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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, Matt Fleming <mfleming@suse.de>
Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "X86 ML" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"kvm list" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 09:55:09 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUk2kRSzKfwhio6KV3iuYaSV2uxybd-e95kK3vY=yTSfg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160822223738.29880.6909.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On Aug 22, 2016 6:53 PM, "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>
> BOOT data (such as EFI related data) is not encyrpted when the system is
> booted and needs to be accessed as non-encrypted.  Add support to the
> early_memremap API to identify the type of data being accessed so that
> the proper encryption attribute can be applied.  Currently, two types
> of data are defined, KERNEL_DATA and BOOT_DATA.

What happens when you memremap boot services data outside of early
boot?  Matt just added code that does this.

IMO this API is not so great.  It scatters a specialized consideration
all over the place.  Could early_memremap not look up the PA to figure
out what to do?

--Andy

[leaving the rest here for Matt's benefit]

>                      unsigned long size,
> +                                                   enum memremap_owner owner,
> +                                                   pgprot_t prot)
> +{
> +       return prot;
> +}
> +
>  void __init early_ioremap_reset(void)
>  {
>         early_ioremap_shutdown();
> @@ -213,16 +221,23 @@ early_ioremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
>
>  /* Remap memory */
>  void __init *
> -early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +              enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
> -       return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size,
> -                                              FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL);
> +       pgprot_t prot = early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(phys_addr, size, owner,
> +                                                    FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL);
> +
> +       return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
>  }
>  #ifdef FIXMAP_PAGE_RO
>  void __init *
> -early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +                 enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
> -       return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, FIXMAP_PAGE_RO);
> +       pgprot_t prot = early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(phys_addr, size, owner,
> +                                                    FIXMAP_PAGE_RO);
> +
> +       return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
>  }
>  #endif
>
> @@ -236,7 +251,8 @@ early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
>
>  #define MAX_MAP_CHUNK  (NR_FIX_BTMAPS << PAGE_SHIFT)
>
> -void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size)
> +void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size,
> +                               enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
>         unsigned long slop, clen;
>         char *p;
> @@ -246,7 +262,7 @@ void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size)
>                 clen = size;
>                 if (clen > MAX_MAP_CHUNK - slop)
>                         clen = MAX_MAP_CHUNK - slop;
> -               p = early_memremap(src & PAGE_MASK, clen + slop);
> +               p = early_memremap(src & PAGE_MASK, clen + slop, owner);
>                 memcpy(dest, p + slop, clen);
>                 early_memunmap(p, clen + slop);
>                 dest += clen;
> @@ -265,12 +281,14 @@ early_ioremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
>
>  /* Remap memory */
>  void __init *
> -early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +              enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
>         return (void *)phys_addr;
>  }
>  void __init *
> -early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +                 enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
>         return (void *)phys_addr;
>  }
>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, Matt Fleming <mfleming@suse.de>
Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 09:55:09 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUk2kRSzKfwhio6KV3iuYaSV2uxybd-e95kK3vY=yTSfg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160822223738.29880.6909.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On Aug 22, 2016 6:53 PM, "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>
> BOOT data (such as EFI related data) is not encyrpted when the system is
> booted and needs to be accessed as non-encrypted.  Add support to the
> early_memremap API to identify the type of data being accessed so that
> the proper encryption attribute can be applied.  Currently, two types
> of data are defined, KERNEL_DATA and BOOT_DATA.

What happens when you memremap boot services data outside of early
boot?  Matt just added code that does this.

IMO this API is not so great.  It scatters a specialized consideration
all over the place.  Could early_memremap not look up the PA to figure
out what to do?

--Andy

[leaving the rest here for Matt's benefit]

>                      unsigned long size,
> +                                                   enum memremap_owner owner,
> +                                                   pgprot_t prot)
> +{
> +       return prot;
> +}
> +
>  void __init early_ioremap_reset(void)
>  {
>         early_ioremap_shutdown();
> @@ -213,16 +221,23 @@ early_ioremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
>
>  /* Remap memory */
>  void __init *
> -early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +              enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
> -       return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size,
> -                                              FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL);
> +       pgprot_t prot = early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(phys_addr, size, owner,
> +                                                    FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL);
> +
> +       return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
>  }
>  #ifdef FIXMAP_PAGE_RO
>  void __init *
> -early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +                 enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
> -       return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, FIXMAP_PAGE_RO);
> +       pgprot_t prot = early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(phys_addr, size, owner,
> +                                                    FIXMAP_PAGE_RO);
> +
> +       return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
>  }
>  #endif
>
> @@ -236,7 +251,8 @@ early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
>
>  #define MAX_MAP_CHUNK  (NR_FIX_BTMAPS << PAGE_SHIFT)
>
> -void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size)
> +void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size,
> +                               enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
>         unsigned long slop, clen;
>         char *p;
> @@ -246,7 +262,7 @@ void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size)
>                 clen = size;
>                 if (clen > MAX_MAP_CHUNK - slop)
>                         clen = MAX_MAP_CHUNK - slop;
> -               p = early_memremap(src & PAGE_MASK, clen + slop);
> +               p = early_memremap(src & PAGE_MASK, clen + slop, owner);
>                 memcpy(dest, p + slop, clen);
>                 early_memunmap(p, clen + slop);
>                 dest += clen;
> @@ -265,12 +281,14 @@ early_ioremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
>
>  /* Remap memory */
>  void __init *
> -early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +              enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
>         return (void *)phys_addr;
>  }
>  void __init *
> -early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +                 enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
>         return (void *)phys_addr;
>  }
>

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, Matt Fleming <mfleming@suse.de>
Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "X86 ML" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"kvm list" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 09:55:09 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUk2kRSzKfwhio6KV3iuYaSV2uxybd-e95kK3vY=yTSfg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160822223738.29880.6909.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On Aug 22, 2016 6:53 PM, "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>
> BOOT data (such as EFI related data) is not encyrpted when the system is
> booted and needs to be accessed as non-encrypted.  Add support to the
> early_memremap API to identify the type of data being accessed so that
> the proper encryption attribute can be applied.  Currently, two types
> of data are defined, KERNEL_DATA and BOOT_DATA.

What happens when you memremap boot services data outside of early
boot?  Matt just added code that does this.

IMO this API is not so great.  It scatters a specialized consideration
all over the place.  Could early_memremap not look up the PA to figure
out what to do?

--Andy

[leaving the rest here for Matt's benefit]

>                      unsigned long size,
> +                                                   enum memremap_owner owner,
> +                                                   pgprot_t prot)
> +{
> +       return prot;
> +}
> +
>  void __init early_ioremap_reset(void)
>  {
>         early_ioremap_shutdown();
> @@ -213,16 +221,23 @@ early_ioremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
>
>  /* Remap memory */
>  void __init *
> -early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +              enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
> -       return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size,
> -                                              FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL);
> +       pgprot_t prot = early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(phys_addr, size, owner,
> +                                                    FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL);
> +
> +       return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
>  }
>  #ifdef FIXMAP_PAGE_RO
>  void __init *
> -early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +                 enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
> -       return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, FIXMAP_PAGE_RO);
> +       pgprot_t prot = early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(phys_addr, size, owner,
> +                                                    FIXMAP_PAGE_RO);
> +
> +       return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
>  }
>  #endif
>
> @@ -236,7 +251,8 @@ early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
>
>  #define MAX_MAP_CHUNK  (NR_FIX_BTMAPS << PAGE_SHIFT)
>
> -void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size)
> +void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size,
> +                               enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
>         unsigned long slop, clen;
>         char *p;
> @@ -246,7 +262,7 @@ void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size)
>                 clen = size;
>                 if (clen > MAX_MAP_CHUNK - slop)
>                         clen = MAX_MAP_CHUNK - slop;
> -               p = early_memremap(src & PAGE_MASK, clen + slop);
> +               p = early_memremap(src & PAGE_MASK, clen + slop, owner);
>                 memcpy(dest, p + slop, clen);
>                 early_memunmap(p, clen + slop);
>                 dest += clen;
> @@ -265,12 +281,14 @@ early_ioremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
>
>  /* Remap memory */
>  void __init *
> -early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +              enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
>         return (void *)phys_addr;
>  }
>  void __init *
> -early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +                 enum memremap_owner owner)
>  {
>         return (void *)phys_addr;
>  }
>

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-09-12 16:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 229+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 22:35 [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02  8:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02  8:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 15:23         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25  3:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-25  3:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 11:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 11:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 13:04   ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-25 13:04     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-30 13:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 13:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 14:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 14:57         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 14:57         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-31 13:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-31 13:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 14:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 14:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:07     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:07       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 18:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 18:14     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:11     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:11       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05  8:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-05  8:48     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:16       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05 15:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-05 15:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06  9:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-06  9:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:30     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 15:55         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:55             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 13:43             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 13:43               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/20] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06 16:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-06 16:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 15:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 15:53     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:33         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:11         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:11           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:11           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 16:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 16:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:35       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:35         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:55   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2016-09-12 16:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-12 16:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 14:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15  9:57         ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15  9:57         ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15 16:52         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:52           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:52           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 17:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:41     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:41       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:41       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 17:34     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 10:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 11:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 11:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:45     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:45       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:45       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 16:57         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:57           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:57           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:08           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-16  7:08             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 12:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 12:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:50       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 14:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 17:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 17:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 17:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:11           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-16  7:11             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 17:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 17:08     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:31     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:31       ` Tom Lendacky

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