From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pa Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 12:41:37 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20181017104137.GE22535@zn.tnic> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20181011151523.27101-4-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:14:59AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote: > Control Flow Enforcement (CET) MSRs are XSAVES system states. That sentence needs massaging. MSRs are system states?!?! > To support CET, we introduce XSAVES system states first. Pls drop the "we" in all commit messages and convert the tone to impartial and passive. Also, this commit message needs to explain *why* you're doing this - it is too laconic. > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 3 +- > arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 4 +- > arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 6 +- > arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c | 10 ---- > arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++----------- > 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h > index 02c4296478c8..9a5db5a63f60 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h > @@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ extern void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void); > extern void fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); > extern void fpu__init_check_bugs(void); > extern void fpu__resume_cpu(void); > -extern u64 fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask(void); > > /* > * Debugging facility: > @@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ static inline void fpstate_init_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave) > * XRSTORS requires these bits set in xcomp_bv, or it will > * trigger #GP: > */ > - xsave->header.xcomp_bv = XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT | xfeatures_mask_user; > + xsave->header.xcomp_bv = XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT | xfeatures_mask_all; > } > > static inline void fpstate_init_fxstate(struct fxregs_state *fx) > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h > index 76f83d2ac10e..d8e2ec99f635 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h > @@ -19,9 +19,6 @@ > #define XSAVE_YMM_SIZE 256 > #define XSAVE_YMM_OFFSET (XSAVE_HDR_SIZE + XSAVE_HDR_OFFSET) > > -/* Supervisor features */ > -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR (XFEATURE_MASK_PT) > - > /* All currently supported features */ > #define SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | \ > XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | \ > @@ -40,6 +37,7 @@ > #endif > > extern u64 xfeatures_mask_user; > +extern u64 xfeatures_mask_all; You have a bunch of places where you generate the system mask by doing ~xfeatures_mask_user. Why not define xfeatures_mask_system instead and generate the _all mask at the places you need it by doing xfeatures_mask_user | xfeatures_mask_system ? We are differentiating user and system states now so it is only logical to have that mirrored in the variables, right? You even do that in fpu__init_system_xstate(). ... > @@ -225,20 +230,19 @@ void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void) > * set here. > */ > > - xfeatures_mask_user &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR; > - > cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE); > xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xfeatures_mask_user); <---- newline here. > + /* > + * MSR_IA32_XSS sets which XSAVES system states to be managed by Improve: "MSR_IA32_XSS controls which system (not user) states are going to be managed by XSAVES." > @@ -702,6 +703,7 @@ static int init_xstate_size(void) > */ > static void fpu__init_disable_system_xstate(void) > { > + xfeatures_mask_all = 0; > xfeatures_mask_user = 0; > cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE); > fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps(); > @@ -717,6 +719,8 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void) > static int on_boot_cpu __initdata = 1; > int err; > int i; > + u64 cpu_user_xfeatures_mask; > + u64 cpu_system_xfeatures_mask; Please sort function local variables declaration in a reverse christmas tree order: <type> longest_variable_name; <type> shorter_var_name; <type> even_shorter; <type> i; > > WARN_ON_FPU(!on_boot_cpu); > on_boot_cpu = 0; ... -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>, "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>, Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 12:41:37 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20181017104137.GE22535@zn.tnic> (raw) Message-ID: <20181017104137.R0wYQX9URUiImTolvhwSrxDCDh-HwgIYRYHp_qQiRAE@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20181011151523.27101-4-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:14:59AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote: > Control Flow Enforcement (CET) MSRs are XSAVES system states. That sentence needs massaging. MSRs are system states?!?! > To support CET, we introduce XSAVES system states first. Pls drop the "we" in all commit messages and convert the tone to impartial and passive. Also, this commit message needs to explain *why* you're doing this - it is too laconic. > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 3 +- > arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 4 +- > arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 6 +- > arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c | 10 ---- > arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++----------- > 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h > index 02c4296478c8..9a5db5a63f60 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h > @@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ extern void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void); > extern void fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); > extern void fpu__init_check_bugs(void); > extern void fpu__resume_cpu(void); > -extern u64 fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask(void); > > /* > * Debugging facility: > @@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ static inline void fpstate_init_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave) > * XRSTORS requires these bits set in xcomp_bv, or it will > * trigger #GP: > */ > - xsave->header.xcomp_bv = XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT | xfeatures_mask_user; > + xsave->header.xcomp_bv = XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT | xfeatures_mask_all; > } > > static inline void fpstate_init_fxstate(struct fxregs_state *fx) > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h > index 76f83d2ac10e..d8e2ec99f635 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h > @@ -19,9 +19,6 @@ > #define XSAVE_YMM_SIZE 256 > #define XSAVE_YMM_OFFSET (XSAVE_HDR_SIZE + XSAVE_HDR_OFFSET) > > -/* Supervisor features */ > -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR (XFEATURE_MASK_PT) > - > /* All currently supported features */ > #define SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | \ > XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | \ > @@ -40,6 +37,7 @@ > #endif > > extern u64 xfeatures_mask_user; > +extern u64 xfeatures_mask_all; You have a bunch of places where you generate the system mask by doing ~xfeatures_mask_user. Why not define xfeatures_mask_system instead and generate the _all mask at the places you need it by doing xfeatures_mask_user | xfeatures_mask_system ? We are differentiating user and system states now so it is only logical to have that mirrored in the variables, right? You even do that in fpu__init_system_xstate(). ... > @@ -225,20 +230,19 @@ void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void) > * set here. > */ > > - xfeatures_mask_user &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR; > - > cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE); > xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xfeatures_mask_user); <---- newline here. > + /* > + * MSR_IA32_XSS sets which XSAVES system states to be managed by Improve: "MSR_IA32_XSS controls which system (not user) states are going to be managed by XSAVES." > @@ -702,6 +703,7 @@ static int init_xstate_size(void) > */ > static void fpu__init_disable_system_xstate(void) > { > + xfeatures_mask_all = 0; > xfeatures_mask_user = 0; > cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE); > fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps(); > @@ -717,6 +719,8 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void) > static int on_boot_cpu __initdata = 1; > int err; > int i; > + u64 cpu_user_xfeatures_mask; > + u64 cpu_system_xfeatures_mask; Please sort function local variables declaration in a reverse christmas tree order: <type> longest_variable_name; <type> shorter_var_name; <type> even_shorter; <type> i; > > WARN_ON_FPU(!on_boot_cpu); > on_boot_cpu = 0; ... -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-17 10:41 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 160+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-11 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-11 16:45 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 16:45 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-15 17:03 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-15 17:03 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-17 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov [this message] 2018-10-17 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-17 22:39 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-17 22:39 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-17 22:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-17 22:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-17 23:17 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-17 23:17 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-18 9:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-18 9:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-18 9:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-18 9:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-18 12:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-18 12:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-18 18:33 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-18 18:33 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-18 9:24 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-18 9:24 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 18:40 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-08 18:40 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-08 20:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 20:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 23:52 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-08 23:52 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 14:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-11 14:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-11 19:02 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 19:02 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-08 20:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 20:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 21:01 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 21:01 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 21:22 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 21:22 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 21:31 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2018-11-08 21:31 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2018-11-08 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 22:18 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2018-11-08 22:18 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2018-11-08 21:48 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-08 21:48 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-08 22:00 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-08 22:00 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-08 23:35 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-08 23:35 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 0:32 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-09 0:32 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-09 0:45 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-09 0:45 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-09 17:13 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:13 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:17 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-09 17:17 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-09 17:20 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:20 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:28 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:28 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-13 18:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-13 18:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-13 21:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-13 21:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-14 18:44 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-14 18:44 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-14 20:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-14 20:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-14 20:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-14 20:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 20:39 ` Jann Horn 2018-10-11 20:39 ` Jann Horn 2018-10-11 20:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 20:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 20:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-10-11 20:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-10-12 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-12 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-12 13:17 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-10-12 13:17 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-10-11 20:49 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-11 20:49 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-12 10:24 ` Florian Weimer 2018-10-12 10:24 ` Florian Weimer 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 08/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 09/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 10/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 11/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 12/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 13/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 14/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 15/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 16/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 17/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 18/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 19/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-06 18:43 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-06 18:43 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-06 18:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-06 18:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-06 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-06 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen 2018-10-11 19:21 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-11 19:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 19:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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