From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Subject: Re: [Patch v5 11/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 14:49:36 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1811191438290.21108@cbobk.fhfr.pm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1811191433100.1537@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
On Mon, 19 Nov 2018, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > On Sat, 17 Nov 2018, Jiri Kosina wrote:
>
> > Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: enforce STIBP for SECCOMP tasks in lite mode
> >
> > If 'lite' mode of app2app protection from spectre_v2 is selected on
> > kernel command-line, we are currently applying STIBP protection to
> > non-dumpable tasks, and tasks that have explicitly requested such
> > protection via
> >
> > prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
> >
> > Let's extend this to cover also SECCOMP tasks (analogically to how we
> > apply SSBD protection).
>
> Right. And SSBD does not fiddle with dumpable.
>
> Willy had concerns about the (ab)use of dumpable so I'm holding off on that
> bit for now.
Yeah. IBPB implementation used to check the dumpability of tasks during
rescheduling, but that went away later.
I still think that ideally that 'app2app' setting would toggle how IBPB is
being used as well, something along the lines:
lite:
- STIBP for the ones marked via prctl() and SECCOMP with the TIF_
flag
- ibpb_needed() returning true for the same
strict:
- STIBP: as currently implemented
- ibpb_needed() returning always true
off:
- neither STIBP nor IBPB applied ever
That's give us also some % of performance lost via IBPB back.
Makes sense?
Thanks,
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-19 13:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-17 1:53 [Patch v5 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 01/16] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 02/16] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 03/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 04/16] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 05/16] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 06/16] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 07/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 08/16] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-11-19 12:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 20:50 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 14:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-19 18:08 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 19:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 19:25 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 09/16] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-19 12:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 12:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 10/16] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 11/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-11-17 9:47 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-18 22:59 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 13:49 ` Jiri Kosina [this message]
2018-11-19 13:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 14:00 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 18:31 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 19:32 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 19:39 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 21:40 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 21:33 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:16 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 23:25 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:45 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-20 0:22 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 13:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20 0:08 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-20 0:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20 1:14 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-20 1:17 ` Andi Kleen
2018-11-19 15:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 18:27 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 18:31 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 20:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 22:44 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 20:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 20:55 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 21:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 22:48 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 23:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 23:23 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-20 0:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20 0:24 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 23:39 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:49 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-20 0:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 12/16] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-11-17 9:53 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 18:29 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 13/16] security: Update speculation restriction of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 14/16] x86/speculation: Use STIBP to restrict speculation on non-dumpable task Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 15/16] x86/speculation: Update comment on TIF_SSBD Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 16/16] x86: Group thread info flags by functionality Tim Chen
2018-11-17 9:34 ` [Patch v5 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Jiri Kosina
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