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From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	jroedel@suse.de
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com, jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com,
	junaids@google.com, oweisse@google.com, rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
	graf@amazon.de, mgross@linux.intel.com, kuzuno@gmail.com,
	alexandre.chartre@oracle.com
Subject: [RFC][PATCH v2 15/21] x86/pti: Execute IDT handlers with error code on the kernel stack
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 15:47:51 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201116144757.1920077-16-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201116144757.1920077-1-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>

After an interrupt/exception in userland, the kernel is entered
and it switches the stack to the PTI stack which is mapped both in
the kernel and in the user page-table. When executing the interrupt
function, switch to the kernel stack (which is mapped only in the
kernel page-table) so that no kernel data leak to the userland
through the stack.

Changes IDT handlers which have an error code.

Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c         |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index 3595a31947b3..a82e31b45442 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@ void idtentry_exit_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs, bool irq_state);
 		(void (*)(void))(func), (void *)(arg1)) :		\
 	 func(arg1))
 
+#define CALL_ON_STACK_2(stack, func, arg1, arg2)			\
+	((stack) ?							\
+	 asm_call_on_stack_2(stack,					\
+		(void (*)(void))(func), (void *)(arg1), (void *)(arg2)) : \
+	 func(arg1, arg2))
+
 /*
  * Functions to return the top of the kernel stack if we are using the
  * user page-table (and thus not running with the kernel stack). If we
@@ -53,6 +59,13 @@ void run_idt(void (*func)(struct pt_regs *), struct pt_regs *regs)
 	CALL_ON_STACK_1(pti_kernel_stack(regs), func, regs);
 }
 
+static __always_inline
+void run_idt_errcode(void (*func)(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long),
+		     struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+{
+	CALL_ON_STACK_2(pti_kernel_stack(regs), func, regs, error_code);
+}
+
 /**
  * DECLARE_IDTENTRY - Declare functions for simple IDT entry points
  *		      No error code pushed by hardware
@@ -141,7 +154,7 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs,			\
 	irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs);			\
 									\
 	instrumentation_begin();					\
-	__##func (regs, error_code);					\
+	run_idt_errcode(__##func, regs, error_code);			\
 	instrumentation_end();						\
 	irqentry_exit(regs, state);					\
 }									\
@@ -239,7 +252,8 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs,			\
 	instrumentation_begin();					\
 	irq_enter_rcu();						\
 	kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();					\
-	__##func (regs, (u8)error_code);				\
+	run_idt_errcode((void (*)(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long))__##func, \
+			regs, (u8)error_code);				\
 	irq_exit_rcu();							\
 	instrumentation_end();						\
 	irqentry_exit(regs, state);					\
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 5161385b3670..9a51aa016fb3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_DEBUG(exc_debug)
 /* User entry, runs on regular task stack */
 DEFINE_IDTENTRY_DEBUG_USER(exc_debug)
 {
-	exc_debug_user(regs, debug_read_clear_dr6());
+	run_idt_errcode(exc_debug_user, regs, debug_read_clear_dr6());
 }
 #else
 /* 32 bit does not have separate entry points. */
-- 
2.18.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-11-16 14:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-16 14:47 [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 01/21] x86/syscall: Add wrapper for invoking syscall function Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 02/21] x86/entry: Update asm_call_on_stack to support more function arguments Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 03/21] x86/entry: Consolidate IST entry from userspace Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 04/21] x86/sev-es: Define a setup stack function for the VC idtentry Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 05/21] x86/entry: Implement ret_from_fork body with C code Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 06/21] x86/pti: Provide C variants of PTI switch CR3 macros Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 07/21] x86/entry: Fill ESPFIX stack using C code Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 08/21] x86/pti: Introduce per-task PTI trampoline stack Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 09/21] x86/pti: Function to clone page-table entries from a specified mm Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 10/21] x86/pti: Function to map per-cpu page-table entry Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 11/21] x86/pti: Extend PTI user mappings Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 19:48   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-16 20:21     ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 23:06       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-17  8:42         ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-17 15:49           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-19 19:15           ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 12/21] x86/pti: Use PTI stack instead of trampoline stack Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 16:57   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-16 18:10     ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 18:34       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-16 19:37         ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-17 15:09         ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-17 15:52           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-17 17:01             ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-19  1:49               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-19  8:05                 ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-19 12:06                   ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-19 16:06                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-19 17:02                       ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 21:24       ` David Laight
2020-11-17  8:27         ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-19 19:10       ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-11-19 19:55         ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-19 21:20           ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-11-24  7:20   ` [x86/pti] 5da9e742d1: PANIC:double_fault kernel test robot
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 13/21] x86/pti: Execute syscall functions on the kernel stack Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 14/21] x86/pti: Execute IDT handlers " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` Alexandre Chartre [this message]
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 16/21] x86/pti: Execute system vector " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 17/21] x86/pti: Execute page fault handler " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 18/21] x86/pti: Execute NMI " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 19/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code for IST entries Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 20/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code for non-IST and syscall entries Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 14:47 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 21/21] x86/pti: Use a different stack canary with the user and kernel page-table Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 16:56   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-16 18:34     ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 20:17 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code Borislav Petkov
2020-11-17  7:56   ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-17 16:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-17 18:12       ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-17 18:28         ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-17 19:02           ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-17 21:23             ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-18  7:08               ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-17 21:26         ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-18  7:41           ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-18  9:30             ` David Laight
2020-11-18 10:29               ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-18 13:22                 ` David Laight
2020-11-18 17:15                   ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-18 11:29             ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-18 19:37               ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-16 20:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-17  8:19   ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-17 17:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-17 18:24       ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-19 19:32     ` Thomas Gleixner

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