+
+	if (insn_len != sizeof(ud2))
+		return false;
+
+	if (memcmp(vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt.fetch.data, ud2, insn_len))
+		return false;
+
+	/* Do not reexecute the UD2 instruction, else we might enter to an
+	 * endless emulation loop. Let the emulator fall down through the
+	 * handle_emulation_failure() which shall inject the #UD exception.
+	 */
+	*emulation_type &= ~EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 void kvmi_arch_start_single_step(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	kvm_set_mtf(vcpu, true);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index 0b859b1797f6..c2f863797495 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -6667,6 +6667,11 @@ void kvm_mmu_module_exit(void)
 	mmu_audit_disable();
 }
 
+u64 kvm_mmu_fault_gla(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_x86_ops->fault_gla(vcpu);
+}
+
 bool kvm_mmu_nested_pagefault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return kvm_x86_ops->nested_pagefault(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 3481c0247680..cb536a2611f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -2675,6 +2675,8 @@ static int pf_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	u64 fault_address = __sme_clr(svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2);
 	u64 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
 
+	svm->vcpu.arch.error_code = error_code;
+
 	return kvm_handle_page_fault(&svm->vcpu, error_code, fault_address,
 			static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS) ?
 			svm->vmcb->control.insn_bytes : NULL,
@@ -7171,6 +7173,11 @@ static void svm_msr_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int msr,
 	set_msr_interception(svm, msrpm, msr, enable, enable);
 }
 
+static u64 svm_fault_gla(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return ~0ull;
+}
+
 static bool svm_nested_pagefault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return false;
@@ -7233,6 +7240,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
 	.cr3_write_exiting = svm_cr3_write_exiting,
 	.msr_intercept = svm_msr_intercept,
 	.desc_intercept = svm_desc_intercept,
+	.fault_gla = svm_fault_gla,
 	.nested_pagefault = svm_nested_pagefault,
 	.spt_fault = svm_spt_fault,
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index f0369d0574dc..dc648ba47df3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -5171,10 +5171,11 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 			EPT_VIOLATION_EXECUTABLE))
 		      ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
 
-	error_code |= (exit_qualification & 0x100) != 0 ?
-	       PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED)
+		      ? PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
 
 	vcpu->arch.exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
+	vcpu->arch.error_code = error_code;
 	return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
 }
 
@@ -7880,6 +7881,13 @@ static void vmx_cr3_write_exiting(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	/* TODO: nested ? vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control */
 }
 
+static u64 vmx_fault_gla(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (vcpu->arch.exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GLA_VALID)
+		return vmcs_readl(GUEST_LINEAR_ADDRESS);
+	return ~0ull;
+}
+
 static bool vmx_nested_pagefault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (vcpu->arch.exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED)
@@ -7947,6 +7955,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
 	.msr_intercept = vmx_msr_intercept,
 	.cr3_write_exiting = vmx_cr3_write_exiting,
 	.desc_intercept = vmx_desc_intercept,
+	.fault_gla = vmx_fault_gla,
 	.nested_pagefault = vmx_nested_pagefault,
 	.spt_fault = vmx_spt_fault,
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 65855340249a..dd10f9e0c054 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -6526,6 +6526,53 @@ static bool is_vmware_backdoor_opcode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 	return false;
 }
 
+/*
+ * With introspection enabled, emulation failures translate in events being
+ * missed because the read/write callbacks are not invoked. All we have is
+ * the fetch event (kvm_page_track_preexec). Below we use the EPT/NPT VMEXIT
+ * information to generate the events, but without providing accurate
+ * data and size (the emulator would have computed those). If an instruction
+ * would happen to read and write in the same page, the second event will
+ * initially be missed and we rely on the page tracking mechanism to bring
+ * us back here to send it.
+ */
+static bool kvm_page_track_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	u64 error_code = vcpu->arch.error_code;
+	bool data_ready = false;
+	u8 data = 0;
+	gva_t gva;
+	bool ret;
+
+	/* MMIO emulation failures should be treated the normal way */
+	if (unlikely(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))
+		return true;
+
+	/* EPT/NTP must be enabled */
+	if (unlikely(!vcpu->arch.mmu->direct_map))
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * The A/D bit emulation should make this test unneeded, but just
+	 * in case
+	 */
+	if (unlikely((error_code & PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE) ==
+		     PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE))
+		return true;
+
+	gva = kvm_mmu_fault_gla(vcpu);
+
+	if (error_code & PFERR_WRITE_MASK)
+		ret = kvm_page_track_prewrite(vcpu, gpa, gva, &data, 0);
+	else if (error_code & PFERR_USER_MASK)
+		ret = kvm_page_track_preread(vcpu, gpa, gva, &data, 0,
+					     &data_ready);
+	else
+		ret = true;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			    unsigned long cr2,
 			    int emulation_type,
@@ -6574,9 +6621,13 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		++vcpu->stat.insn_emulation;
 		if (r == EMULATION_RETRY_INSTR)
 			return EMULATE_DONE;
-		if (r != EMULATION_OK)  {
+		if (r != EMULATION_OK) {
 			if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD)
 				return EMULATE_FAIL;
+			if (!kvm_page_track_emulation_failure(vcpu, cr2))
+				return EMULATE_DONE;
+			if (kvmi_single_step(vcpu, cr2, &emulation_type))
+				return EMULATE_DONE;
 			if (reexecute_instruction(vcpu, cr2, write_fault_to_spt,
 						emulation_type))
 				return EMULATE_DONE;
@@ -6621,6 +6672,10 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		return EMULATE_DONE;
 
 	if (r == EMULATION_FAILED) {
+		if (!kvm_page_track_emulation_failure(vcpu, cr2))
+			return EMULATE_DONE;
+		if (kvmi_single_step(vcpu, cr2, &emulation_type))
+			return EMULATE_DONE;
 		if (reexecute_instruction(vcpu, cr2, write_fault_to_spt,
 					emulation_type))
 			return EMULATE_DONE;
diff --git a/include/linux/kvmi.h b/include/linux/kvmi.h
index 1dc90284dc3a..69db02795fc0 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvmi.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvmi.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ bool kvmi_hypercall_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 bool kvmi_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvmi_trap_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 bool kvmi_descriptor_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 descriptor, u8 write);
+bool kvmi_single_step(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int *emulation_type);
 void kvmi_handle_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvmi_stop_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 bool kvmi_vcpu_enabled_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -41,6 +42,9 @@ static inline bool kvmi_breakpoint_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gva,
 static inline bool kvmi_descriptor_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 descriptor,
 					 u8 write)
 			{ return true; }
+static inline bool kvmi_single_step(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+				    int *emulation_type)
+			{ return false; }
 static inline void kvmi_vcpu_uninit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { }
 static inline void kvmi_handle_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { }
 static inline bool kvmi_hypercall_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvmi.c b/virt/kvm/kvmi.c
index 06dc23f40ded..14eadc3b9ca9 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvmi.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvmi.c
@@ -1018,6 +1018,62 @@ void kvmi_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
 	wait_for_completion_killable(&kvm->kvmi_completed);
 }
 
+static u8 kvmi_translate_pf_error_code(u64 error_code)
+{
+	u8 access = 0;
+
+	if (error_code & PFERR_USER_MASK)
+		access |= KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_R;
+	if (error_code & PFERR_WRITE_MASK)
+		access |= KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_W;
+	if (error_code & PFERR_FETCH_MASK)
+		access |= KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_X;
+
+	return access;
+}
+
+static bool __kvmi_single_step(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+			       int *emulation_type)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct kvmi *ikvm = IKVM(kvm);
+	u8 allowed_access, pf_access;
+	u32 ignored_write_bitmap;
+	gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
+	int err;
+
+	if (is_ud2_instruction(vcpu, emulation_type))
+		return false;
+
+	err = kvmi_get_gfn_access(ikvm, gfn, &allowed_access,
+				  &ignored_write_bitmap);
+	if (err) {
+		kvmi_warn(ikvm, "%s: gfn 0x%llx not found in the radix tree\n",
+			  __func__, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	pf_access = kvmi_translate_pf_error_code(vcpu->arch.error_code);
+
+	return kvmi_start_ss(vcpu, gpa, pf_access);
+}
+
+bool kvmi_single_step(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int *emulation_type)
+{
+	struct kvmi *ikvm;
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	ikvm = kvmi_get(vcpu->kvm);
+	if (!ikvm)
+		return false;
+
+	ret = __kvmi_single_step(vcpu, gpa, emulation_type);
+
+	kvmi_put(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int kvmi_vcpu_kill(int sig, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	int err = -ESRCH;
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h b/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h
index 5485529db06b..c96fa2b1e9b7 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ int kvmi_arch_cmd_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector,
 				   u64 address);
 int kvmi_arch_cmd_control_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			     const struct kvmi_control_cr *req);
+bool is_ud2_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *emulation_type);
 void kvmi_arch_start_single_step(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvmi_arch_stop_single_step(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 u8 kvmi_arch_relax_page_access(u8 old, u8 new);


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-08-09 16:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 168+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-09 15:59 [RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/92] kvm: introduce KVMI (VM introspection subsystem) Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 20:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13  9:11     ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 11:57     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d52a5ae.1c69fb81.5c260.1573SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-13 12:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 15:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13 21:03           ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-14  9:48           ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]           ` <5d53d8d1.1c69fb81.7d32.0bedSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-14 10:37             ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/92] kvm: introspection: add basic ioctls (hook/unhook) Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:44   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 14:24     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/92] kvm: introspection: add permission access ioctls Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/92] kvm: introspection: add the read/dispatch message function Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VERSION Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_CMD_RESPONSE Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:15   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 17:08     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/92] kvm: introspection: honor the reply option when handling the KVMI_GET_VERSION command Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:16   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CHECK_COMMAND and KVMI_CHECK_EVENT Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_GUEST_INFO Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_VM_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/92] kvm: introspection: add vCPU related data Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/92] kvm: introspection: add a jobs list to every introspected vCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/92] kvm: introspection: make the vCPU wait even when its jobs list is empty Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:43   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 14:19     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/92] kvm: introspection: handle introspection commands before returning to guest Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:26   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 13:54     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d52c10e.1c69fb81.26904.fd34SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-13 14:45       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-14  9:39         ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/92] kvm: introspection: handle vCPU related introspection commands Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/92] kvm: introspection: handle events and event replies Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:55   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 15:25     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/92] kvm: introspection: introduce event actions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_UNHOOK Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_CREATE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VCPU_INFO Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/92] kvm: page track: add track_create_slot() callback Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/92] kvm: x86: provide all page tracking hooks with the guest virtual address Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/92] kvm: page track: add support for preread, prewrite and preexec Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/92] kvm: x86: wire in the preread/prewrite/preexec page trackers Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/92] kvm: x86: intercept the write access on sidt and other emulated instructions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_mmu_nested_pagefault() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 27/92] kvm: introspection: use page track Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 28/92] kvm: x86: consult the page tracking from kvm_mmu_get_page() and __direct_map() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 29/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 30/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_spt_fault() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 31/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_PF Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 32/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_PAGE_ACCESS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 33/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_PAGE_ACCESS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 34/92] Documentation: Introduce EPT based Subpage Protection Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 35/92] KVM: VMX: Add control flags for SPP enabling Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 36/92] KVM: VMX: Implement functions for SPPT paging setup Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 37/92] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP access bitmap and operation functions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 38/92] KVM: VMX: Add init/set/get functions for SPP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 39/92] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP user-space IOCTLs Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 40/92] KVM: VMX: Handle SPP induced vmexit and page fault Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 41/92] KVM: MMU: Enable Lazy mode SPPT setup Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 42/92] KVM: MMU: Handle host memory remapping and reclaim Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 43/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_SPP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 44/92] kvm: introspection: extend the internal database of tracked pages with write_bitmap info Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 45/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_PAGE_WRITE_BITMAP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 46/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_PAGE_WRITE_BITMAP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 47/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_READ_PHYSICAL and KVMI_WRITE_PHYSICAL Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 48/92] kvm: add kvm_vcpu_kick_and_wait() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 49/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_PAUSE_VCPU and KVMI_EVENT_PAUSE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 50/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 51/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 52/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_CPUID Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 53/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_INJECT_EXCEPTION + KVMI_EVENT_TRAP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 54/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_CR and KVMI_EVENT_CR Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 55/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_MSR and KVMI_EVENT_MSR Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 21:05   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-15  6:36     ` Nicusor CITU
2019-08-19 18:36       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-20  8:44         ` Nicusor CITU
2019-08-20 11:43           ` Mihai Donțu
2019-08-21 15:18             ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-19 18:52   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 56/92] kvm: x86: block any attempt to disable MSR interception if tracked by introspection Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 57/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_XSAVE Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 58/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_MTRR_TYPE Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 59/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_XSETBV Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 60/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_arch_vcpu_set_guest_debug() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 61/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_BREAKPOINT Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 62/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_HYPERCALL Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 63/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_DESCRIPTOR Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 64/92] kvm: introspection: add single-stepping Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 20:50   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13 12:51     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-14 12:36     ` Nicusor CITU
2019-08-14 12:53       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 65/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_SINGLESTEP Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 66/92] kvm: introspection: add custom input when single-stepping a vCPU Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` Adalbert Lazăr [this message]
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 68/92] kvm: x86: emulate a guest page table walk on SPT violations due to A/D bit updates Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 69/92] kvm: x86: keep the page protected if tracked by the introspection tool Adalbert Lazăr
2019-09-10 14:26   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-09-10 16:28     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 70/92] kvm: x86: filter out access rights only when " Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:08   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 16:06     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 71/92] mm: add support for remote mapping Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:24   ` DANGER WILL ROBINSON, DANGER Matthew Wilcox
2019-08-13  9:29     ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 11:24       ` Matthew Wilcox
2019-08-13 12:02         ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 11:01     ` Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-15 19:19       ` Jerome Glisse
2019-08-15 20:16         ` Jerome Glisse
2019-08-16 17:45           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-08-23 12:39           ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-09-05 18:09             ` Jerome Glisse
2019-09-09 17:00               ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-09-10  7:49                 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-10-02 19:27                   ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-02 13:46                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-02 14:15                       ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-02 16:18                         ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-02 17:04                           ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-02 20:10                             ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-03 15:42                               ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-03 15:50                                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-03 16:42                                   ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-10-03 18:31                                     ` Jerome Glisse
2019-10-03 19:38                                       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-04  9:41                                         ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-10-04 11:46                                           ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-03 16:36                               ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 72/92] kvm: introspection: add memory map/unmap support on the guest side Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 73/92] kvm: introspection: use remote mapping Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 74/92] kvm: x86: do not unconditionally patch the hypercall instruction during emulation Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:20   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-14 12:07     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d53f965.1c69fb81.cd952.035bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-14 12:33       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 75/92] kvm: x86: disable gpa_available optimization in emulator_read_write_onepage() Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  8:47   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-13 14:33     ` Adalbert Lazăr
     [not found]     ` <5d52ca22.1c69fb81.4ceb8.e90bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2019-08-13 14:35       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 76/92] kvm: x86: disable EPT A/D bits if introspection is present Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:18   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 77/92] kvm: introspection: add trace functions Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 78/92] kvm: x86: add tracepoints for interrupt and exception injections Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 79/92] kvm: x86: emulate movsd xmm, m64 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-13  9:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 80/92] kvm: x86: emulate movss xmm, m32 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 81/92] kvm: x86: emulate movq xmm, m64 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 82/92] kvm: x86: emulate movq r, xmm Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 83/92] kvm: x86: emulate movd xmm, m32 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 84/92] kvm: x86: enable the half part of movss, movsd, movups Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 85/92] kvm: x86: emulate lfence Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 86/92] kvm: x86: emulate xorpd xmm2/m128, xmm1 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 87/92] kvm: x86: emulate xorps xmm/m128, xmm Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 88/92] kvm: x86: emulate fst/fstp m64fp Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 89/92] kvm: x86: make lock cmpxchg r, r/m atomic Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 90/92] kvm: x86: emulate lock cmpxchg8b atomically Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 91/92] kvm: x86: emulate lock cmpxchg16b m128 Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 92/92] kvm: x86: fallback to the single-step on multipage CMPXCHG emulation Adalbert Lazăr
2019-08-12 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection Sean Christopherson
2019-08-12 21:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-13  9:34 ` Paolo Bonzini

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