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From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support
Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2012 23:07:34 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20121001210734.GB21712@elf.ucw.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120904161256.GA22961@srcf.ucam.org>

On Tue 2012-09-04 17:12:56, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 05:08:53PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
> > On Tue,  4 Sep 2012 11:55:06 -0400
> > Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > The UEFI Secure Boot trust model is based on it not being possible for a
> > > user to cause a signed OS to boot an unsigned OS
> > 
> > Unfortunately you can't fix this at kernel level because an untrusted
> > application can at GUI level fake a system crash, reboot cycle and phish
> > any basic credentials such as passwords for the windows partition.
> 
> Any well-designed software asking for credentials should already be 
> requiring a SAK, so in that case we just need to implement sensible SAK 
> support in Linux.

So... the "secure" boot specification also describes what the SAK is?
It has to be same on all the operating systems to be effective.

And... you'd need to put SAK functionality into the kernel. (Currently
SAK only notifies _root_ user. You'd need to implement SAK
functionality displaying penguin with "This is not Windows"
message... in kernel).
									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

      reply	other threads:[~2012-10-01 21:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-09-04 15:55 Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 01/11] Secure boot: Add new capability Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 02/11] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments Matthew Garrett
2012-10-01 21:00   ` Pavel Machek
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 03/11] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:16   ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 16:16     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 04/11] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 05/11] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:12   ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 16:13     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 06/11] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 20:13   ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-04 20:22     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 21:13       ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-04 21:27         ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 22:12           ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-04 23:25             ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05  4:33               ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-05  5:16                 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05  7:00                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-05  7:03                     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 21:39         ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 21:40           ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 15:43             ` Roland Eggner
2012-09-05 15:46               ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 21:13   ` Mimi Zohar
2012-09-05 21:41     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 21:49       ` Eric Paris
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 08/11] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 09/11] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 10/11] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:30   ` Shuah Khan
2012-09-04 16:38     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:44       ` Shuah Khan
2012-09-04 20:37         ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 20:37           ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 20:50             ` Josh Boyer
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 11/11] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:08 ` [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support Alan Cox
2012-09-04 16:12   ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-01 21:07     ` Pavel Machek [this message]

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