From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>, lin ux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support Date: Thu, 07 Jul 2016 14:35:17 +1000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <87oa6aysje.fsf@@concordia.ellerman.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1467843928-29351-10-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> writes: > Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the > SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. > > Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c > index 825ff4505336..0c8ace04f075 100644 > --- a/mm/slub.c > +++ b/mm/slub.c > @@ -3614,6 +3614,33 @@ void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) > EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_node); > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY > +/* > + * Rejects objects that are incorrectly sized. > + * > + * Returns NULL if check passes, otherwise const char * to name of cache > + * to indicate an error. > + */ > +const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, > + struct page *page) > +{ > + struct kmem_cache *s; > + unsigned long offset; > + > + /* Find object. */ > + s = page->slab_cache; > + > + /* Find offset within object. */ > + offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size; > + > + /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */ > + if (offset <= s->object_size && n <= s->object_size - offset) > + return NULL; > + > + return s->name; > +} I gave this a quick spin on powerpc, it blew up immediately :) Brought up 16 CPUs usercopy: kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to c0000001fe023868 (kmalloc-16) (9 bytes) CPU: 8 PID: 103 Comm: kdevtmpfs Not tainted 4.7.0-rc3-00098-g09d9556ae5d1 #55 Call Trace: [c0000001fa0cfb40] [c0000000009bdbe8] dump_stack+0xb0/0xf0 (unreliable) [c0000001fa0cfb80] [c00000000029cf44] __check_object_size+0x74/0x320 [c0000001fa0cfc00] [c00000000005d4d0] copy_from_user+0x60/0xd4 [c0000001fa0cfc40] [c00000000022b6cc] memdup_user+0x5c/0xf0 [c0000001fa0cfc80] [c00000000022b90c] strndup_user+0x7c/0x110 [c0000001fa0cfcc0] [c0000000002d6c28] SyS_mount+0x58/0x180 [c0000001fa0cfd10] [c0000000005ee908] devtmpfsd+0x98/0x210 [c0000001fa0cfd80] [c0000000000df810] kthread+0x110/0x130 [c0000001fa0cfe30] [c0000000000095e8] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x74 SLUB tracing says: TRACE kmalloc-16 alloc 0xc0000001fe023868 inuse=186 fp=0x (null) Which is not 16-byte aligned, which seems to be caused by the red zone? The following patch fixes it for me, but I don't know SLUB enough to say if it's always correct. diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index 0c8ace04f075..66191ea4545a 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -3630,6 +3630,9 @@ const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, /* Find object. */ s = page->slab_cache; + /* Subtract red zone if enabled */ + ptr = restore_red_left(s, ptr); + /* Find offset within object. */ offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size; cheers
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>, lin ux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support Date: Thu, 07 Jul 2016 14:35:17 +1000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <87oa6aysje.fsf@@concordia.ellerman.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1467843928-29351-10-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> writes: > Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the > SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. > > Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c > index 825ff4505336..0c8ace04f075 100644 > --- a/mm/slub.c > +++ b/mm/slub.c > @@ -3614,6 +3614,33 @@ void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) > EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_node); > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY > +/* > + * Rejects objects that are incorrectly sized. > + * > + * Returns NULL if check passes, otherwise const char * to name of cache > + * to indicate an error. > + */ > +const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, > + struct page *page) > +{ > + struct kmem_cache *s; > + unsigned long offset; > + > + /* Find object. */ > + s = page->slab_cache; > + > + /* Find offset within object. */ > + offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size; > + > + /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */ > + if (offset <= s->object_size && n <= s->object_size - offset) > + return NULL; > + > + return s->name; > +} I gave this a quick spin on powerpc, it blew up immediately :) Brought up 16 CPUs usercopy: kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to c0000001fe023868 (kmalloc-16) (9 bytes) CPU: 8 PID: 103 Comm: kdevtmpfs Not tainted 4.7.0-rc3-00098-g09d9556ae5d1 #55 Call Trace: [c0000001fa0cfb40] [c0000000009bdbe8] dump_stack+0xb0/0xf0 (unreliable) [c0000001fa0cfb80] [c00000000029cf44] __check_object_size+0x74/0x320 [c0000001fa0cfc00] [c00000000005d4d0] copy_from_user+0x60/0xd4 [c0000001fa0cfc40] [c00000000022b6cc] memdup_user+0x5c/0xf0 [c0000001fa0cfc80] [c00000000022b90c] strndup_user+0x7c/0x110 [c0000001fa0cfcc0] [c0000000002d6c28] SyS_mount+0x58/0x180 [c0000001fa0cfd10] [c0000000005ee908] devtmpfsd+0x98/0x210 [c0000001fa0cfd80] [c0000000000df810] kthread+0x110/0x130 [c0000001fa0cfe30] [c0000000000095e8] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x74 SLUB tracing says: TRACE kmalloc-16 alloc 0xc0000001fe023868 inuse=186 fp=0x (null) Which is not 16-byte aligned, which seems to be caused by the red zone? The following patch fixes it for me, but I don't know SLUB enough to say if it's always correct. diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index 0c8ace04f075..66191ea4545a 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -3630,6 +3630,9 @@ const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, /* Find object. */ s = page->slab_cache; + /* Subtract red zone if enabled */ + ptr = restore_red_left(s, ptr); + /* Find offset within object. */ offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size; cheers
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-07 4:35 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 366+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-07-06 22:25 [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 1/9] " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 5:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 18:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach 2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 7:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 19:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-07 8:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 5:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-08 9:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann 2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-07 16:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel 2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-07 16:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel 2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 3/9] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland 2016-07-07 10:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland 2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland 2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland 2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland 2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland 2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 5/9] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 6/9] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 7/9] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 8/9] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman [this message] 2016-07-07 4:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman 2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman [not found] ` <577ddc18.d351190a.1fa54.ffffbe79SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2016-07-07 18:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-07 18:56 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 18:56 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 18:56 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 18:56 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter 2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter 2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter 2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter 2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter 2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter 2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter 2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter 2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter 2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter 2016-07-08 17:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 5:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman [not found] ` <57809299.84b3370a.5390c.ffff9e58SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2016-07-09 6:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks 2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu 2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks 2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks 2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks 2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks 2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim 2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim 2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim 2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim 2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim 2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim 2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 10:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman 2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-07 7:30 ` [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Christian Borntraeger 2016-07-07 7:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger 2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger 2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger 2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger 2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger 2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-08 8:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar 2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-07-08 16:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-08 18:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar 2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-09 2:22 ` Laura Abbott 2016-07-09 2:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott 2016-07-09 2:22 ` Laura Abbott 2016-07-09 2:22 ` Laura Abbott 2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-09 2:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel 2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-09 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar 2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-07-09 8:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel 2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-07-09 12:58 ` Laura Abbott 2016-07-09 12:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott 2016-07-09 12:58 ` Laura Abbott 2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-09 21:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team 2016-07-09 23:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team 2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team 2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team 2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team 2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team 2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team 2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team 2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-10 9:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar 2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar 2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team 2016-07-10 12:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team 2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team 2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team 2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team 2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team 2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team 2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team 2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-10 12:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-12 18:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks 2016-07-12 18:44 ` Kees Cook
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