From: "Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com> To: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>, "Tamas K Lengyel" <tamas@tklengyel.com>, "Mathieu Tarral" <mathieu.tarral@protonmail.com>, "Samuel Laurén" <samuel.lauren@iki.fi>, "Patrick Colp" <patrick.colp@oracle.com>, "Jan Kiszka" <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>, "Stefan Hajnoczi" <stefanha@redhat.com>, "Weijiang Yang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>, Zhang@kvack.org, "Yu C" <yu.c.zhang@intel.com>, "Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>, "Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com>, "Nicușor Cîțu" <ncitu@bitdefender.com>, "Jim Mattson" <jmattson@google.com>, "Sean Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org> Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 64/92] kvm: introspection: add single-stepping Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2019 19:00:19 +0300 Message-ID: <20190809160047.8319-65-alazar@bitdefender.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190809160047.8319-1-alazar@bitdefender.com> From: Nicușor Cîțu <ncitu@bitdefender.com> This would be used either if the introspection tool request it as a reply to a KVMI_EVENT_PF event or to cope with instructions that cannot be handled by the x86 emulator during the handling of a VMEXIT. In these situations, all other vCPU-s are kicked and held, the EPT-based protection is removed and the guest is single stepped by the vCPU that triggered the initial VMEXIT. Upon completion the EPT-base protection is reinstalled and all vCPU-s all allowed to return to the guest. This is a rather slow workaround that kicks in occasionally. In the future, the most frequently single-stepped instructions should be added to the emulator (usually, stores to and from memory - SSE/AVX). For the moment it works only on Intel. CC: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> CC: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> CC: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Signed-off-by: Nicușor Cîțu <ncitu@bitdefender.com> Co-developed-by: Mihai Donțu <mdontu@bitdefender.com> Signed-off-by: Mihai Donțu <mdontu@bitdefender.com> Co-developed-by: Adalbert Lazăr <alazar@bitdefender.com> Signed-off-by: Adalbert Lazăr <alazar@bitdefender.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 + arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c | 47 ++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 5 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 17 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 19 +++++ include/linux/kvmi.h | 4 + virt/kvm/kvmi.c | 145 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h | 16 ++++ 8 files changed, 253 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index ad36a5fc2048..60e2c298d469 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1016,6 +1016,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { void (*msr_intercept)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int msr, bool enable); bool (*desc_intercept)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable); + void (*set_mtf)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable); void (*cr3_write_exiting)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable); bool (*nested_pagefault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); bool (*spt_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); @@ -1628,6 +1629,8 @@ void kvm_arch_msr_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int msr, bool enable); bool kvm_mmu_nested_pagefault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); bool kvm_spt_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +void kvm_set_mtf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable); +void kvm_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask); void kvm_control_cr3_write_exiting(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable); #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_HOST_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c b/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c index 04cac5b8a4d0..f0ab4bd9eb37 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvmi.c @@ -520,7 +520,6 @@ bool kvmi_arch_pf_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, gva_t gva, u32 ctx_size; u64 ctx_addr; u32 action; - bool singlestep_ignored; bool ret = false; if (!kvm_spt_fault(vcpu)) @@ -533,7 +532,7 @@ bool kvmi_arch_pf_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, gva_t gva, if (ivcpu->effective_rep_complete) return true; - action = kvmi_msg_send_pf(vcpu, gpa, gva, access, &singlestep_ignored, + action = kvmi_msg_send_pf(vcpu, gpa, gva, access, &ivcpu->ss_requested, &ivcpu->rep_complete, &ctx_addr, ivcpu->ctx_data, &ctx_size); @@ -547,6 +546,8 @@ bool kvmi_arch_pf_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, gva_t gva, ret = true; break; case KVMI_EVENT_ACTION_RETRY: + if (ivcpu->ss_requested && !kvmi_start_ss(vcpu, gpa, access)) + ret = true; break; default: kvmi_handle_common_event_actions(vcpu, action, "PF"); @@ -758,6 +759,48 @@ int kvmi_arch_cmd_control_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return 0; } +void kvmi_arch_start_single_step(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + kvm_set_mtf(vcpu, true); + + /* + * Set block by STI only if the RFLAGS.IF = 1. + * Blocking by both STI and MOV/POP SS is not possible. + */ + if (kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu)) + kvm_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI); + +} + +void kvmi_arch_stop_single_step(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + kvm_set_mtf(vcpu, false); + /* + * The blocking by STI is cleared after the guest + * executes one instruction or incurs an exception. + * However we migh stop the SS before entering to guest, + * so be sure we are clearing the STI blocking. + */ + kvm_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0); +} + +u8 kvmi_arch_relax_page_access(u8 old, u8 new) +{ + u8 ret = old | new; + + /* + * An SPTE entry with just the -wx bits set can trigger a + * misconfiguration error from the hardware, as it's the case + * for x86 where this access mode is used to mark I/O memory. + * Thus, we make sure that -wx accesses are translated to rwx. + */ + if ((ret & (KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_W | KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_X)) == + (KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_W | KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_X)) + ret |= KVMI_PAGE_ACCESS_R; + + return ret; +} + static const struct { unsigned int allow_bit; enum kvm_page_track_mode track_mode; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index b178b8900660..3481c0247680 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -7183,6 +7183,10 @@ static bool svm_spt_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NPF); } +static void svm_set_mtf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable) +{ +} + static void svm_cr3_write_exiting(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable) { } @@ -7225,6 +7229,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = { .cpu_has_accelerated_tpr = svm_cpu_has_accelerated_tpr, .has_emulated_msr = svm_has_emulated_msr, + .set_mtf = svm_set_mtf, .cr3_write_exiting = svm_cr3_write_exiting, .msr_intercept = svm_msr_intercept, .desc_intercept = svm_desc_intercept, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 7d1e341b51ad..f0369d0574dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -5384,6 +5384,7 @@ static int handle_invalid_op(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static int handle_monitor_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { + kvmi_stop_ss(vcpu); return 1; } @@ -5992,6 +5993,11 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } } + if (kvmi_vcpu_enabled_ss(vcpu) + && exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION + && exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG) + kvmi_stop_ss(vcpu); + if (exit_reason < kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers && kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason]) return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason](vcpu); @@ -7842,6 +7848,16 @@ static __exit void hardware_unsetup(void) free_kvm_area(); } +static void vmx_set_mtf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable) +{ + if (enable) + vmcs_set_bits(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, + CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG); + else + vmcs_clear_bits(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, + CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG); +} + static void vmx_msr_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int msr, bool enable) { @@ -7927,6 +7943,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = { .cpu_has_accelerated_tpr = report_flexpriority, .has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr, + .set_mtf = vmx_set_mtf, .msr_intercept = vmx_msr_intercept, .cr3_write_exiting = vmx_cr3_write_exiting, .desc_intercept = vmx_desc_intercept, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 38aaddadb93a..65855340249a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -7358,6 +7358,13 @@ static int inject_pending_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool req_int_win) { int r; + if (kvmi_vcpu_enabled_ss(vcpu)) + /* + * We cannot inject events during single-stepping. + * Try again later. + */ + return -1; + /* try to reinject previous events if any */ if (vcpu->arch.exception.injected) @@ -10134,6 +10141,18 @@ void kvm_control_cr3_write_exiting(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvm_control_cr3_write_exiting); +void kvm_set_mtf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enable) +{ + kvm_x86_ops->set_mtf(vcpu, enable); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvm_set_mtf); + +void kvm_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask) +{ + kvm_x86_ops->set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, mask); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvm_set_interrupt_shadow); + bool kvm_spt_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return kvm_x86_ops->spt_fault(vcpu); diff --git a/include/linux/kvmi.h b/include/linux/kvmi.h index 5d162b9e67f2..1dc90284dc3a 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvmi.h +++ b/include/linux/kvmi.h @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ bool kvmi_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvmi_trap_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); bool kvmi_descriptor_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 descriptor, u8 write); void kvmi_handle_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +void kvmi_stop_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool kvmi_vcpu_enabled_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvmi_init_emulate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvmi_activate_rep_complete(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); bool kvmi_bp_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 dbg); @@ -44,6 +46,8 @@ static inline void kvmi_handle_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { } static inline bool kvmi_hypercall_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; } static inline bool kvmi_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return true; } static inline void kvmi_trap_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { } +static inline void kvmi_stop_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { } +static inline bool kvmi_vcpu_enabled_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; } static inline void kvmi_init_emulate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { } static inline void kvmi_activate_rep_complete(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { } static inline bool kvmi_bp_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 dbg) diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvmi.c b/virt/kvm/kvmi.c index d47a725a4045..a3a5af9080a9 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/kvmi.c +++ b/virt/kvm/kvmi.c @@ -1260,11 +1260,19 @@ void kvmi_run_jobs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } } +static bool need_to_wait_for_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvmi_vcpu *ivcpu = IVCPU(vcpu); + struct kvmi *ikvm = IKVM(vcpu->kvm); + + return atomic_read(&ikvm->ss_active) && !ivcpu->ss_owner; +} + static bool need_to_wait(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct kvmi_vcpu *ivcpu = IVCPU(vcpu); - return ivcpu->reply_waiting; + return ivcpu->reply_waiting || need_to_wait_for_ss(vcpu); } static bool done_waiting(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -1572,6 +1580,141 @@ int kvmi_cmd_pause_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool wait) return 0; } +void kvmi_stop_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvmi_vcpu *ivcpu = IVCPU(vcpu); + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm; + struct kvmi *ikvm; + int i; + + ikvm = kvmi_get(kvm); + if (!ikvm) + return; + + if (unlikely(!ivcpu->ss_owner)) { + kvmi_warn(ikvm, "%s\n", __func__); + goto out; + } + + for (i = ikvm->ss_level; i--;) + kvmi_set_gfn_access(kvm, + ikvm->ss_context[i].gfn, + ikvm->ss_context[i].old_access, + ikvm->ss_context[i].old_write_bitmap); + + ikvm->ss_level = 0; + + kvmi_arch_stop_single_step(vcpu); + + atomic_set(&ikvm->ss_active, false); + /* + * Make ss_active update visible + * before resuming all the other vCPUs. + */ + smp_mb__after_atomic(); + kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, 0); + + ivcpu->ss_owner = false; + +out: + kvmi_put(kvm); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvmi_stop_ss); + +static bool kvmi_acquire_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvmi_vcpu *ivcpu = IVCPU(vcpu); + struct kvmi *ikvm = IKVM(vcpu->kvm); + + if (ivcpu->ss_owner) + return true; + + if (atomic_cmpxchg(&ikvm->ss_active, false, true) != false) + return false; + + kvm_make_all_cpus_request(vcpu->kvm, KVM_REQ_INTROSPECTION | + KVM_REQUEST_WAIT); + + ivcpu->ss_owner = true; + + return true; +} + +static bool kvmi_run_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u8 access) +{ + struct kvmi *ikvm = IKVM(vcpu->kvm); + u8 old_access, new_access; + u32 old_write_bitmap; + gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa); + int err; + + kvmi_arch_start_single_step(vcpu); + + err = kvmi_get_gfn_access(ikvm, gfn, &old_access, &old_write_bitmap); + /* likely was removed from radix tree due to rwx */ + if (err) { + kvmi_warn(ikvm, "%s: gfn 0x%llx not found in the radix tree\n", + __func__, gfn); + return true; + } + + if (ikvm->ss_level == SINGLE_STEP_MAX_DEPTH - 1) { + kvmi_err(ikvm, "single step limit reached\n"); + return false; + } + + ikvm->ss_context[ikvm->ss_level].gfn = gfn; + ikvm->ss_context[ikvm->ss_level].old_access = old_access; + ikvm->ss_context[ikvm->ss_level].old_write_bitmap = old_write_bitmap; + ikvm->ss_level++; + + new_access = kvmi_arch_relax_page_access(old_access, access); + + kvmi_set_gfn_access(vcpu->kvm, gfn, new_access, old_write_bitmap); + + return true; +} + +bool kvmi_start_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u8 access) +{ + bool ret = false; + + while (!kvmi_acquire_ss(vcpu)) { + int err = kvmi_run_jobs_and_wait(vcpu); + + if (err) { + kvmi_err(IKVM(vcpu->kvm), "kvmi_acquire_ss() has failed\n"); + goto out; + } + } + + if (kvmi_run_ss(vcpu, gpa, access)) + ret = true; + else + kvmi_stop_ss(vcpu); + +out: + return ret; +} + +bool kvmi_vcpu_enabled_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvmi_vcpu *ivcpu = IVCPU(vcpu); + struct kvmi *ikvm; + bool ret; + + ikvm = kvmi_get(vcpu->kvm); + if (!ikvm) + return false; + + ret = ivcpu->ss_owner; + + kvmi_put(vcpu->kvm); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvmi_vcpu_enabled_ss); + static void kvmi_job_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *ctx) { struct kvmi_vcpu *ivcpu = IVCPU(vcpu); diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h b/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h index d7f9858d3e97..1550fe33ed48 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h +++ b/virt/kvm/kvmi_int.h @@ -126,6 +126,9 @@ struct kvmi_vcpu { DECLARE_BITMAP(high, KVMI_NUM_MSR); } msr_mask; + bool ss_owner; + bool ss_requested; + struct list_head job_list; spinlock_t job_lock; @@ -151,6 +154,15 @@ struct kvmi { DECLARE_BITMAP(event_allow_mask, KVMI_NUM_EVENTS); DECLARE_BITMAP(vm_ev_mask, KVMI_NUM_EVENTS); +#define SINGLE_STEP_MAX_DEPTH 8 + struct { + gfn_t gfn; + u8 old_access; + u32 old_write_bitmap; + } ss_context[SINGLE_STEP_MAX_DEPTH]; + u8 ss_level; + atomic_t ss_active; + struct { bool initialized; atomic_t enabled; @@ -224,6 +236,7 @@ int kvmi_add_job(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *ctx, void (*free_fct)(void *ctx)); void kvmi_handle_common_event_actions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 action, const char *str); +bool kvmi_start_ss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u8 access); /* arch */ void kvmi_arch_update_page_tracking(struct kvm *kvm, @@ -274,6 +287,9 @@ int kvmi_arch_cmd_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector, u64 address); int kvmi_arch_cmd_control_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvmi_control_cr *req); +void kvmi_arch_start_single_step(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +void kvmi_arch_stop_single_step(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +u8 kvmi_arch_relax_page_access(u8 old, u8 new); int kvmi_arch_cmd_control_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvmi_control_msr *req); int kvmi_arch_cmd_get_mtrr_type(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u8 *type);
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 168+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-08-09 15:59 [RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/92] kvm: introduce KVMI (VM introspection subsystem) Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-12 20:20 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-13 9:11 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 11:57 ` Adalbert Lazăr [not found] ` <5d52a5ae.1c69fb81.5c260.1573SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2019-08-13 12:09 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 15:01 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-13 21:03 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-14 9:48 ` Adalbert Lazăr [not found] ` <5d53d8d1.1c69fb81.7d32.0bedSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2019-08-14 10:37 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/92] kvm: introspection: add basic ioctls (hook/unhook) Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 8:44 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 14:24 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/92] kvm: introspection: add permission access ioctls Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/92] kvm: introspection: add the read/dispatch message function Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VERSION Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_CMD_RESPONSE Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:15 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 17:08 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/92] kvm: introspection: honor the reply option when handling the KVMI_GET_VERSION command Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:16 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CHECK_COMMAND and KVMI_CHECK_EVENT Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_GUEST_INFO Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_VM_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/92] kvm: introspection: add vCPU related data Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/92] kvm: introspection: add a jobs list to every introspected vCPU Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/92] kvm: introspection: make the vCPU wait even when its jobs list is empty Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 8:43 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 14:19 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/92] kvm: introspection: handle introspection commands before returning to guest Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 8:26 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 13:54 ` Adalbert Lazăr [not found] ` <5d52c10e.1c69fb81.26904.fd34SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2019-08-13 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-14 9:39 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/92] kvm: introspection: handle vCPU related introspection commands Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/92] kvm: introspection: handle events and event replies Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 8:55 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 15:25 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/92] kvm: introspection: introduce event actions Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_UNHOOK Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_CREATE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VCPU_INFO Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/92] kvm: page track: add track_create_slot() callback Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/92] kvm: x86: provide all page tracking hooks with the guest virtual address Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/92] kvm: page track: add support for preread, prewrite and preexec Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/92] kvm: x86: wire in the preread/prewrite/preexec page trackers Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/92] kvm: x86: intercept the write access on sidt and other emulated instructions Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_mmu_nested_pagefault() Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 8:12 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 27/92] kvm: introspection: use page track Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:06 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 28/92] kvm: x86: consult the page tracking from kvm_mmu_get_page() and __direct_map() Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 29/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 30/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_spt_fault() Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 31/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_PF Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 32/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_PAGE_ACCESS Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 33/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_PAGE_ACCESS Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 34/92] Documentation: Introduce EPT based Subpage Protection Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 35/92] KVM: VMX: Add control flags for SPP enabling Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 36/92] KVM: VMX: Implement functions for SPPT paging setup Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 37/92] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP access bitmap and operation functions Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 38/92] KVM: VMX: Add init/set/get functions for SPP Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 39/92] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP user-space IOCTLs Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 40/92] KVM: VMX: Handle SPP induced vmexit and page fault Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 41/92] KVM: MMU: Enable Lazy mode SPPT setup Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 42/92] KVM: MMU: Handle host memory remapping and reclaim Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 43/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_SPP Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 15:59 ` [RFC PATCH v6 44/92] kvm: introspection: extend the internal database of tracked pages with write_bitmap info Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 45/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_PAGE_WRITE_BITMAP Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 46/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_PAGE_WRITE_BITMAP Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 47/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_READ_PHYSICAL and KVMI_WRITE_PHYSICAL Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 48/92] kvm: add kvm_vcpu_kick_and_wait() Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 49/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_PAUSE_VCPU and KVMI_EVENT_PAUSE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 50/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 51/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_SET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 52/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_CPUID Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 53/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_INJECT_EXCEPTION + KVMI_EVENT_TRAP Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 54/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_CR and KVMI_EVENT_CR Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 55/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_CONTROL_MSR and KVMI_EVENT_MSR Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-12 21:05 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-15 6:36 ` Nicusor CITU 2019-08-19 18:36 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-20 8:44 ` Nicusor CITU 2019-08-20 11:43 ` Mihai Donțu 2019-08-21 15:18 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-19 18:52 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 56/92] kvm: x86: block any attempt to disable MSR interception if tracked by introspection Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 57/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_XSAVE Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 58/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_GET_MTRR_TYPE Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 59/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_XSETBV Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 60/92] kvm: x86: add kvm_arch_vcpu_set_guest_debug() Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 61/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_BREAKPOINT Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 62/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_HYPERCALL Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 63/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_DESCRIPTOR Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` Adalbert Lazăr [this message] 2019-08-12 20:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 64/92] kvm: introspection: add single-stepping Sean Christopherson 2019-08-13 12:51 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-14 12:36 ` Nicusor CITU 2019-08-14 12:53 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 65/92] kvm: introspection: add KVMI_EVENT_SINGLESTEP Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 66/92] kvm: introspection: add custom input when single-stepping a vCPU Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 67/92] kvm: introspection: use single stepping on unimplemented instructions Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 68/92] kvm: x86: emulate a guest page table walk on SPT violations due to A/D bit updates Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 69/92] kvm: x86: keep the page protected if tracked by the introspection tool Adalbert Lazăr 2019-09-10 14:26 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2019-09-10 16:28 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 70/92] kvm: x86: filter out access rights only when " Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:08 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 16:06 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 71/92] mm: add support for remote mapping Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:24 ` DANGER WILL ROBINSON, DANGER Matthew Wilcox 2019-08-13 9:29 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 11:24 ` Matthew Wilcox 2019-08-13 12:02 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 11:01 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-15 19:19 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-08-15 20:16 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-08-16 17:45 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2019-08-23 12:39 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU 2019-09-05 18:09 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-09-09 17:00 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-09-10 7:49 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU 2019-10-02 19:27 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-10-02 13:46 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-10-02 14:15 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-10-02 16:18 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-10-02 17:04 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-10-02 20:10 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-10-03 15:42 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-10-03 15:50 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-10-03 16:42 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU 2019-10-03 18:31 ` Jerome Glisse 2019-10-03 19:38 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-10-04 9:41 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU 2019-10-04 11:46 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-10-03 16:36 ` Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 72/92] kvm: introspection: add memory map/unmap support on the guest side Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 73/92] kvm: introspection: use remote mapping Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 74/92] kvm: x86: do not unconditionally patch the hypercall instruction during emulation Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:20 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-14 12:07 ` Adalbert Lazăr [not found] ` <5d53f965.1c69fb81.cd952.035bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2019-08-14 12:33 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 75/92] kvm: x86: disable gpa_available optimization in emulator_read_write_onepage() Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 8:47 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-13 14:33 ` Adalbert Lazăr [not found] ` <5d52ca22.1c69fb81.4ceb8.e90bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2019-08-13 14:35 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 76/92] kvm: x86: disable EPT A/D bits if introspection is present Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:18 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 77/92] kvm: introspection: add trace functions Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 78/92] kvm: x86: add tracepoints for interrupt and exception injections Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 79/92] kvm: x86: emulate movsd xmm, m64 Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-13 9:17 ` Paolo Bonzini 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 80/92] kvm: x86: emulate movss xmm, m32 Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 81/92] kvm: x86: emulate movq xmm, m64 Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 82/92] kvm: x86: emulate movq r, xmm Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 83/92] kvm: x86: emulate movd xmm, m32 Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 84/92] kvm: x86: enable the half part of movss, movsd, movups Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 85/92] kvm: x86: emulate lfence Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 86/92] kvm: x86: emulate xorpd xmm2/m128, xmm1 Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 87/92] kvm: x86: emulate xorps xmm/m128, xmm Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 88/92] kvm: x86: emulate fst/fstp m64fp Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 89/92] kvm: x86: make lock cmpxchg r, r/m atomic Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 90/92] kvm: x86: emulate lock cmpxchg8b atomically Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 91/92] kvm: x86: emulate lock cmpxchg16b m128 Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-09 16:00 ` [RFC PATCH v6 92/92] kvm: x86: fallback to the single-step on multipage CMPXCHG emulation Adalbert Lazăr 2019-08-12 18:23 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection Sean Christopherson 2019-08-12 21:40 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-08-13 9:34 ` Paolo Bonzini
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