From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: yu-cheng.yu@intel.com, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, hjl.tools@gmail.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nad Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 06:17:28 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20181012131728.GA28309@bombadil.infradead.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez3R7XL8MX_sjff1FFYuARX_58wA_=ACbv2im-XJKR8tvA@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 10:39:24PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > Sorry to bring this up so late, but Daniel Micay pointed out to me > that, given that VMA guards will raise the number of VMAs by > inhibiting vma_merge(), people are more likely to run into > /proc/sys/vm/max_map_count (which limits the number of VMAs to ~65k by > default, and can't easily be raised without risking an overflow of > page->_mapcount on systems with over ~800GiB of RAM, see > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180208021112.GB14918@bombadil.infradead.org/ > and replies) with this change. > [...] > > Arguably the proper solution to this would be to raise the default > max_map_count to be much higher; but then that requires fixing the > mapcount overflow. I have a fix that nobody has any particular reaction to: diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h index 7059a8389194..977852b8329e 100644 --- a/mm/internal.h +++ b/mm/internal.h @@ -97,6 +97,11 @@ extern void putback_lru_page(struct page *page); */ extern pmd_t *mm_find_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address); +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT +extern void mm_mapcount_overflow(struct page *page); +#else +static inline void mm_mapcount_overflow(struct page *page) { } +#endif /* * in mm/page_alloc.c */ diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 9efdc021ad22..575766ec02f8 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -1315,6 +1315,115 @@ static inline int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT +/* + * Machines with more than 2TB of memory can create enough VMAs to overflow + * page->_mapcount if they all point to the same page. 32-bit machines do + * not need to be concerned. + */ +/* + * Experimentally determined. gnome-shell currently uses fewer than + * 3000 mappings, so should have zero effect on desktop users. + */ +#define mm_track_threshold 5000 +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(heavy_users_lock); +static DEFINE_IDR(heavy_users); + +static void mmap_track_user(struct mm_struct *mm, int max) +{ + struct mm_struct *entry; + unsigned int id; + + idr_preload(GFP_KERNEL); + spin_lock(&heavy_users_lock); + idr_for_each_entry(&heavy_users, entry, id) { + if (entry == mm) + break; + if (entry->map_count < mm_track_threshold) + idr_remove(&heavy_users, id); + } + if (!entry) + idr_alloc(&heavy_users, mm, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC); + spin_unlock(&heavy_users_lock); +} + +static void mmap_untrack_user(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct mm_struct *entry; + unsigned int id; + + spin_lock(&heavy_users_lock); + idr_for_each_entry(&heavy_users, entry, id) { + if (entry == mm) { + idr_remove(&heavy_users, id); + break; + } + } + spin_unlock(&heavy_users_lock); +} + +static void kill_mm(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + /* Tear down the mappings first */ + do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_FORCED, tsk, true); +} + +static void kill_abuser(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct task_struct *tsk; + + for_each_process(tsk) + if (tsk->mm == mm) + break; + + if (down_write_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) { + kill_mm(tsk); + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + } else { + do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_FORCED, tsk, true); + } +} + +void mm_mapcount_overflow(struct page *page) +{ + struct mm_struct *entry = current->mm; + unsigned int id; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + struct address_space *mapping = page_mapping(page); + unsigned long pgoff = page_to_pgoff(page); + unsigned int count = 0; + + vma_interval_tree_foreach(vma, &mapping->i_mmap, pgoff, pgoff + 1) { + if (vma->vm_mm == entry) + count++; + if (count > 1000) + kill_mm(current); + } + + rcu_read_lock(); + idr_for_each_entry(&heavy_users, entry, id) { + count = 0; + + vma_interval_tree_foreach(vma, &mapping->i_mmap, + pgoff, pgoff + 1) { + if (vma->vm_mm == entry) + count++; + if (count > 1000) { + kill_abuser(entry); + goto out; + } + } + } + if (!entry) + panic("No abusers found but mapcount exceeded\n"); +out: + rcu_read_unlock(); +} +#else +static void mmap_track_user(struct mm_struct *mm, int max) { } +static void mmap_untrack_user(struct mm_struct *mm) { } +#endif + /* * The caller must hold down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem). */ @@ -1357,6 +1466,8 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, /* Too many mappings? */ if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count) return -ENOMEM; + if (mm->map_count > mm_track_threshold) + mmap_track_user(mm, mm_track_threshold); /* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure * that it represents a valid section of the address space. @@ -2997,6 +3108,8 @@ void exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) /* mm's last user has gone, and its about to be pulled down */ mmu_notifier_release(mm); + mmap_untrack_user(mm); + if (mm->locked_vm) { vma = mm->mmap; while (vma) { diff --git a/mm/rmap.c b/mm/rmap.c index 47db27f8049e..d88acf5c98e9 100644 --- a/mm/rmap.c +++ b/mm/rmap.c @@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ void page_add_file_rmap(struct page *page, bool compound) VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageSwapBacked(page), page); __inc_node_page_state(page, NR_SHMEM_PMDMAPPED); } else { + int v; if (PageTransCompound(page) && page_mapping(page)) { VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(page)); @@ -1197,8 +1198,13 @@ void page_add_file_rmap(struct page *page, bool compound) if (PageMlocked(page)) clear_page_mlock(compound_head(page)); } - if (!atomic_inc_and_test(&page->_mapcount)) + v = atomic_inc_return(&page->_mapcount); + if (likely(v > 0)) goto out; + if (unlikely(v < 0)) { + mm_mapcount_overflow(page); + goto out; + } } __mod_lruvec_page_state(page, NR_FILE_MAPPED, nr); out:
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: yu-cheng.yu@intel.com, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, hjl.tools@gmail.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, rdunlap@infradead.org, ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 06:17:28 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20181012131728.GA28309@bombadil.infradead.org> (raw) Message-ID: <20181012131728.HRe4U40_Ib2ZJe1MG71sr0B174mht4QD3XmohFLbiN4@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez3R7XL8MX_sjff1FFYuARX_58wA_=ACbv2im-XJKR8tvA@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 10:39:24PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > Sorry to bring this up so late, but Daniel Micay pointed out to me > that, given that VMA guards will raise the number of VMAs by > inhibiting vma_merge(), people are more likely to run into > /proc/sys/vm/max_map_count (which limits the number of VMAs to ~65k by > default, and can't easily be raised without risking an overflow of > page->_mapcount on systems with over ~800GiB of RAM, see > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180208021112.GB14918@bombadil.infradead.org/ > and replies) with this change. > [...] > > Arguably the proper solution to this would be to raise the default > max_map_count to be much higher; but then that requires fixing the > mapcount overflow. I have a fix that nobody has any particular reaction to: diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h index 7059a8389194..977852b8329e 100644 --- a/mm/internal.h +++ b/mm/internal.h @@ -97,6 +97,11 @@ extern void putback_lru_page(struct page *page); */ extern pmd_t *mm_find_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address); +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT +extern void mm_mapcount_overflow(struct page *page); +#else +static inline void mm_mapcount_overflow(struct page *page) { } +#endif /* * in mm/page_alloc.c */ diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 9efdc021ad22..575766ec02f8 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -1315,6 +1315,115 @@ static inline int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT +/* + * Machines with more than 2TB of memory can create enough VMAs to overflow + * page->_mapcount if they all point to the same page. 32-bit machines do + * not need to be concerned. + */ +/* + * Experimentally determined. gnome-shell currently uses fewer than + * 3000 mappings, so should have zero effect on desktop users. + */ +#define mm_track_threshold 5000 +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(heavy_users_lock); +static DEFINE_IDR(heavy_users); + +static void mmap_track_user(struct mm_struct *mm, int max) +{ + struct mm_struct *entry; + unsigned int id; + + idr_preload(GFP_KERNEL); + spin_lock(&heavy_users_lock); + idr_for_each_entry(&heavy_users, entry, id) { + if (entry == mm) + break; + if (entry->map_count < mm_track_threshold) + idr_remove(&heavy_users, id); + } + if (!entry) + idr_alloc(&heavy_users, mm, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC); + spin_unlock(&heavy_users_lock); +} + +static void mmap_untrack_user(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct mm_struct *entry; + unsigned int id; + + spin_lock(&heavy_users_lock); + idr_for_each_entry(&heavy_users, entry, id) { + if (entry == mm) { + idr_remove(&heavy_users, id); + break; + } + } + spin_unlock(&heavy_users_lock); +} + +static void kill_mm(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + /* Tear down the mappings first */ + do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_FORCED, tsk, true); +} + +static void kill_abuser(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct task_struct *tsk; + + for_each_process(tsk) + if (tsk->mm == mm) + break; + + if (down_write_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) { + kill_mm(tsk); + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + } else { + do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_FORCED, tsk, true); + } +} + +void mm_mapcount_overflow(struct page *page) +{ + struct mm_struct *entry = current->mm; + unsigned int id; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + struct address_space *mapping = page_mapping(page); + unsigned long pgoff = page_to_pgoff(page); + unsigned int count = 0; + + vma_interval_tree_foreach(vma, &mapping->i_mmap, pgoff, pgoff + 1) { + if (vma->vm_mm == entry) + count++; + if (count > 1000) + kill_mm(current); + } + + rcu_read_lock(); + idr_for_each_entry(&heavy_users, entry, id) { + count = 0; + + vma_interval_tree_foreach(vma, &mapping->i_mmap, + pgoff, pgoff + 1) { + if (vma->vm_mm == entry) + count++; + if (count > 1000) { + kill_abuser(entry); + goto out; + } + } + } + if (!entry) + panic("No abusers found but mapcount exceeded\n"); +out: + rcu_read_unlock(); +} +#else +static void mmap_track_user(struct mm_struct *mm, int max) { } +static void mmap_untrack_user(struct mm_struct *mm) { } +#endif + /* * The caller must hold down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem). */ @@ -1357,6 +1466,8 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, /* Too many mappings? */ if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count) return -ENOMEM; + if (mm->map_count > mm_track_threshold) + mmap_track_user(mm, mm_track_threshold); /* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure * that it represents a valid section of the address space. @@ -2997,6 +3108,8 @@ void exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) /* mm's last user has gone, and its about to be pulled down */ mmu_notifier_release(mm); + mmap_untrack_user(mm); + if (mm->locked_vm) { vma = mm->mmap; while (vma) { diff --git a/mm/rmap.c b/mm/rmap.c index 47db27f8049e..d88acf5c98e9 100644 --- a/mm/rmap.c +++ b/mm/rmap.c @@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ void page_add_file_rmap(struct page *page, bool compound) VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageSwapBacked(page), page); __inc_node_page_state(page, NR_SHMEM_PMDMAPPED); } else { + int v; if (PageTransCompound(page) && page_mapping(page)) { VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(page)); @@ -1197,8 +1198,13 @@ void page_add_file_rmap(struct page *page, bool compound) if (PageMlocked(page)) clear_page_mlock(compound_head(page)); } - if (!atomic_inc_and_test(&page->_mapcount)) + v = atomic_inc_return(&page->_mapcount); + if (likely(v > 0)) goto out; + if (unlikely(v < 0)) { + mm_mapcount_overflow(page); + goto out; + } } __mod_lruvec_page_state(page, NR_FILE_MAPPED, nr); out:
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-12 13:17 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 160+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-11 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-11 16:45 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 16:45 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-15 17:03 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-15 17:03 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-17 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-17 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-17 22:39 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-17 22:39 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-17 22:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-17 22:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-17 23:17 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-17 23:17 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-18 9:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-18 9:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-18 9:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-18 9:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-18 12:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-18 12:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-18 18:33 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-18 18:33 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-10-18 9:24 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-18 9:24 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 18:40 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-08 18:40 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-08 20:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 20:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 23:52 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-08 23:52 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 14:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-11 14:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-11 19:02 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 19:02 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-08 20:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 20:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 21:01 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 21:01 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-08 21:22 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 21:22 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 21:31 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2018-11-08 21:31 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2018-11-08 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-08 22:18 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2018-11-08 22:18 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2018-11-08 21:48 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-08 21:48 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-08 22:00 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-08 22:00 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-08 23:35 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-08 23:35 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 0:32 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-09 0:32 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-09 0:45 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-09 0:45 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-09 17:13 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:13 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:17 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-09 17:17 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-11-09 17:20 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:20 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:28 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-09 17:28 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-13 18:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-13 18:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-13 21:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-13 21:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-14 18:44 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-14 18:44 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-14 20:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-14 20:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-14 20:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-11-14 20:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 20:39 ` Jann Horn 2018-10-11 20:39 ` Jann Horn 2018-10-11 20:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 20:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 20:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-10-11 20:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-10-12 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-12 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-12 13:17 ` Matthew Wilcox [this message] 2018-10-12 13:17 ` Matthew Wilcox 2018-10-11 20:49 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-11 20:49 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-12 10:24 ` Florian Weimer 2018-10-12 10:24 ` Florian Weimer 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 08/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 09/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 10/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 11/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 12/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 13/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 14/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 15/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 16/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 17/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 18/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 19/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-06 18:43 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-06 18:43 ` Dave Hansen 2018-11-06 18:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-06 18:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-11-06 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-11-06 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen 2018-10-11 19:21 ` Dave Hansen 2018-10-11 19:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-10-11 19:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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