From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
Case y Sc hauf ler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Sat, 9 Jul 2016 10:07:34 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJhnTDDhun6U9rV8H9YzuiTcqSD035Uvdv3MXB+S-LtsA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <24451.1468045037@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 11:17 PM, <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> wrote:
> Yeah, 'ping' dies with a similar traceback going to rawv6_setsockopt(),
> and 'trinity' dies a horrid death during initialization because it creates
> some sctp sockets to fool around with. The problem in all these cases is that
> setsockopt uses copy_from_user() to pull in the option value, and the allocation
> isn't tagged with USERCOPY to whitelist it.
Just a note to clear up confusion: this series doesn't include the
whitelist protection, so this appears to be either bugs in the slub
checker or bugs in the code using the cfq_io_cq cache. I suspect the
former. :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Sat, 9 Jul 2016 10:07:34 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJhnTDDhun6U9rV8H9YzuiTcqSD035Uvdv3MXB+S-LtsA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <24451.1468045037@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 11:17 PM, <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> wrote:
> Yeah, 'ping' dies with a similar traceback going to rawv6_setsockopt(),
> and 'trinity' dies a horrid death during initialization because it creates
> some sctp sockets to fool around with. The problem in all these cases is that
> setsockopt uses copy_from_user() to pull in the option value, and the allocation
> isn't tagged with USERCOPY to whitelist it.
Just a note to clear up confusion: this series doesn't include the
whitelist protection, so this appears to be either bugs in the slub
checker or bugs in the code using the cfq_io_cq cache. I suspect the
former. :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
Case y Sc hauf ler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Sat, 09 Jul 2016 17:07:34 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJhnTDDhun6U9rV8H9YzuiTcqSD035Uvdv3MXB+S-LtsA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <24451.1468045037@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 11:17 PM, <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> wrote:
> Yeah, 'ping' dies with a similar traceback going to rawv6_setsockopt(),
> and 'trinity' dies a horrid death during initialization because it creates
> some sctp sockets to fool around with. The problem in all these cases is that
> setsockopt uses copy_from_user() to pull in the option value, and the allocation
> isn't tagged with USERCOPY to whitelist it.
Just a note to clear up confusion: this series doesn't include the
whitelist protection, so this appears to be either bugs in the slub
checker or bugs in the code using the cfq_io_cq cache. I suspect the
former. :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
Case y Sc hauf ler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Sat, 9 Jul 2016 10:07:34 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJhnTDDhun6U9rV8H9YzuiTcqSD035Uvdv3MXB+S-LtsA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <24451.1468045037@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 11:17 PM, <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> wrote:
> Yeah, 'ping' dies with a similar traceback going to rawv6_setsockopt(),
> and 'trinity' dies a horrid death during initialization because it creates
> some sctp sockets to fool around with. The problem in all these cases is that
> setsockopt uses copy_from_user() to pull in the option value, and the allocation
> isn't tagged with USERCOPY to whitelist it.
Just a note to clear up confusion: this series doesn't include the
whitelist protection, so this appears to be either bugs in the slub
checker or bugs in the code using the cfq_io_cq cache. I suspect the
former. :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Sat, 9 Jul 2016 10:07:34 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJhnTDDhun6U9rV8H9YzuiTcqSD035Uvdv3MXB+S-LtsA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <24451.1468045037@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 11:17 PM, <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> wrote:
> Yeah, 'ping' dies with a similar traceback going to rawv6_setsockopt(),
> and 'trinity' dies a horrid death during initialization because it creates
> some sctp sockets to fool around with. The problem in all these cases is that
> setsockopt uses copy_from_user() to pull in the option value, and the allocation
> isn't tagged with USERCOPY to whitelist it.
Just a note to clear up confusion: this series doesn't include the
whitelist protection, so this appears to be either bugs in the slub
checker or bugs in the code using the cfq_io_cq cache. I suspect the
former. :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-09 17:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 366+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-06 22:25 [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 1/9] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 5:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 7:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 8:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 5:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08 9:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 3/9] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 5/9] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 6/9] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 7/9] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 8/9] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 4:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
[not found] ` <577ddc18.d351190a.1fa54.ffffbe79SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-07 18:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 17:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
[not found] ` <57809299.84b3370a.5390c.ffff9e58SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-09 6:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu
2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 7:30 ` [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 7:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 8:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 2:22 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 2:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 2:22 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 2:22 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09 2:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 12:58 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 12:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 12:58 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 9:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-12 18:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-12 18:44 ` Kees Cook
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