From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pa Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Subject: [PATCH v5 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2018 08:15:22 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20181011151523.27101-27-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20181011151523.27101-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, unsigned long *addr) Return CET feature status. The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer. On returning to the caller, the kernel fills the following information: *addr = SHSTK/IBT status *(addr + 1) = SHSTK base address *(addr + 2) = SHSTK size arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned long features) Disable CET features specified in 'features'. Return -EPERM if CET is locked. arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK) Lock in CET feature. arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK, unsigned long *addr) Allocate a new SHSTK. The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer and indicates the desired SHSTK size to allocate. On returning to the caller the buffer contains the address of the new SHSTK. There is no CET enabling arch_prctl function. By design, CET is enabled automatically if the binary and the system can support it. The parameters passed are always unsigned 64-bit. When an ia32 application passing pointers, it should only use the lower 32 bits. Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 5 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 5 ++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 29 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 4 +- 6 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h index 008b4651b5be..6fa23a41580c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h @@ -12,19 +12,24 @@ struct task_struct; struct cet_status { unsigned long shstk_base; unsigned long shstk_size; + unsigned int locked:1; unsigned int shstk_enabled:1; }; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET +int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2); int cet_setup_shstk(void); int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p); +int cet_alloc_shstk(unsigned long *arg); void cet_disable_shstk(void); void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p); int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp); int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, unsigned long *new_ssp); #else +static inline int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; } static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return -EINVAL; } static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p) { return -EINVAL; } +static inline int cet_alloc_shstk(unsigned long *arg) { return -EINVAL; } static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {} static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {} static inline int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h index 5a6aac9fa41f..d962f0ec9ccf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h @@ -14,4 +14,9 @@ #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32 0x2002 #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64 0x2003 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS 0x3001 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE 0x3002 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK 0x3003 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK 0x3004 + #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index 36b14ef410c8..b9e6cdc6b4f7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o -obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o cet_prctl.o obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROGRAM_PROPERTIES) += elf.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c index 51b26616ac20..17ad328586aa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c @@ -121,6 +121,35 @@ static int create_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp, return 0; } +int cet_alloc_shstk(unsigned long *arg) +{ + unsigned long len = *arg; + unsigned long addr; + unsigned long token; + unsigned long ssp; + + addr = do_mmap_locked(0, len, PROT_READ, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK); + if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Restore token is 8 bytes and aligned to 8 bytes */ + ssp = addr + len; + token = ssp; + + if (!in_ia32_syscall()) + token |= TOKEN_MODE_64; + ssp -= 8; + + if (write_user_shstk_64(ssp, token)) { + vm_munmap(addr, len); + return -EINVAL; + } + + *arg = addr; + return 0; +} + int cet_setup_shstk(void) { unsigned long addr, size; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..320dbb620d61 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <linux/compat.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <asm/processor.h> +#include <asm/prctl.h> +#include <asm/elf.h> +#include <asm/elf_property.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> + +/* See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.txt. */ + +static int handle_get_status(unsigned long arg2) +{ + unsigned int features = 0; + unsigned long shstk_base, shstk_size; + unsigned long buf[3]; + + if (current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled) + features |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK; + + shstk_base = current->thread.cet.shstk_base; + shstk_size = current->thread.cet.shstk_size; + + buf[0] = (unsigned long)features; + buf[1] = shstk_base; + buf[2] = shstk_size; + return copy_to_user((unsigned long __user *)arg2, buf, + sizeof(buf)); +} + +static int handle_alloc_shstk(unsigned long arg2) +{ + int err = 0; + unsigned long arg; + unsigned long addr = 0; + unsigned long size = 0; + + if (get_user(arg, (unsigned long __user *)arg2)) + return -EFAULT; + + size = arg; + err = cet_alloc_shstk(&arg); + if (err) + return err; + + addr = arg; + if (put_user(addr, (unsigned long __user *)arg2)) { + vm_munmap(addr, size); + return -EFAULT; + } + + return 0; +} + +int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2) +{ + if (!cpu_x86_cet_enabled()) + return -EINVAL; + + switch (option) { + case ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS: + return handle_get_status(arg2); + + case ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE: + if (current->thread.cet.locked) + return -EPERM; + if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK) + cet_disable_free_shstk(current); + + return 0; + + case ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK: + current->thread.cet.locked = 1; + return 0; + + case ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK: + return handle_alloc_shstk(arg2); + + default: + return -EINVAL; + } +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 440f012ef925..f240fce2b20f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option, return get_cpuid_mode(); case ARCH_SET_CPUID: return set_cpuid_mode(task, cpuid_enabled); + default: + return prctl_cet(option, cpuid_enabled); } - - return -EINVAL; } -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>, "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>, Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com> Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Subject: [PATCH v5 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2018 08:15:22 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20181011151523.27101-27-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw) Message-ID: <20181011151522.7nPbFwJ2DJ7nIIB5XQRQkwDiMiD16X3ufZCWH5tbUbI@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20181011151523.27101-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, unsigned long *addr) Return CET feature status. The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer. On returning to the caller, the kernel fills the following information: *addr = SHSTK/IBT status *(addr + 1) = SHSTK base address *(addr + 2) = SHSTK size arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned long features) Disable CET features specified in 'features'. Return -EPERM if CET is locked. arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK) Lock in CET feature. arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK, unsigned long *addr) Allocate a new SHSTK. The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer and indicates the desired SHSTK size to allocate. On returning to the caller the buffer contains the address of the new SHSTK. There is no CET enabling arch_prctl function. By design, CET is enabled automatically if the binary and the system can support it. The parameters passed are always unsigned 64-bit. When an ia32 application passing pointers, it should only use the lower 32 bits. Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 5 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 5 ++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 29 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 4 +- 6 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h index 008b4651b5be..6fa23a41580c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h @@ -12,19 +12,24 @@ struct task_struct; struct cet_status { unsigned long shstk_base; unsigned long shstk_size; + unsigned int locked:1; unsigned int shstk_enabled:1; }; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET +int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2); int cet_setup_shstk(void); int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p); +int cet_alloc_shstk(unsigned long *arg); void cet_disable_shstk(void); void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p); int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp); int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, unsigned long *new_ssp); #else +static inline int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; } static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return -EINVAL; } static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p) { return -EINVAL; } +static inline int cet_alloc_shstk(unsigned long *arg) { return -EINVAL; } static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {} static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {} static inline int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h index 5a6aac9fa41f..d962f0ec9ccf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h @@ -14,4 +14,9 @@ #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32 0x2002 #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64 0x2003 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS 0x3001 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE 0x3002 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK 0x3003 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK 0x3004 + #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index 36b14ef410c8..b9e6cdc6b4f7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o -obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o cet_prctl.o obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROGRAM_PROPERTIES) += elf.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c index 51b26616ac20..17ad328586aa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c @@ -121,6 +121,35 @@ static int create_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp, return 0; } +int cet_alloc_shstk(unsigned long *arg) +{ + unsigned long len = *arg; + unsigned long addr; + unsigned long token; + unsigned long ssp; + + addr = do_mmap_locked(0, len, PROT_READ, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK); + if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Restore token is 8 bytes and aligned to 8 bytes */ + ssp = addr + len; + token = ssp; + + if (!in_ia32_syscall()) + token |= TOKEN_MODE_64; + ssp -= 8; + + if (write_user_shstk_64(ssp, token)) { + vm_munmap(addr, len); + return -EINVAL; + } + + *arg = addr; + return 0; +} + int cet_setup_shstk(void) { unsigned long addr, size; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..320dbb620d61 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <linux/compat.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <asm/processor.h> +#include <asm/prctl.h> +#include <asm/elf.h> +#include <asm/elf_property.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> + +/* See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.txt. */ + +static int handle_get_status(unsigned long arg2) +{ + unsigned int features = 0; + unsigned long shstk_base, shstk_size; + unsigned long buf[3]; + + if (current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled) + features |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK; + + shstk_base = current->thread.cet.shstk_base; + shstk_size = current->thread.cet.shstk_size; + + buf[0] = (unsigned long)features; + buf[1] = shstk_base; + buf[2] = shstk_size; + return copy_to_user((unsigned long __user *)arg2, buf, + sizeof(buf)); +} + +static int handle_alloc_shstk(unsigned long arg2) +{ + int err = 0; + unsigned long arg; + unsigned long addr = 0; + unsigned long size = 0; + + if (get_user(arg, (unsigned long __user *)arg2)) + return -EFAULT; + + size = arg; + err = cet_alloc_shstk(&arg); + if (err) + return err; + + addr = arg; + if (put_user(addr, (unsigned long __user *)arg2)) { + vm_munmap(addr, size); + return -EFAULT; + } + + return 0; +} + +int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2) +{ + if (!cpu_x86_cet_enabled()) + return -EINVAL; + + switch (option) { + case ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS: + return handle_get_status(arg2); + + case ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE: + if (current->thread.cet.locked) + return -EPERM; + if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK) + cet_disable_free_shstk(current); + + return 0; + + case ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK: + current->thread.cet.locked = 1; + return 0; + + case ARCH_X86_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK: + return handle_alloc_shstk(arg2); + + default: + return -EINVAL; + } +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 440f012ef925..f240fce2b20f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option, return get_cpuid_mode(); case ARCH_SET_CPUID: return set_cpuid_mode(task, cpuid_enabled); + default: + return prctl_cet(option, cpuid_enabled); } - - return -EINVAL; } -- 2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-11 15:15 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 160+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-11 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-11 16:45 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 16:45 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-15 17:03 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-15 17:03 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-17 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-17 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-17 22:39 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-17 22:39 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-17 22:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-17 22:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-17 23:17 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-17 23:17 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-18 9:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-18 9:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-18 9:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-18 9:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-18 12:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-18 12:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-18 18:33 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-18 18:33 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-18 9:24 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-18 9:24 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 18:40 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-08 18:40 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-08 20:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 20:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 23:52 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-08 23:52 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 14:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-11 14:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-11 19:02 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 19:02 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-08 20:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 20:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 21:01 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 21:01 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 21:22 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 21:22 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 21:31 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2018-11-08 21:31 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2018-11-08 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 22:18 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2018-11-08 22:18 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2018-11-08 21:48 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-08 21:48 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-08 22:00 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-08 22:00 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-08 23:35 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-08 23:35 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 0:32 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-09 0:32 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-09 0:45 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-09 0:45 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-09 17:13 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:13 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:17 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-09 17:17 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-09 17:20 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:20 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:28 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:28 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-13 18:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-13 18:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-13 21:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-13 21:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-14 18:44 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-14 18:44 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-14 20:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-14 20:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-14 20:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-14 20:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 20:39 ` Jann Horn 2018-10-11 20:39 ` Jann Horn 2018-10-11 20:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 20:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 20:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-10-11 20:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-10-12 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-12 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-12 13:17 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-10-12 13:17 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-10-11 20:49 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-11 20:49 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-12 10:24 ` Florian Weimer 2018-10-12 10:24 ` Florian Weimer 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 08/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 09/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 10/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 11/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 12/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 13/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 14/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 15/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 16/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 17/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 18/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 19/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-06 18:43 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-06 18:43 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-06 18:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-06 18:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-06 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-06 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message] 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen 2018-10-11 19:21 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-11 19:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 19:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=20181011151523.27101-27-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \ --to=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \ --cc=arnd@arndb.de \ --cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \ --cc=corbet@lwn.net \ --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \ --cc=esyr@redhat.com \ --cc=fweimer@redhat.com \ --cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \ --cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \ --cc=hpa@zytor.com \ --cc=jannh@google.com \ --cc=keescook@chromium.org \ --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \ --cc=luto@amacapital.net \ --cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \ --cc=mingo@redhat.com \ --cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \ --cc=oleg@redhat.com \ --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \ --cc=x86@kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox; as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).