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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 09:30:54 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f4125cae-63af-f8c7-086f-e297ce480a07@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160906093113.GA18319@pd.tnic>

On 09/06/2016 04:31 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 05:36:46PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Adding general kernel support for memory encryption includes:
>> - Modify and create some page table macros to include the Secure Memory
>>   Encryption (SME) memory encryption mask
>> - Update kernel boot support to call an SME routine that checks for and
>>   sets the SME capability (the SME routine will grow later and for now
>>   is just a stub routine)
>> - Update kernel boot support to call an SME routine that encrypts the
>>   kernel (the SME routine will grow later and for now is just a stub
>>   routine)
>> - Provide an SME initialization routine to update the protection map with
>>   the memory encryption mask so that it is used by default
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> 
> ...
> 
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> index 54a2372..88c7bae 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
>>  #include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
>>  #include <asm/microcode.h>
>>  #include <asm/kasan.h>
>> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
>>  
>>  /*
>>   * Manage page tables very early on.
>> @@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
>>  {
>>  	memset(early_level4_pgt, 0, sizeof(pgd_t)*(PTRS_PER_PGD-1));
>>  	next_early_pgt = 0;
>> -	write_cr3(__pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>> +	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>>  }
>>  
>>  /* Create a new PMD entry */
>> @@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
>>  	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
>>  
>>  	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
>> -	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
>> +	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
>>  		return -1;
>>  
>>  again:
>> @@ -157,6 +158,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
>>  
>>  	clear_page(init_level4_pgt);
>>  
>> +	/* Update the early_pmd_flags with the memory encryption mask */
>> +	early_pmd_flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
>> +
>> +	sme_early_init();
>> +
> 
> So maybe this comes later but you're setting _PAGE_ENC unconditionally
> *before* sme_early_init().
> 
> I think you should set it in sme_early_init() and iff SME is enabled.

_PAGE_ENC is #defined as sme_me_mask and sme_me_mask has already been
set (or not set) at this point - so it will be the mask if SME is
active or 0 if SME is not active.  sme_early_init() is merely
propagating the mask to other structures.  Since early_pmd_flags is
mainly used in this file (one line in head_64.S is the other place) I
felt it best to modify it here.  But it can always be moved if you feel
that is best.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Matt Fleming"
	<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
	x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org,
	"Alexander Potapenko"
	<glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin"
	<aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org,
	"Paolo Bonzini"
	<pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 09:30:54 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f4125cae-63af-f8c7-086f-e297ce480a07@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160906093113.GA18319-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>

On 09/06/2016 04:31 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 05:36:46PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Adding general kernel support for memory encryption includes:
>> - Modify and create some page table macros to include the Secure Memory
>>   Encryption (SME) memory encryption mask
>> - Update kernel boot support to call an SME routine that checks for and
>>   sets the SME capability (the SME routine will grow later and for now
>>   is just a stub routine)
>> - Update kernel boot support to call an SME routine that encrypts the
>>   kernel (the SME routine will grow later and for now is just a stub
>>   routine)
>> - Provide an SME initialization routine to update the protection map with
>>   the memory encryption mask so that it is used by default
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
> 
> ...
> 
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> index 54a2372..88c7bae 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
>>  #include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
>>  #include <asm/microcode.h>
>>  #include <asm/kasan.h>
>> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
>>  
>>  /*
>>   * Manage page tables very early on.
>> @@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
>>  {
>>  	memset(early_level4_pgt, 0, sizeof(pgd_t)*(PTRS_PER_PGD-1));
>>  	next_early_pgt = 0;
>> -	write_cr3(__pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>> +	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>>  }
>>  
>>  /* Create a new PMD entry */
>> @@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
>>  	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
>>  
>>  	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
>> -	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
>> +	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
>>  		return -1;
>>  
>>  again:
>> @@ -157,6 +158,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
>>  
>>  	clear_page(init_level4_pgt);
>>  
>> +	/* Update the early_pmd_flags with the memory encryption mask */
>> +	early_pmd_flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
>> +
>> +	sme_early_init();
>> +
> 
> So maybe this comes later but you're setting _PAGE_ENC unconditionally
> *before* sme_early_init().
> 
> I think you should set it in sme_early_init() and iff SME is enabled.

_PAGE_ENC is #defined as sme_me_mask and sme_me_mask has already been
set (or not set) at this point - so it will be the mask if SME is
active or 0 if SME is not active.  sme_early_init() is merely
propagating the mask to other structures.  Since early_pmd_flags is
mainly used in this file (one line in head_64.S is the other place) I
felt it best to modify it here.  But it can always be moved if you feel
that is best.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 09:30:54 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f4125cae-63af-f8c7-086f-e297ce480a07@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160906093113.GA18319@pd.tnic>

On 09/06/2016 04:31 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 05:36:46PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Adding general kernel support for memory encryption includes:
>> - Modify and create some page table macros to include the Secure Memory
>>   Encryption (SME) memory encryption mask
>> - Update kernel boot support to call an SME routine that checks for and
>>   sets the SME capability (the SME routine will grow later and for now
>>   is just a stub routine)
>> - Update kernel boot support to call an SME routine that encrypts the
>>   kernel (the SME routine will grow later and for now is just a stub
>>   routine)
>> - Provide an SME initialization routine to update the protection map with
>>   the memory encryption mask so that it is used by default
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> 
> ...
> 
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> index 54a2372..88c7bae 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
>>  #include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
>>  #include <asm/microcode.h>
>>  #include <asm/kasan.h>
>> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
>>  
>>  /*
>>   * Manage page tables very early on.
>> @@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
>>  {
>>  	memset(early_level4_pgt, 0, sizeof(pgd_t)*(PTRS_PER_PGD-1));
>>  	next_early_pgt = 0;
>> -	write_cr3(__pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>> +	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>>  }
>>  
>>  /* Create a new PMD entry */
>> @@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
>>  	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
>>  
>>  	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
>> -	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
>> +	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
>>  		return -1;
>>  
>>  again:
>> @@ -157,6 +158,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
>>  
>>  	clear_page(init_level4_pgt);
>>  
>> +	/* Update the early_pmd_flags with the memory encryption mask */
>> +	early_pmd_flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
>> +
>> +	sme_early_init();
>> +
> 
> So maybe this comes later but you're setting _PAGE_ENC unconditionally
> *before* sme_early_init().
> 
> I think you should set it in sme_early_init() and iff SME is enabled.

_PAGE_ENC is #defined as sme_me_mask and sme_me_mask has already been
set (or not set) at this point - so it will be the mask if SME is
active or 0 if SME is not active.  sme_early_init() is merely
propagating the mask to other structures.  Since early_pmd_flags is
mainly used in this file (one line in head_64.S is the other place) I
felt it best to modify it here.  But it can always be moved if you feel
that is best.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

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  reply	other threads:[~2016-09-07 14:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 229+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 22:35 [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02  8:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02  8:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 15:23         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25  3:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-25  3:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 11:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 11:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 13:04   ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-25 13:04     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-30 13:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 13:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 14:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 14:57         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 14:57         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-31 13:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-31 13:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 14:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 14:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:07     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:07       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 18:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 18:14     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:11     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:11       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05  8:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-05  8:48     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:16       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05 15:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-05 15:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06  9:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-06  9:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:30     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-09-07 14:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 15:55         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:55             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 13:43             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 13:43               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/20] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06 16:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-06 16:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 15:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 15:53     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:33         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:11         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:11           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:11           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 16:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 16:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:35       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:35         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:55   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-12 16:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-12 16:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 14:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15  9:57         ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15  9:57         ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15 16:52         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:52           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:52           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 17:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:41     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:41       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:41       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 17:34     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 10:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 11:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 11:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:45     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:45       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:45       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 16:57         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:57           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:57           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:08           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-16  7:08             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 12:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 12:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:50       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 14:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 17:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 17:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 17:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:11           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-16  7:11             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 17:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 17:08     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:31     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:31       ` Tom Lendacky

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