From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2016 13:41:30 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+zxyPEfswD-03TDhuzxaG6itKsoc6-15rMuE+Sz3booA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467909317.13253.17.camel@redhat.com>
On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 12:35 PM, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-07-06 at 15:25 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> + /* Allow kernel rodata region (if not marked as Reserved).
>> */
>> + if (ptr >= (const void *)__start_rodata &&
>> + end <= (const void *)__end_rodata)
>> + return NULL;
>>
> One comment here.
>
> __check_object_size gets "to_user" as an argument.
>
> It may make sense to pass that to check_heap_object, and
> only allow copy_to_user from rodata, never copy_from_user,
> since that section should be read only.
Well, that's two votes for this extra check, but I'm still not sure
since it may already be allowed by the Reserved check, but I can
reorder things to _reject_ on rodata writes before the Reserved check,
etc.
I'll see what could work here...
-Kees
>
>> +void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool
>> to_user)
>> +{
>>
>
> --
>
> All Rights Reversed.
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>And
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2016 13:41:30 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+zxyPEfswD-03TDhuzxaG6itKsoc6-15rMuE+Sz3booA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467909317.13253.17.camel@redhat.com>
On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 12:35 PM, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-07-06 at 15:25 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> + /* Allow kernel rodata region (if not marked as Reserved).
>> */
>> + if (ptr >= (const void *)__start_rodata &&
>> + end <= (const void *)__end_rodata)
>> + return NULL;
>>
> One comment here.
>
> __check_object_size gets "to_user" as an argument.
>
> It may make sense to pass that to check_heap_object, and
> only allow copy_to_user from rodata, never copy_from_user,
> since that section should be read only.
Well, that's two votes for this extra check, but I'm still not sure
since it may already be allowed by the Reserved check, but I can
reorder things to _reject_ on rodata writes before the Reserved check,
etc.
I'll see what could work here...
-Kees
>
>> +void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool
>> to_user)
>> +{
>>
>
> --
>
> All Rights Reversed.
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 07 Jul 2016 17:41:30 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+zxyPEfswD-03TDhuzxaG6itKsoc6-15rMuE+Sz3booA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467909317.13253.17.camel@redhat.com>
On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 12:35 PM, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-07-06 at 15:25 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> + /* Allow kernel rodata region (if not marked as Reserved).
>> */
>> + if (ptr >= (const void *)__start_rodata &&
>> + end <= (const void *)__end_rodata)
>> + return NULL;
>>
> One comment here.
>
> __check_object_size gets "to_user" as an argument.
>
> It may make sense to pass that to check_heap_object, and
> only allow copy_to_user from rodata, never copy_from_user,
> since that section should be read only.
Well, that's two votes for this extra check, but I'm still not sure
since it may already be allowed by the Reserved check, but I can
reorder things to _reject_ on rodata writes before the Reserved check,
etc.
I'll see what could work here...
-Kees
>
>> +void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool
>> to_user)
>> +{
>>
>
> --
>
> All Rights Reversed.
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2016 13:41:30 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+zxyPEfswD-03TDhuzxaG6itKsoc6-15rMuE+Sz3booA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467909317.13253.17.camel@redhat.com>
On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 12:35 PM, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-07-06 at 15:25 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> + /* Allow kernel rodata region (if not marked as Reserved).
>> */
>> + if (ptr >= (const void *)__start_rodata &&
>> + end <= (const void *)__end_rodata)
>> + return NULL;
>>
> One comment here.
>
> __check_object_size gets "to_user" as an argument.
>
> It may make sense to pass that to check_heap_object, and
> only allow copy_to_user from rodata, never copy_from_user,
> since that section should be read only.
Well, that's two votes for this extra check, but I'm still not sure
since it may already be allowed by the Reserved check, but I can
reorder things to _reject_ on rodata writes before the Reserved check,
etc.
I'll see what could work here...
-Kees
>
>> +void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool
>> to_user)
>> +{
>>
>
> --
>
> All Rights Reversed.
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/9] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2016 13:41:30 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+zxyPEfswD-03TDhuzxaG6itKsoc6-15rMuE+Sz3booA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467909317.13253.17.camel@redhat.com>
On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 12:35 PM, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-07-06 at 15:25 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> + /* Allow kernel rodata region (if not marked as Reserved).
>> */
>> + if (ptr >= (const void *)__start_rodata &&
>> + end <= (const void *)__end_rodata)
>> + return NULL;
>>
> One comment here.
>
> __check_object_size gets "to_user" as an argument.
>
> It may make sense to pass that to check_heap_object, and
> only allow copy_to_user from rodata, never copy_from_user,
> since that section should be read only.
Well, that's two votes for this extra check, but I'm still not sure
since it may already be allowed by the Reserved check, but I can
reorder things to _reject_ on rodata writes before the Reserved check,
etc.
I'll see what could work here...
-Kees
>
>> +void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool
>> to_user)
>> +{
>>
>
> --
>
> All Rights Reversed.
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/9] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2016 13:41:30 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+zxyPEfswD-03TDhuzxaG6itKsoc6-15rMuE+Sz3booA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467909317.13253.17.camel@redhat.com>
On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 12:35 PM, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-07-06 at 15:25 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> + /* Allow kernel rodata region (if not marked as Reserved).
>> */
>> + if (ptr >= (const void *)__start_rodata &&
>> + end <= (const void *)__end_rodata)
>> + return NULL;
>>
> One comment here.
>
> __check_object_size gets "to_user" as an argument.
>
> It may make sense to pass that to check_heap_object, and
> only allow copy_to_user from rodata, never copy_from_user,
> since that section should be read only.
Well, that's two votes for this extra check, but I'm still not sure
since it may already be allowed by the Reserved check, but I can
reorder things to _reject_ on rodata writes before the Reserved check,
etc.
I'll see what could work here...
-Kees
>
>> +void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool
>> to_user)
>> +{
>>
>
> --
>
> All Rights Reversed.
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-07 17:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 366+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-06 22:25 [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 1/9] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 5:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 7:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 8:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 5:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08 9:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-07-07 17:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 3/9] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 5/9] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 6/9] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 7/9] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 8/9] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 4:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
[not found] ` <577ddc18.d351190a.1fa54.ffffbe79SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-07 18:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 17:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
[not found] ` <57809299.84b3370a.5390c.ffff9e58SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-09 6:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu
2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-07 7:30 ` [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 7:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 8:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 2:22 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 2:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 2:22 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 2:22 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09 2:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 12:58 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 12:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 12:58 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 9:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-12 18:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-12 18:44 ` Kees Cook
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