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From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [Patch v5 08/16] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 17:53:51 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <91b719e53640f60666b40a3516da2b80703b2f76.1542418937.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542418936.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542418936.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>

In later code, STIBP will be turned on/off in the context switch code
path when SMT is enabled.  Checks for SMT is best
avoided on such hot paths.

Create cpu_smt_enabled static key to turn on such SMT specific code
statically.

This key is set in code under hot plug, so it is limited in
scope to architecture supporting CPU hotplug, like x86.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
---
 include/linux/cpu.h |  1 +
 kernel/cpu.c        | 12 ++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index 218df7f..b54f085 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -188,5 +188,6 @@ static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void) { }
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
 #endif
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(cpu_smt_enabled);
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index 3c7f3b4..e216154 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -370,6 +370,8 @@ static void lockdep_release_cpus_lock(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
 enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_smt_control);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(cpu_smt_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_smt_enabled);
 
 static bool cpu_smt_available __read_mostly;
 
@@ -386,6 +388,7 @@ void __init cpu_smt_disable(bool force)
 		pr_info("SMT: disabled\n");
 		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_DISABLED;
 	}
+	static_branch_disable(&cpu_smt_enabled);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -395,8 +398,10 @@ void __init cpu_smt_disable(bool force)
  */
 void __init cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void)
 {
-	if (!topology_smt_supported())
+	if (!topology_smt_supported()) {
 		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+		static_branch_disable(&cpu_smt_enabled);
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -408,8 +413,10 @@ void __init cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void)
  */
 void __init cpu_smt_check_topology(void)
 {
-	if (!cpu_smt_available)
+	if (!cpu_smt_available) {
 		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+		static_branch_disable(&cpu_smt_enabled);
+	}
 }
 
 static int __init smt_cmdline_disable(char *str)
@@ -2101,6 +2108,7 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_enable(void)
 
 	cpu_maps_update_begin();
 	cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
+	static_branch_enable(&cpu_smt_enabled);
 	arch_smt_update();
 	for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
 		/* Skip online CPUs and CPUs on offline nodes */
-- 
2.9.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-17  2:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-17  1:53 [Patch v5 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 01/16] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 02/16] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 03/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 04/16] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 05/16] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 06/16] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 07/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-11-19 12:58   ` [Patch v5 08/16] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 20:50     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 14:57   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-19 18:08     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 19:03       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 19:25         ` Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 09/16] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-19 12:48   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 12:59     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 10/16] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 11/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-11-17  9:47   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-18 22:59     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:36       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 13:49         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:51           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 14:00             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 18:31               ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 19:32           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 19:39             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 21:40               ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 21:33             ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:16               ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 23:25                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:45                   ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-20  0:22                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 13:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20  0:08     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-20  0:30       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20  1:14         ` Tim Chen
2018-11-20  1:17         ` Andi Kleen
2018-11-19 15:00   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 18:27     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 18:31       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 20:21   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 22:44     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 20:46   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 20:55     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 21:12       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 22:48       ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 23:01         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 23:23           ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-20  0:00             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20  0:24               ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 23:39           ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:49             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-20  0:02               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 12/16] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-11-17  9:53   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 18:29     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 13/16] security: Update speculation restriction of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 14/16] x86/speculation: Use STIBP to restrict speculation on non-dumpable task Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 15/16] x86/speculation: Update comment on TIF_SSBD Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 16/16] x86: Group thread info flags by functionality Tim Chen
2018-11-17  9:34 ` [Patch v5 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Jiri Kosina

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