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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Wed,  6 Jul 2016 15:25:21 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1467843928-29351-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467843928-29351-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on x86. This is done both in
copy_*_user() and __copy_*_user() because copy_*_user() actually calls
down to _copy_*_user() and not __copy_*_user().

Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 0a7b885964ba..2a66b73a996d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -80,11 +80,13 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE		if SLUB
 	select HAVE_AOUT			if X86_32
 	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+	select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
 	select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP		if X86_64 || X86_PAE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN			if X86_64 && SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK
+	select HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING	if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS		if MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS	if MMU && COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2982387ba817..aa9cc58409c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -742,9 +742,10 @@ copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	 * case, and do only runtime checking for non-constant sizes.
 	 */
 
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+		check_object_size(to, n, false);
 		n = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
-	else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+	} else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		copy_from_user_overflow();
 	else
 		__copy_from_user_overflow(sz, n);
@@ -762,9 +763,10 @@ copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 	might_fault();
 
 	/* See the comment in copy_from_user() above. */
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+		check_object_size(from, n, true);
 		n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n);
-	else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+	} else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		copy_to_user_overflow();
 	else
 		__copy_to_user_overflow(sz, n);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
index 4b32da24faaf..7d3bdd1ed697 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero
 static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
 __copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
+	check_object_size(from, n, true);
 	return __copy_to_user_ll(to, from, n);
 }
 
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long
 __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
 	might_fault();
+	check_object_size(to, n, false);
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(n)) {
 		unsigned long ret;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index 2eac2aa3e37f..673059a109fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	check_object_size(dst, size, false);
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
 		return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size);
 	switch (size) {
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ int __copy_to_user_nocheck(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned size)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	check_object_size(src, size, true);
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
 		return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst, src, size);
 	switch (size) {
-- 
2.7.4

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Subject: [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Wed,  6 Jul 2016 15:25:21 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1467843928-29351-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467843928-29351-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on x86. This is done both in
copy_*_user() and __copy_*_user() because copy_*_user() actually calls
down to _copy_*_user() and not __copy_*_user().

Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 0a7b885964ba..2a66b73a996d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -80,11 +80,13 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE		if SLUB
 	select HAVE_AOUT			if X86_32
 	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+	select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
 	select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP		if X86_64 || X86_PAE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN			if X86_64 && SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK
+	select HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING	if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS		if MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS	if MMU && COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2982387ba817..aa9cc58409c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -742,9 +742,10 @@ copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	 * case, and do only runtime checking for non-constant sizes.
 	 */
 
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+		check_object_size(to, n, false);
 		n = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
-	else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+	} else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		copy_from_user_overflow();
 	else
 		__copy_from_user_overflow(sz, n);
@@ -762,9 +763,10 @@ copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 	might_fault();
 
 	/* See the comment in copy_from_user() above. */
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+		check_object_size(from, n, true);
 		n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n);
-	else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+	} else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		copy_to_user_overflow();
 	else
 		__copy_to_user_overflow(sz, n);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
index 4b32da24faaf..7d3bdd1ed697 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero
 static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
 __copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
+	check_object_size(from, n, true);
 	return __copy_to_user_ll(to, from, n);
 }
 
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long
 __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
 	might_fault();
+	check_object_size(to, n, false);
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(n)) {
 		unsigned long ret;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index 2eac2aa3e37f..673059a109fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	check_object_size(dst, size, false);
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
 		return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size);
 	switch (size) {
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ int __copy_to_user_nocheck(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned size)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	check_object_size(src, size, true);
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
 		return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst, src, size);
 	switch (size) {
-- 
2.7.4

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2016 22:25:21 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1467843928-29351-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467843928-29351-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on x86. This is done both in
copy_*_user() and __copy_*_user() because copy_*_user() actually calls
down to _copy_*_user() and not __copy_*_user().

Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 0a7b885964ba..2a66b73a996d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -80,11 +80,13 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE		if SLUB
 	select HAVE_AOUT			if X86_32
 	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+	select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
 	select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP		if X86_64 || X86_PAE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN			if X86_64 && SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK
+	select HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING	if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS		if MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS	if MMU && COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2982387ba817..aa9cc58409c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -742,9 +742,10 @@ copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	 * case, and do only runtime checking for non-constant sizes.
 	 */
 
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+		check_object_size(to, n, false);
 		n = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
-	else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+	} else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		copy_from_user_overflow();
 	else
 		__copy_from_user_overflow(sz, n);
@@ -762,9 +763,10 @@ copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 	might_fault();
 
 	/* See the comment in copy_from_user() above. */
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+		check_object_size(from, n, true);
 		n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n);
-	else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+	} else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		copy_to_user_overflow();
 	else
 		__copy_to_user_overflow(sz, n);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
index 4b32da24faaf..7d3bdd1ed697 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero
 static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
 __copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
+	check_object_size(from, n, true);
 	return __copy_to_user_ll(to, from, n);
 }
 
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long
 __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
 	might_fault();
+	check_object_size(to, n, false);
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(n)) {
 		unsigned long ret;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index 2eac2aa3e37f..673059a109fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	check_object_size(dst, size, false);
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
 		return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size);
 	switch (size) {
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ int __copy_to_user_nocheck(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned size)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	check_object_size(src, size, true);
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
 		return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst, src, size);
 	switch (size) {
-- 
2.7.4


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Wed,  6 Jul 2016 15:25:21 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1467843928-29351-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467843928-29351-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on x86. This is done both in
copy_*_user() and __copy_*_user() because copy_*_user() actually calls
down to _copy_*_user() and not __copy_*_user().

Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 0a7b885964ba..2a66b73a996d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -80,11 +80,13 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE		if SLUB
 	select HAVE_AOUT			if X86_32
 	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+	select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
 	select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP		if X86_64 || X86_PAE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN			if X86_64 && SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK
+	select HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING	if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS		if MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS	if MMU && COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2982387ba817..aa9cc58409c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -742,9 +742,10 @@ copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	 * case, and do only runtime checking for non-constant sizes.
 	 */
 
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+		check_object_size(to, n, false);
 		n = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
-	else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+	} else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		copy_from_user_overflow();
 	else
 		__copy_from_user_overflow(sz, n);
@@ -762,9 +763,10 @@ copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 	might_fault();
 
 	/* See the comment in copy_from_user() above. */
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+		check_object_size(from, n, true);
 		n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n);
-	else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+	} else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		copy_to_user_overflow();
 	else
 		__copy_to_user_overflow(sz, n);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
index 4b32da24faaf..7d3bdd1ed697 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero
 static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
 __copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
+	check_object_size(from, n, true);
 	return __copy_to_user_ll(to, from, n);
 }
 
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long
 __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
 	might_fault();
+	check_object_size(to, n, false);
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(n)) {
 		unsigned long ret;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index 2eac2aa3e37f..673059a109fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	check_object_size(dst, size, false);
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
 		return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size);
 	switch (size) {
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ int __copy_to_user_nocheck(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned size)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	check_object_size(src, size, true);
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
 		return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst, src, size);
 	switch (size) {
-- 
2.7.4

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Wed,  6 Jul 2016 15:25:21 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1467843928-29351-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467843928-29351-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on x86. This is done both in
copy_*_user() and __copy_*_user() because copy_*_user() actually calls
down to _copy_*_user() and not __copy_*_user().

Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 0a7b885964ba..2a66b73a996d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -80,11 +80,13 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE		if SLUB
 	select HAVE_AOUT			if X86_32
 	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+	select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
 	select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP		if X86_64 || X86_PAE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN			if X86_64 && SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK
+	select HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING	if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS		if MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS	if MMU && COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2982387ba817..aa9cc58409c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -742,9 +742,10 @@ copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	 * case, and do only runtime checking for non-constant sizes.
 	 */
 
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+		check_object_size(to, n, false);
 		n = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
-	else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+	} else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		copy_from_user_overflow();
 	else
 		__copy_from_user_overflow(sz, n);
@@ -762,9 +763,10 @@ copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 	might_fault();
 
 	/* See the comment in copy_from_user() above. */
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+		check_object_size(from, n, true);
 		n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n);
-	else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+	} else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		copy_to_user_overflow();
 	else
 		__copy_to_user_overflow(sz, n);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
index 4b32da24faaf..7d3bdd1ed697 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero
 static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
 __copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
+	check_object_size(from, n, true);
 	return __copy_to_user_ll(to, from, n);
 }
 
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long
 __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
 	might_fault();
+	check_object_size(to, n, false);
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(n)) {
 		unsigned long ret;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index 2eac2aa3e37f..673059a109fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	check_object_size(dst, size, false);
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
 		return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size);
 	switch (size) {
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ int __copy_to_user_nocheck(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned size)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	check_object_size(src, size, true);
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
 		return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst, src, size);
 	switch (size) {
-- 
2.7.4

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Wed,  6 Jul 2016 15:25:21 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1467843928-29351-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467843928-29351-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on x86. This is done both in
copy_*_user() and __copy_*_user() because copy_*_user() actually calls
down to _copy_*_user() and not __copy_*_user().

Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 0a7b885964ba..2a66b73a996d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -80,11 +80,13 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE		if SLUB
 	select HAVE_AOUT			if X86_32
 	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+	select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
 	select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP		if X86_64 || X86_PAE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN			if X86_64 && SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK
+	select HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING	if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS		if MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS	if MMU && COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2982387ba817..aa9cc58409c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -742,9 +742,10 @@ copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	 * case, and do only runtime checking for non-constant sizes.
 	 */
 
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+		check_object_size(to, n, false);
 		n = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
-	else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+	} else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		copy_from_user_overflow();
 	else
 		__copy_from_user_overflow(sz, n);
@@ -762,9 +763,10 @@ copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 	might_fault();
 
 	/* See the comment in copy_from_user() above. */
-	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+	if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+		check_object_size(from, n, true);
 		n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n);
-	else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+	} else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		copy_to_user_overflow();
 	else
 		__copy_to_user_overflow(sz, n);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
index 4b32da24faaf..7d3bdd1ed697 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero
 static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
 __copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
+	check_object_size(from, n, true);
 	return __copy_to_user_ll(to, from, n);
 }
 
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long
 __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
 	might_fault();
+	check_object_size(to, n, false);
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(n)) {
 		unsigned long ret;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index 2eac2aa3e37f..673059a109fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	check_object_size(dst, size, false);
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
 		return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size);
 	switch (size) {
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ int __copy_to_user_nocheck(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned size)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	check_object_size(src, size, true);
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
 		return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst, src, size);
 	switch (size) {
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-07-06 22:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 366+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-06 22:25 [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 1/9] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07  5:37   ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` [kernel-hardening] " Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 17:25     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:35       ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` [kernel-hardening] " Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  7:42   ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 17:29     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 19:34       ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  8:01   ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 17:37     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34         ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34         ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  9:22       ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 16:19   ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35   ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35     ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 17:41     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 3/9] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 10:07   ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 17:19     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 5/9] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 6/9] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 7/9] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 8/9] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35     ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
     [not found]   ` <577ddc18.d351190a.1fa54.ffffbe79SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-07 18:56     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 13:45         ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:07           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:20             ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 17:41               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
     [not found]                   ` <57809299.84b3370a.5390c.ffff9e58SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-09  6:17                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 17:07                       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11  6:08                   ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19         ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  7:30 ` [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 17:27   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08  8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 16:19   ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 18:23     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  2:22 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:22   ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:22   ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:22   ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:44   ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  2:44     ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  2:44     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  2:44     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  2:44     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  7:55     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  8:25   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 12:58     ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 12:58       ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 12:58       ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 17:03     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 23:16   ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-10  9:16     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 12:03       ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:38         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 18:40           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-12 18:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-12 18:44   ` Kees Cook

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