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From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Case y Schauf ler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" 
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 15:08:29 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160711060829.GB14107@js1304-P5Q-DELUXE> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKxw3RxWNKLX4XVCwJ6x_zA=_RwiU9jLDm2+VRO79G7+w@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 04:48:38PM -0400, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 12:20 PM, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> wrote:
> >> On Fri, 8 Jul 2016, Kees Cook wrote:
> >>
> >>> Is check_valid_pointer() making sure the pointer is within the usable
> >>> size? It seemed like it was checking that it was within the slub
> >>> object (checks against s->size, wants it above base after moving
> >>> pointer to include redzone, etc).
> >>
> >> check_valid_pointer verifies that a pointer is pointing to the start of an
> >> object. It is used to verify the internal points that SLUB used and
> >> should not be modified to do anything different.
> >
> > Yup, no worries -- I won't touch it. :) I just wanted to verify my
> > understanding.
> >
> > And after playing a bit more, I see that the only thing to the left is
> > padding and redzone. SLUB layout, from what I saw:
> >
> > offset: what's there
> > -------
> > start: padding, redzone
> > red_left_pad: object itself
> > inuse: rest of metadata
> > size: start of next slub object
> >
> > (and object_size == inuse - red_left_pad)
> >
> > i.e. a pointer must be between red_left_pad and inuse, which is the
> > same as pointer - ref_left_pad being less than object_size.
> >
> > So, as found already, the position in the usercopy check needs to be
> > bumped down by red_left_pad, which is what Michael's fix does, so I'll
> > include it in the next version.
> 
> Actually, after some offline chats, I think this is better, since it
> makes sure the ptr doesn't end up somewhere weird before we start the
> calculations. This leaves the pointer as-is, but explicitly handles
> the redzone on the offset instead, with no wrapping, etc:
> 
>         /* Find offset within object. */
>         offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
> 
> +       /* Adjust for redzone and reject if within the redzone. */
> +       if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
> +               if (offset < s->red_left_pad)
> +                       return s->name;
> +               offset -= s->red_left_pad;
> +       }
> +
>         /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */
>         if (offset <= s->object_size && n <= s->object_size - offset)
>                 return NULL;
> 

As Christoph saids, please use slab_ksize() rather than
s->object_size.

Otherwise, looks good to me.

Thanks.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	Brad
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 15:08:29 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160711060829.GB14107@js1304-P5Q-DELUXE> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKxw3RxWNKLX4XVCwJ6x_zA=_RwiU9jLDm2+VRO79G7+w@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 04:48:38PM -0400, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 12:20 PM, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> wrote:
> >> On Fri, 8 Jul 2016, Kees Cook wrote:
> >>
> >>> Is check_valid_pointer() making sure the pointer is within the usable
> >>> size? It seemed like it was checking that it was within the slub
> >>> object (checks against s->size, wants it above base after moving
> >>> pointer to include redzone, etc).
> >>
> >> check_valid_pointer verifies that a pointer is pointing to the start of an
> >> object. It is used to verify the internal points that SLUB used and
> >> should not be modified to do anything different.
> >
> > Yup, no worries -- I won't touch it. :) I just wanted to verify my
> > understanding.
> >
> > And after playing a bit more, I see that the only thing to the left is
> > padding and redzone. SLUB layout, from what I saw:
> >
> > offset: what's there
> > -------
> > start: padding, redzone
> > red_left_pad: object itself
> > inuse: rest of metadata
> > size: start of next slub object
> >
> > (and object_size == inuse - red_left_pad)
> >
> > i.e. a pointer must be between red_left_pad and inuse, which is the
> > same as pointer - ref_left_pad being less than object_size.
> >
> > So, as found already, the position in the usercopy check needs to be
> > bumped down by red_left_pad, which is what Michael's fix does, so I'll
> > include it in the next version.
> 
> Actually, after some offline chats, I think this is better, since it
> makes sure the ptr doesn't end up somewhere weird before we start the
> calculations. This leaves the pointer as-is, but explicitly handles
> the redzone on the offset instead, with no wrapping, etc:
> 
>         /* Find offset within object. */
>         offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
> 
> +       /* Adjust for redzone and reject if within the redzone. */
> +       if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
> +               if (offset < s->red_left_pad)
> +                       return s->name;
> +               offset -= s->red_left_pad;
> +       }
> +
>         /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */
>         if (offset <= s->object_size && n <= s->object_size - offset)
>                 return NULL;
> 

As Christoph saids, please use slab_ksize() rather than
s->object_size.

Otherwise, looks good to me.

Thanks.


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Case y Schauf ler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 06:08:29 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160711060829.GB14107@js1304-P5Q-DELUXE> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKxw3RxWNKLX4XVCwJ6x_zA=_RwiU9jLDm2+VRO79G7+w@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 04:48:38PM -0400, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 12:20 PM, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> wrote:
> >> On Fri, 8 Jul 2016, Kees Cook wrote:
> >>
> >>> Is check_valid_pointer() making sure the pointer is within the usable
> >>> size? It seemed like it was checking that it was within the slub
> >>> object (checks against s->size, wants it above base after moving
> >>> pointer to include redzone, etc).
> >>
> >> check_valid_pointer verifies that a pointer is pointing to the start of an
> >> object. It is used to verify the internal points that SLUB used and
> >> should not be modified to do anything different.
> >
> > Yup, no worries -- I won't touch it. :) I just wanted to verify my
> > understanding.
> >
> > And after playing a bit more, I see that the only thing to the left is
> > padding and redzone. SLUB layout, from what I saw:
> >
> > offset: what's there
> > -------
> > start: padding, redzone
> > red_left_pad: object itself
> > inuse: rest of metadata
> > size: start of next slub object
> >
> > (and object_size = inuse - red_left_pad)
> >
> > i.e. a pointer must be between red_left_pad and inuse, which is the
> > same as pointer - ref_left_pad being less than object_size.
> >
> > So, as found already, the position in the usercopy check needs to be
> > bumped down by red_left_pad, which is what Michael's fix does, so I'll
> > include it in the next version.
> 
> Actually, after some offline chats, I think this is better, since it
> makes sure the ptr doesn't end up somewhere weird before we start the
> calculations. This leaves the pointer as-is, but explicitly handles
> the redzone on the offset instead, with no wrapping, etc:
> 
>         /* Find offset within object. */
>         offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
> 
> +       /* Adjust for redzone and reject if within the redzone. */
> +       if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
> +               if (offset < s->red_left_pad)
> +                       return s->name;
> +               offset -= s->red_left_pad;
> +       }
> +
>         /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */
>         if (offset <= s->object_size && n <= s->object_size - offset)
>                 return NULL;
> 

As Christoph saids, please use slab_ksize() rather than
s->object_size.

Otherwise, looks good to me.

Thanks.


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Case y Schauf ler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 15:08:29 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160711060829.GB14107@js1304-P5Q-DELUXE> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKxw3RxWNKLX4XVCwJ6x_zA=_RwiU9jLDm2+VRO79G7+w@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 04:48:38PM -0400, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 12:20 PM, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> wrote:
> >> On Fri, 8 Jul 2016, Kees Cook wrote:
> >>
> >>> Is check_valid_pointer() making sure the pointer is within the usable
> >>> size? It seemed like it was checking that it was within the slub
> >>> object (checks against s->size, wants it above base after moving
> >>> pointer to include redzone, etc).
> >>
> >> check_valid_pointer verifies that a pointer is pointing to the start of an
> >> object. It is used to verify the internal points that SLUB used and
> >> should not be modified to do anything different.
> >
> > Yup, no worries -- I won't touch it. :) I just wanted to verify my
> > understanding.
> >
> > And after playing a bit more, I see that the only thing to the left is
> > padding and redzone. SLUB layout, from what I saw:
> >
> > offset: what's there
> > -------
> > start: padding, redzone
> > red_left_pad: object itself
> > inuse: rest of metadata
> > size: start of next slub object
> >
> > (and object_size == inuse - red_left_pad)
> >
> > i.e. a pointer must be between red_left_pad and inuse, which is the
> > same as pointer - ref_left_pad being less than object_size.
> >
> > So, as found already, the position in the usercopy check needs to be
> > bumped down by red_left_pad, which is what Michael's fix does, so I'll
> > include it in the next version.
> 
> Actually, after some offline chats, I think this is better, since it
> makes sure the ptr doesn't end up somewhere weird before we start the
> calculations. This leaves the pointer as-is, but explicitly handles
> the redzone on the offset instead, with no wrapping, etc:
> 
>         /* Find offset within object. */
>         offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
> 
> +       /* Adjust for redzone and reject if within the redzone. */
> +       if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
> +               if (offset < s->red_left_pad)
> +                       return s->name;
> +               offset -= s->red_left_pad;
> +       }
> +
>         /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */
>         if (offset <= s->object_size && n <= s->object_size - offset)
>                 return NULL;
> 

As Christoph saids, please use slab_ksize() rather than
s->object_size.

Otherwise, looks good to me.

Thanks.

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com (Joonsoo Kim)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 15:08:29 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160711060829.GB14107@js1304-P5Q-DELUXE> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKxw3RxWNKLX4XVCwJ6x_zA=_RwiU9jLDm2+VRO79G7+w@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 04:48:38PM -0400, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 12:20 PM, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> wrote:
> >> On Fri, 8 Jul 2016, Kees Cook wrote:
> >>
> >>> Is check_valid_pointer() making sure the pointer is within the usable
> >>> size? It seemed like it was checking that it was within the slub
> >>> object (checks against s->size, wants it above base after moving
> >>> pointer to include redzone, etc).
> >>
> >> check_valid_pointer verifies that a pointer is pointing to the start of an
> >> object. It is used to verify the internal points that SLUB used and
> >> should not be modified to do anything different.
> >
> > Yup, no worries -- I won't touch it. :) I just wanted to verify my
> > understanding.
> >
> > And after playing a bit more, I see that the only thing to the left is
> > padding and redzone. SLUB layout, from what I saw:
> >
> > offset: what's there
> > -------
> > start: padding, redzone
> > red_left_pad: object itself
> > inuse: rest of metadata
> > size: start of next slub object
> >
> > (and object_size == inuse - red_left_pad)
> >
> > i.e. a pointer must be between red_left_pad and inuse, which is the
> > same as pointer - ref_left_pad being less than object_size.
> >
> > So, as found already, the position in the usercopy check needs to be
> > bumped down by red_left_pad, which is what Michael's fix does, so I'll
> > include it in the next version.
> 
> Actually, after some offline chats, I think this is better, since it
> makes sure the ptr doesn't end up somewhere weird before we start the
> calculations. This leaves the pointer as-is, but explicitly handles
> the redzone on the offset instead, with no wrapping, etc:
> 
>         /* Find offset within object. */
>         offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
> 
> +       /* Adjust for redzone and reject if within the redzone. */
> +       if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
> +               if (offset < s->red_left_pad)
> +                       return s->name;
> +               offset -= s->red_left_pad;
> +       }
> +
>         /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */
>         if (offset <= s->object_size && n <= s->object_size - offset)
>                 return NULL;
> 

As Christoph saids, please use slab_ksize() rather than
s->object_size.

Otherwise, looks good to me.

Thanks.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-07-11  6:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 366+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-06 22:25 [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 1/9] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07  5:37   ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` [kernel-hardening] " Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 17:25     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:35       ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` [kernel-hardening] " Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  7:42   ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 17:29     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 19:34       ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  8:01   ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 17:37     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34         ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34         ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  9:22       ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 16:19   ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35   ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35     ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 17:41     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 3/9] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 10:07   ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 17:19     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 5/9] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 6/9] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 7/9] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 8/9] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35     ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
     [not found]   ` <577ddc18.d351190a.1fa54.ffffbe79SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-07 18:56     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 13:45         ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:07           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:20             ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 17:41               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
     [not found]                   ` <57809299.84b3370a.5390c.ffff9e58SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-09  6:17                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 17:07                       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11  6:08                   ` Joonsoo Kim [this message]
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19         ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  7:30 ` [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 17:27   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08  8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 16:19   ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 18:23     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  2:22 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:22   ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:22   ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:22   ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:44   ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  2:44     ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  2:44     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  2:44     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  2:44     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  7:55     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  8:25   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 12:58     ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 12:58       ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 12:58       ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 17:03     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 23:16   ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-10  9:16     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 12:03       ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:38         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 18:40           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-12 18:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-12 18:44   ` Kees Cook

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