From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v5 11/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 17:17:26 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181120011726.GB13936@tassilo.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1811200122580.1669@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
> I'm not taking that stuff without proper documentation.
Ok can you just revert Jiri's code then instead?
This is after all mainly an emergency fixup patch for that disaster,
which got fast tracked without any of these considerations
which now suddenly appear. Requiring new documentation for old
for old existing code as part of emergency patches definitely seems to
be unwarranted scope creep.
> I complained about
> that vs. L1TF and got told that no sysadmin cares, but L1TF has shown that
> they care very much and appreciate proper documentation.
I suspect what they mainly want is a single global switch to turn it all off...
which we sadly lack.
-Andi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-20 1:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-17 1:53 [Patch v5 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 01/16] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 02/16] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 03/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 04/16] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 05/16] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 06/16] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 07/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 08/16] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-11-19 12:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 20:50 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 14:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-19 18:08 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 19:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 19:25 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 09/16] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-19 12:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 12:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 10/16] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 11/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-11-17 9:47 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-18 22:59 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 13:49 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 14:00 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 18:31 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 19:32 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 19:39 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 21:40 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 21:33 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:16 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 23:25 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:45 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-20 0:22 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 13:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20 0:08 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-20 0:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20 1:14 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-20 1:17 ` Andi Kleen [this message]
2018-11-19 15:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 18:27 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 18:31 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 20:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 22:44 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 20:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 20:55 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 21:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 22:48 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 23:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 23:23 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-20 0:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20 0:24 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 23:39 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:49 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-20 0:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 12/16] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-11-17 9:53 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 18:29 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 13/16] security: Update speculation restriction of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 14/16] x86/speculation: Use STIBP to restrict speculation on non-dumpable task Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 15/16] x86/speculation: Update comment on TIF_SSBD Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 16/16] x86: Group thread info flags by functionality Tim Chen
2018-11-17 9:34 ` [Patch v5 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Jiri Kosina
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20181120011726.GB13936@tassilo.jf.intel.com \
--to=ak@linux.intel.com \
--cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=arjan@linux.intel.com \
--cc=asit.k.mallick@intel.com \
--cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
--cc=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
--cc=jcm@redhat.com \
--cc=jikos@kernel.org \
--cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=longman9394@gmail.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).