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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted
Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2016 12:08:04 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b734c2da-fee4-efae-fda2-bbcd74abbb33@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914145101.GB9295@nazgul.tnic>

On 09/14/2016 09:51 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 09:29:41AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> This is still required because just using the __va() would still cause
>> the mapping created to have the encryption bit set. The ioremap call
>> will result in the mapping not having the encryption bit set.
> 
> I meant this: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160902181447.GA25328@nazgul.tnic
> 
> Wouldn't simply clearing the SME mask work?
> 
> #define __va(x)			((void *)(((unsigned long)(x)+PAGE_OFFSET) & ~sme_me_mask))
> 
> Or are you saying, one needs the whole noodling through ioremap_cache()
> because the data is already encrypted and accessing it with sme_me_mask
> cleared would simply give you the encrypted garbage?

The problem is that this physical address does not contain the
encryption bit, and even if it did, it wouldn't matter.  The __va()
define creates a virtual address that will be mapped as encrypted given
the current approach (which is how I found this).  It's only ioremap()
that would create a mapping without the encryption attribute and since
this is unencrypted data it needs to be access accordingly.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Matt Fleming"
	<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
	x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org,
	"Alexander Potapenko"
	<glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin"
	<aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org,
	"Paolo Bonzini"
	<pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted
Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2016 12:08:04 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b734c2da-fee4-efae-fda2-bbcd74abbb33@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914145101.GB9295-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>

On 09/14/2016 09:51 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 09:29:41AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> This is still required because just using the __va() would still cause
>> the mapping created to have the encryption bit set. The ioremap call
>> will result in the mapping not having the encryption bit set.
> 
> I meant this: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160902181447.GA25328-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org
> 
> Wouldn't simply clearing the SME mask work?
> 
> #define __va(x)			((void *)(((unsigned long)(x)+PAGE_OFFSET) & ~sme_me_mask))
> 
> Or are you saying, one needs the whole noodling through ioremap_cache()
> because the data is already encrypted and accessing it with sme_me_mask
> cleared would simply give you the encrypted garbage?

The problem is that this physical address does not contain the
encryption bit, and even if it did, it wouldn't matter.  The __va()
define creates a virtual address that will be mapped as encrypted given
the current approach (which is how I found this).  It's only ioremap()
that would create a mapping without the encryption attribute and since
this is unencrypted data it needs to be access accordingly.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted
Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2016 12:08:04 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b734c2da-fee4-efae-fda2-bbcd74abbb33@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914145101.GB9295@nazgul.tnic>

On 09/14/2016 09:51 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 09:29:41AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> This is still required because just using the __va() would still cause
>> the mapping created to have the encryption bit set. The ioremap call
>> will result in the mapping not having the encryption bit set.
> 
> I meant this: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160902181447.GA25328@nazgul.tnic
> 
> Wouldn't simply clearing the SME mask work?
> 
> #define __va(x)			((void *)(((unsigned long)(x)+PAGE_OFFSET) & ~sme_me_mask))
> 
> Or are you saying, one needs the whole noodling through ioremap_cache()
> because the data is already encrypted and accessing it with sme_me_mask
> cleared would simply give you the encrypted garbage?

The problem is that this physical address does not contain the
encryption bit, and even if it did, it wouldn't matter.  The __va()
define creates a virtual address that will be mapped as encrypted given
the current approach (which is how I found this).  It's only ioremap()
that would create a mapping without the encryption attribute and since
this is unencrypted data it needs to be access accordingly.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

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  reply	other threads:[~2016-09-15 17:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 229+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 22:35 [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02  8:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02  8:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 15:23         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25  3:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-25  3:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 11:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 11:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 13:04   ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-25 13:04     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-30 13:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 13:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 14:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 14:57         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 14:57         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-31 13:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-31 13:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 14:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 14:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:07     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:07       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 18:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 18:14     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:11     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:11       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05  8:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-05  8:48     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:16       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05 15:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-05 15:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06  9:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-06  9:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:30     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 15:55         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:55             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 13:43             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 13:43               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/20] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06 16:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-06 16:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 15:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 15:53     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:33         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:11         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:11           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:11           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 16:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 16:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:35       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:35         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:55   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-12 16:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-12 16:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 14:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15  9:57         ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15  9:57         ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15 16:52         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:52           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:52           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 17:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:41     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:41       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:41       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 17:34     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 10:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 11:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 11:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:45     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:45       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:45       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 16:57         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:57           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:57           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:08           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-16  7:08             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 12:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 12:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:50       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 14:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 17:08         ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-09-15 17:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 17:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:11           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-16  7:11             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 17:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 17:08     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:31     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:31       ` Tom Lendacky

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