From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [Patch v5 16/16] x86: Group thread info flags by functionality
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 17:53:59 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a3487832e8452a8cf157d47ad976c065bc0f4c32.1542418937.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542418936.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542418936.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
The thread info flags are currently randomly distributed in the header
file arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h.
Group TIF flags together according to the following categories:
operation mode, syscall mode, pending work, task status and security
status.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
index a8c5e52..453616f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -74,60 +74,75 @@ struct thread_info {
* - these are process state flags that various assembly files
* may need to access
*/
-#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE 0 /* syscall trace active */
-#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME 1 /* callback before returning to user */
-#define TIF_SIGPENDING 2 /* signal pending */
-#define TIF_NEED_RESCHED 3 /* rescheduling necessary */
-#define TIF_SINGLESTEP 4 /* reenable singlestep on user return*/
-#define TIF_SSBD 5 /* Speculative store bypass disable */
-#define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU 6 /* syscall emulation active */
-#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */
-#define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* secure computing */
-#define TIF_STIBP 9 /* Single thread indirect branch speculation */
-#define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY 11 /* notify kernel of userspace return */
-#define TIF_UPROBE 12 /* breakpointed or singlestepping */
-#define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 13 /* pending live patching update */
-#define TIF_NOCPUID 15 /* CPUID is not accessible in userland */
-#define TIF_NOTSC 16 /* TSC is not accessible in userland */
-#define TIF_IA32 17 /* IA32 compatibility process */
-#define TIF_NOHZ 19 /* in adaptive nohz mode */
-#define TIF_MEMDIE 20 /* is terminating due to OOM killer */
-#define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG 21 /* idle is polling for TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
-#define TIF_IO_BITMAP 22 /* uses I/O bitmap */
-#define TIF_FORCED_TF 24 /* true if TF in eflags artificially */
-#define TIF_BLOCKSTEP 25 /* set when we want DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF */
-#define TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES 27 /* task is updating the mmu lazily */
-#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT 28 /* syscall tracepoint instrumentation */
-#define TIF_ADDR32 29 /* 32-bit address space on 64 bits */
-#define TIF_X32 30 /* 32-bit native x86-64 binary */
-#define TIF_FSCHECK 31 /* Check FS is USER_DS on return */
+
+/* Operation mode */
+#define TIF_NOCPUID 0 /* CPUID is not accessible in userland */
+#define TIF_NOTSC 1 /* TSC is not accessible in userland */
+#define TIF_IA32 2 /* IA32 compatibility process */
+#define TIF_NOHZ 3 /* In adaptive nohz mode */
+#define TIF_ADDR32 4 /* 32-bit address space on 64 bits */
+#define TIF_X32 5 /* 32-bit native x86-64 binary */
+
+/* Syscall mode */
+#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE 6 /* Syscall trace active */
+#define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU 7 /* Syscall emulation active */
+#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 8 /* Syscall auditing active */
+#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT 9 /* Syscall tracepoint instrumentation */
+
+/* Pending work */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME 10 /* Callback before returning to user */
+#define TIF_SIGPENDING 11 /* Signal pending */
+#define TIF_NEED_RESCHED 12 /* Rescheduling necessary */
+#define TIF_SINGLESTEP 13 /* Reenable singlestep on user return*/
+#define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY 14 /* Notify kernel of userspace return */
+#define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 15 /* Pending live patching update */
+#define TIF_FSCHECK 16 /* Check FS is USER_DS on return */
+
+/* Task status */
+#define TIF_UPROBE 17 /* Breakpointed or singlestepping */
+#define TIF_MEMDIE 18 /* Is terminating due to OOM killer */
+#define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG 19 /* Idle is polling for TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
+#define TIF_IO_BITMAP 20 /* Uses I/O bitmap */
+#define TIF_FORCED_TF 21 /* True if TF in eflags artificially */
+#define TIF_BLOCKSTEP 22 /* Set when we want DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF */
+#define TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES 23 /* Task is updating the mmu lazily */
+
+/* Security mode */
+#define TIF_SECCOMP 24 /* Secure computing */
+#define TIF_SSBD 25 /* Speculative store bypass disable */
+#define TIF_STIBP 26 /* Single thread indirect branch speculation */
+
+#define _TIF_NOCPUID (1 << TIF_NOCPUID)
+#define _TIF_NOTSC (1 << TIF_NOTSC)
+#define _TIF_IA32 (1 << TIF_IA32)
+#define _TIF_NOHZ (1 << TIF_NOHZ)
+#define _TIF_ADDR32 (1 << TIF_ADDR32)
+#define _TIF_X32 (1 << TIF_X32)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
+#define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
+#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
+#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
+
#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
#define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
#define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
#define _TIF_SINGLESTEP (1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP)
-#define _TIF_SSBD (1 << TIF_SSBD)
-#define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
-#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
-#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
-#define _TIF_STIBP (1 << TIF_STIBP)
#define _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY (1 << TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
-#define _TIF_UPROBE (1 << TIF_UPROBE)
#define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING (1 << TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
-#define _TIF_NOCPUID (1 << TIF_NOCPUID)
-#define _TIF_NOTSC (1 << TIF_NOTSC)
-#define _TIF_IA32 (1 << TIF_IA32)
-#define _TIF_NOHZ (1 << TIF_NOHZ)
+#define _TIF_FSCHECK (1 << TIF_FSCHECK)
+
+#define _TIF_UPROBE (1 << TIF_UPROBE)
+#define _TIF_MEMDIE (1 << TIF_MEMDIE)
#define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG (1 << TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
#define _TIF_IO_BITMAP (1 << TIF_IO_BITMAP)
#define _TIF_FORCED_TF (1 << TIF_FORCED_TF)
#define _TIF_BLOCKSTEP (1 << TIF_BLOCKSTEP)
#define _TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES (1 << TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES)
-#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
-#define _TIF_ADDR32 (1 << TIF_ADDR32)
-#define _TIF_X32 (1 << TIF_X32)
-#define _TIF_FSCHECK (1 << TIF_FSCHECK)
+
+#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
+#define _TIF_SSBD (1 << TIF_SSBD)
+#define _TIF_STIBP (1 << TIF_STIBP)
/*
* work to do in syscall_trace_enter(). Also includes TIF_NOHZ for
--
2.9.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-17 2:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-17 1:53 [Patch v5 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 01/16] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 02/16] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 03/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 04/16] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 05/16] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 06/16] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 07/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 08/16] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-11-19 12:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 20:50 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 14:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-19 18:08 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 19:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 19:25 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 09/16] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-19 12:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 12:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 10/16] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 11/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-11-17 9:47 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-18 22:59 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 13:49 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 14:00 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 18:31 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 19:32 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 19:39 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 21:40 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 21:33 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:16 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 23:25 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:45 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-20 0:22 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 13:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20 0:08 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-20 0:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20 1:14 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-20 1:17 ` Andi Kleen
2018-11-19 15:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 18:27 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 18:31 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 20:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 22:44 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 20:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 20:55 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 21:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 22:48 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 23:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 23:23 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-20 0:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20 0:24 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 23:39 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:49 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-20 0:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 12/16] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-11-17 9:53 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 18:29 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 13/16] security: Update speculation restriction of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 14/16] x86/speculation: Use STIBP to restrict speculation on non-dumpable task Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` [Patch v5 15/16] x86/speculation: Update comment on TIF_SSBD Tim Chen
2018-11-17 1:53 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-11-17 9:34 ` [Patch v5 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Jiri Kosina
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