From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>, "Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>, "Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>, "Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 19:23:15 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20160909172314.ifcteua7nr52mzgs@pd.tnic> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20160822223749.29880.10183.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 05:37:49PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > This patch adds support to be change the memory encryption attribute for > one or more memory pages. > > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 3 + > arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 13 ++++++ > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 134 insertions(+) ... > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c > index 72c292d..0ba9382 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c > @@ -1728,6 +1728,81 @@ int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages) > __pgprot(0), 1, 0, NULL); > } > > +static int __set_memory_enc_dec(struct cpa_data *cpa) > +{ > + unsigned long addr; > + int numpages; > + int ret; > + > + if (*cpa->vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK) { > + *cpa->vaddr &= PAGE_MASK; > + > + /* People should not be passing in unaligned addresses */ > + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); Let's make this more user-friendly: if (WARN_ONCE(*cpa->vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK, "Misaligned address: 0x%lx\n", *cpa->vaddr)) *cpa->vaddr &= PAGE_MASK; > + } > + > + addr = *cpa->vaddr; > + numpages = cpa->numpages; > + > + /* Must avoid aliasing mappings in the highmem code */ > + kmap_flush_unused(); > + vm_unmap_aliases(); > + > + ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(cpa, 1); > + > + /* Check whether we really changed something */ > + if (!(cpa->flags & CPA_FLUSHTLB)) > + goto out; > + > + /* > + * On success we use CLFLUSH, when the CPU supports it to > + * avoid the WBINVD. > + */ > + if (!ret && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH)) > + cpa_flush_range(addr, numpages, 1); > + else > + cpa_flush_all(1); So if we fail (ret != 0) we do WBINVD unconditionally even if we don't have to? Don't you want this instead: ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(cpa, 1); if (ret) goto out; /* Check whether we really changed something */ if (!(cpa->flags & CPA_FLUSHTLB)) goto out; /* * On success we use CLFLUSH, when the CPU supports it to * avoid the WBINVD. */ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH)) cpa_flush_range(addr, numpages, 1); else cpa_flush_all(1); out: return ret; } ? -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org> To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org> Cc: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, "Matt Fleming" <matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>, x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org, linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org, "Alexander Potapenko" <glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>, linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>, linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, "Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>, "Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 19:23:15 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20160909172314.ifcteua7nr52mzgs@pd.tnic> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20160822223749.29880.10183.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org> On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 05:37:49PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > This patch adds support to be change the memory encryption attribute for > one or more memory pages. > > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org> > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 3 + > arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 13 ++++++ > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 134 insertions(+) ... > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c > index 72c292d..0ba9382 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c > @@ -1728,6 +1728,81 @@ int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages) > __pgprot(0), 1, 0, NULL); > } > > +static int __set_memory_enc_dec(struct cpa_data *cpa) > +{ > + unsigned long addr; > + int numpages; > + int ret; > + > + if (*cpa->vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK) { > + *cpa->vaddr &= PAGE_MASK; > + > + /* People should not be passing in unaligned addresses */ > + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); Let's make this more user-friendly: if (WARN_ONCE(*cpa->vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK, "Misaligned address: 0x%lx\n", *cpa->vaddr)) *cpa->vaddr &= PAGE_MASK; > + } > + > + addr = *cpa->vaddr; > + numpages = cpa->numpages; > + > + /* Must avoid aliasing mappings in the highmem code */ > + kmap_flush_unused(); > + vm_unmap_aliases(); > + > + ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(cpa, 1); > + > + /* Check whether we really changed something */ > + if (!(cpa->flags & CPA_FLUSHTLB)) > + goto out; > + > + /* > + * On success we use CLFLUSH, when the CPU supports it to > + * avoid the WBINVD. > + */ > + if (!ret && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH)) > + cpa_flush_range(addr, numpages, 1); > + else > + cpa_flush_all(1); So if we fail (ret != 0) we do WBINVD unconditionally even if we don't have to? Don't you want this instead: ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(cpa, 1); if (ret) goto out; /* Check whether we really changed something */ if (!(cpa->flags & CPA_FLUSHTLB)) goto out; /* * On success we use CLFLUSH, when the CPU supports it to * avoid the WBINVD. */ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH)) cpa_flush_range(addr, numpages, 1); else cpa_flush_all(1); out: return ret; } ? -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-09-09 17:23 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 229+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-08-22 22:35 [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-02 8:50 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-02 8:50 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-07 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-07 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-07 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-07 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-07 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-25 3:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-08-25 3:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-02 11:03 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-02 11:03 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-07 14:03 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-07 14:03 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-25 13:04 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-08-25 13:04 ` Thomas Gleixner 2016-08-30 13:19 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-30 13:19 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-30 14:57 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-08-30 14:57 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-08-30 14:57 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-08-31 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-31 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-31 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-02 14:09 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-02 14:09 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-07 14:07 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-07 14:07 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-02 18:14 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-02 18:14 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-07 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-07 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-05 8:48 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-05 8:48 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-07 14:16 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-07 14:16 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-05 15:22 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-05 15:22 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-07 14:19 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-07 14:19 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-07 14:19 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-06 9:31 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-06 9:31 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-07 14:30 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-07 14:30 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-07 14:30 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-07 15:55 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-07 15:55 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-08 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-08 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-08 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-08 13:55 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-08 13:55 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/20] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-06 16:12 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-06 16:12 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-09 15:53 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-09 15:53 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 16:33 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 16:33 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-14 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-09 16:38 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-09 16:38 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 16:35 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 16:35 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 16:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-12 16:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-12 16:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-14 14:20 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 14:20 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 14:20 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-15 9:57 ` Matt Fleming 2016-09-15 9:57 ` Matt Fleming 2016-09-15 9:57 ` Matt Fleming 2016-09-15 16:52 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-15 16:52 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-15 16:52 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-09 17:23 ` Borislav Petkov [this message] 2016-09-09 17:23 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 16:41 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 16:41 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-09 17:34 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-09 17:34 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 15:43 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 15:43 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-14 13:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 13:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 13:36 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 11:45 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 11:45 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-14 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-14 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-15 16:57 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-15 16:57 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-15 16:57 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-16 7:08 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-16 7:08 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 12:17 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 12:17 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-14 13:50 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 13:50 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-14 14:12 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 14:12 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 14:12 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-14 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-14 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 14:51 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-14 14:51 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-15 17:08 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-15 17:08 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-15 17:08 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-16 7:11 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-16 7:11 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-08-22 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:39 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:39 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-08-22 22:39 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-12 17:08 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-12 17:08 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-09-14 14:31 ` Tom Lendacky 2016-09-14 14:31 ` Tom Lendacky
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=20160909172314.ifcteua7nr52mzgs@pd.tnic \ --to=bp@alien8.de \ --cc=arnd@arndb.de \ --cc=aryabinin@virtuozzo.com \ --cc=corbet@lwn.net \ --cc=dvyukov@google.com \ --cc=glider@google.com \ --cc=hpa@zytor.com \ --cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \ --cc=joro@8bytes.org \ --cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \ --cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \ --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \ --cc=luto@kernel.org \ --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \ --cc=mingo@redhat.com \ --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \ --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \ --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \ --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \ --cc=x86@kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.