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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" 
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2016 13:19:26 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLeH2KL+FVi7mxBF5oH2-zMfwSY=2ReJOL4JYsQuJKy6Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160707100717.GB8306@leverpostej>

On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 6:07 AM, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Wed, Jul 06, 2016 at 03:25:23PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on arm64. As done by KASAN in -next,
>> renames the low-level functions to __arch_copy_*_user() so a static inline
>> can do additional work before the copy.
>
> The checks themselves look fine, but as with the KASAN checks, it seems
> a shame that this logic is duplicated per arch, integrated in subtly
> different ways.
>
> Can we not __arch prefix all the arch uaccess helpers, and place
> kasan_check_*() and check_object_size() calls in generic wrappers?
>
> If we're going to update all the arch uaccess helpers anyway, doing that
> would make it easier to fix things up, or to add new checks in future.

Yeah, I totally agree, and my work on the next step of this hardening
will require something like this to separate the "check" logic from
the "copy" logic, as I want to introduce a set of constant-sized
copy_*_user helpers.

Though currently x86 poses a weird problem in this regard (they have
separate code paths for copy_* and __copy*, but I think it's actually
a harmless(?) mistake.

For now, I'd like to leave this as-is, and then do the copy_* cleanup,
then do step 2 (slab whitelisting).

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2016 13:19:26 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLeH2KL+FVi7mxBF5oH2-zMfwSY=2ReJOL4JYsQuJKy6Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160707100717.GB8306@leverpostej>

On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 6:07 AM, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Wed, Jul 06, 2016 at 03:25:23PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on arm64. As done by KASAN in -next,
>> renames the low-level functions to __arch_copy_*_user() so a static inline
>> can do additional work before the copy.
>
> The checks themselves look fine, but as with the KASAN checks, it seems
> a shame that this logic is duplicated per arch, integrated in subtly
> different ways.
>
> Can we not __arch prefix all the arch uaccess helpers, and place
> kasan_check_*() and check_object_size() calls in generic wrappers?
>
> If we're going to update all the arch uaccess helpers anyway, doing that
> would make it easier to fix things up, or to add new checks in future.

Yeah, I totally agree, and my work on the next step of this hardening
will require something like this to separate the "check" logic from
the "copy" logic, as I want to introduce a set of constant-sized
copy_*_user helpers.

Though currently x86 poses a weird problem in this regard (they have
separate code paths for copy_* and __copy*, but I think it's actually
a harmless(?) mistake.

For now, I'd like to leave this as-is, and then do the copy_* cleanup,
then do step 2 (slab whitelisting).

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 07 Jul 2016 17:19:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLeH2KL+FVi7mxBF5oH2-zMfwSY=2ReJOL4JYsQuJKy6Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160707100717.GB8306@leverpostej>

On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 6:07 AM, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Wed, Jul 06, 2016 at 03:25:23PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on arm64. As done by KASAN in -next,
>> renames the low-level functions to __arch_copy_*_user() so a static inline
>> can do additional work before the copy.
>
> The checks themselves look fine, but as with the KASAN checks, it seems
> a shame that this logic is duplicated per arch, integrated in subtly
> different ways.
>
> Can we not __arch prefix all the arch uaccess helpers, and place
> kasan_check_*() and check_object_size() calls in generic wrappers?
>
> If we're going to update all the arch uaccess helpers anyway, doing that
> would make it easier to fix things up, or to add new checks in future.

Yeah, I totally agree, and my work on the next step of this hardening
will require something like this to separate the "check" logic from
the "copy" logic, as I want to introduce a set of constant-sized
copy_*_user helpers.

Though currently x86 poses a weird problem in this regard (they have
separate code paths for copy_* and __copy*, but I think it's actually
a harmless(?) mistake.

For now, I'd like to leave this as-is, and then do the copy_* cleanup,
then do step 2 (slab whitelisting).

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2016 13:19:26 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLeH2KL+FVi7mxBF5oH2-zMfwSY=2ReJOL4JYsQuJKy6Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160707100717.GB8306@leverpostej>

On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 6:07 AM, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Wed, Jul 06, 2016 at 03:25:23PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on arm64. As done by KASAN in -next,
>> renames the low-level functions to __arch_copy_*_user() so a static inline
>> can do additional work before the copy.
>
> The checks themselves look fine, but as with the KASAN checks, it seems
> a shame that this logic is duplicated per arch, integrated in subtly
> different ways.
>
> Can we not __arch prefix all the arch uaccess helpers, and place
> kasan_check_*() and check_object_size() calls in generic wrappers?
>
> If we're going to update all the arch uaccess helpers anyway, doing that
> would make it easier to fix things up, or to add new checks in future.

Yeah, I totally agree, and my work on the next step of this hardening
will require something like this to separate the "check" logic from
the "copy" logic, as I want to introduce a set of constant-sized
copy_*_user helpers.

Though currently x86 poses a weird problem in this regard (they have
separate code paths for copy_* and __copy*, but I think it's actually
a harmless(?) mistake.

For now, I'd like to leave this as-is, and then do the copy_* cleanup,
then do step 2 (slab whitelisting).

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2016 13:19:26 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLeH2KL+FVi7mxBF5oH2-zMfwSY=2ReJOL4JYsQuJKy6Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160707100717.GB8306@leverpostej>

On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 6:07 AM, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Wed, Jul 06, 2016 at 03:25:23PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on arm64. As done by KASAN in -next,
>> renames the low-level functions to __arch_copy_*_user() so a static inline
>> can do additional work before the copy.
>
> The checks themselves look fine, but as with the KASAN checks, it seems
> a shame that this logic is duplicated per arch, integrated in subtly
> different ways.
>
> Can we not __arch prefix all the arch uaccess helpers, and place
> kasan_check_*() and check_object_size() calls in generic wrappers?
>
> If we're going to update all the arch uaccess helpers anyway, doing that
> would make it easier to fix things up, or to add new checks in future.

Yeah, I totally agree, and my work on the next step of this hardening
will require something like this to separate the "check" logic from
the "copy" logic, as I want to introduce a set of constant-sized
copy_*_user helpers.

Though currently x86 poses a weird problem in this regard (they have
separate code paths for copy_* and __copy*, but I think it's actually
a harmless(?) mistake.

For now, I'd like to leave this as-is, and then do the copy_* cleanup,
then do step 2 (slab whitelisting).

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2016 13:19:26 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLeH2KL+FVi7mxBF5oH2-zMfwSY=2ReJOL4JYsQuJKy6Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160707100717.GB8306@leverpostej>

On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 6:07 AM, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Wed, Jul 06, 2016 at 03:25:23PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on arm64. As done by KASAN in -next,
>> renames the low-level functions to __arch_copy_*_user() so a static inline
>> can do additional work before the copy.
>
> The checks themselves look fine, but as with the KASAN checks, it seems
> a shame that this logic is duplicated per arch, integrated in subtly
> different ways.
>
> Can we not __arch prefix all the arch uaccess helpers, and place
> kasan_check_*() and check_object_size() calls in generic wrappers?
>
> If we're going to update all the arch uaccess helpers anyway, doing that
> would make it easier to fix things up, or to add new checks in future.

Yeah, I totally agree, and my work on the next step of this hardening
will require something like this to separate the "check" logic from
the "copy" logic, as I want to introduce a set of constant-sized
copy_*_user helpers.

Though currently x86 poses a weird problem in this regard (they have
separate code paths for copy_* and __copy*, but I think it's actually
a harmless(?) mistake.

For now, I'd like to leave this as-is, and then do the copy_* cleanup,
then do step 2 (slab whitelisting).

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

  reply	other threads:[~2016-07-07 17:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 366+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-06 22:25 [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 1/9] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07  5:37   ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` [kernel-hardening] " Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  5:37     ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 17:25     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:35       ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` [kernel-hardening] " Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35         ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07  7:42   ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 17:29     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 19:34       ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07  8:01   ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07  8:01     ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 17:37     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34         ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34         ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  5:34       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08  9:22       ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08  9:22         ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 16:19   ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35   ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35     ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 17:41     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 3/9] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 10:07   ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07     ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 17:19     ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-07-07 17:19       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 5/9] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 6/9] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 7/9] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 8/9] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35     ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  4:35   ` Michael Ellerman
     [not found]   ` <577ddc18.d351190a.1fa54.ffffbe79SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-07 18:56     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 13:45         ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:07           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:20             ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 17:41               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48                   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  5:58                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09  6:07                     ` Michael Ellerman
     [not found]                   ` <57809299.84b3370a.5390c.ffff9e58SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-09  6:17                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09  6:17                       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 17:07                       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07                         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11  6:08                   ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11  6:08                     ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19       ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19         ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07  7:30 ` [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07  7:30   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 17:27   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08  8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08  8:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 16:19   ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 18:23     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  2:22 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:22   ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:22   ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:22   ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09  2:44   ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  2:44     ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  2:44     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  2:44     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  2:44     ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09  7:55     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  7:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09  8:25   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09  8:25     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 12:58     ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 12:58       ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 12:58       ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 17:03     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 23:16   ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16     ` PaX Team
2016-07-10  9:16     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10  9:16       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 12:03       ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03         ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:38         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 18:40           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-12 18:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-12 18:44   ` Kees Cook

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