From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: [PATCH v6 10/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Date: Thu, 4 May 2023 14:50:19 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20230504145023.835096-11-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20230504145023.835096-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> Prior to running the next kernel via kexec, the Secure Launch code closes down private SMX resources and does an SEXIT. This allows the next kernel to start normally without any issues starting the APs etc. Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/kexec_core.c | 4 +++ 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c index 7dba088..176c029 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c @@ -495,3 +495,72 @@ void __init slaunch_setup_txt(void) pr_info("Intel TXT setup complete\n"); } + +static inline void smx_getsec_sexit(void) +{ + asm volatile (".byte 0x0f,0x37\n" + : : "a" (SMX_X86_GETSEC_SEXIT)); +} + +void slaunch_finalize(int do_sexit) +{ + u64 one = TXT_REGVALUE_ONE, val; + void __iomem *config; + + if ((slaunch_get_flags() & (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE|SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) != + (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) + return; + + config = ioremap(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * + PAGE_SIZE); + if (!config) { + pr_emerg("Error SEXIT failed to ioremap TXT private reqs\n"); + return; + } + + /* Clear secrets bit for SEXIT */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_NO_SECRETS, &one, sizeof(one)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + /* Unlock memory configurations */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG, &one, sizeof(one)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + /* Close the TXT private register space */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_CLOSE_PRIVATE, &one, sizeof(one)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + /* + * Calls to iounmap are not being done because of the state of the + * system this late in the kexec process. Local IRQs are disabled and + * iounmap causes a TLB flush which in turn causes a warning. Leaving + * thse mappings is not an issue since the next kernel is going to + * completely re-setup memory management. + */ + + /* Map public registers and do a final read fence */ + config = ioremap(TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * + PAGE_SIZE); + if (!config) { + pr_emerg("Error SEXIT failed to ioremap TXT public reqs\n"); + return; + } + + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + pr_emerg("TXT clear secrets bit and unlock memory complete.\n"); + + if (!do_sexit) + return; + + if (smp_processor_id() != 0) + panic("Error TXT SEXIT must be called on CPU 0\n"); + + /* Disable SMX mode */ + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_SMXE); + + /* Do the SEXIT SMX operation */ + smx_getsec_sexit(); + + pr_info("TXT SEXIT complete.\n"); +} diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c index 3d578c6..5d66d68 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/objtool.h> #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> +#include <linux/slaunch.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/sections.h> @@ -1275,6 +1276,9 @@ int kernel_kexec(void) cpu_hotplug_enable(); pr_notice("Starting new kernel\n"); machine_shutdown(); + + /* Finalize TXT registers and do SEXIT */ + slaunch_finalize(1); } kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_SHUTDOWN); -- 1.8.3.1 _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: [PATCH v6 10/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Date: Thu, 4 May 2023 14:50:19 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20230504145023.835096-11-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20230504145023.835096-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> Prior to running the next kernel via kexec, the Secure Launch code closes down private SMX resources and does an SEXIT. This allows the next kernel to start normally without any issues starting the APs etc. Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/kexec_core.c | 4 +++ 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c index 7dba088..176c029 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c @@ -495,3 +495,72 @@ void __init slaunch_setup_txt(void) pr_info("Intel TXT setup complete\n"); } + +static inline void smx_getsec_sexit(void) +{ + asm volatile (".byte 0x0f,0x37\n" + : : "a" (SMX_X86_GETSEC_SEXIT)); +} + +void slaunch_finalize(int do_sexit) +{ + u64 one = TXT_REGVALUE_ONE, val; + void __iomem *config; + + if ((slaunch_get_flags() & (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE|SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) != + (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) + return; + + config = ioremap(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * + PAGE_SIZE); + if (!config) { + pr_emerg("Error SEXIT failed to ioremap TXT private reqs\n"); + return; + } + + /* Clear secrets bit for SEXIT */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_NO_SECRETS, &one, sizeof(one)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + /* Unlock memory configurations */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG, &one, sizeof(one)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + /* Close the TXT private register space */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_CLOSE_PRIVATE, &one, sizeof(one)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + /* + * Calls to iounmap are not being done because of the state of the + * system this late in the kexec process. Local IRQs are disabled and + * iounmap causes a TLB flush which in turn causes a warning. Leaving + * thse mappings is not an issue since the next kernel is going to + * completely re-setup memory management. + */ + + /* Map public registers and do a final read fence */ + config = ioremap(TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * + PAGE_SIZE); + if (!config) { + pr_emerg("Error SEXIT failed to ioremap TXT public reqs\n"); + return; + } + + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + pr_emerg("TXT clear secrets bit and unlock memory complete.\n"); + + if (!do_sexit) + return; + + if (smp_processor_id() != 0) + panic("Error TXT SEXIT must be called on CPU 0\n"); + + /* Disable SMX mode */ + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_SMXE); + + /* Do the SEXIT SMX operation */ + smx_getsec_sexit(); + + pr_info("TXT SEXIT complete.\n"); +} diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c index 3d578c6..5d66d68 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/objtool.h> #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> +#include <linux/slaunch.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/sections.h> @@ -1275,6 +1276,9 @@ int kernel_kexec(void) cpu_hotplug_enable(); pr_notice("Starting new kernel\n"); machine_shutdown(); + + /* Finalize TXT registers and do SEXIT */ + slaunch_finalize(1); } kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_SHUTDOWN); -- 1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-04 14:51 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 200+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2023-05-04 14:50 [PATCH v6 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 01/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 16:19 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 16:19 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 17:32 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 17:32 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-06 8:48 ` Bagas Sanjaya 2023-05-06 8:48 ` Bagas Sanjaya 2023-05-10 15:41 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-10 15:41 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 10:47 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 10:47 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-06-16 16:44 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-06-16 16:44 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-06-16 16:54 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-06-16 16:54 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-06-16 18:21 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-06-16 18:21 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-12 13:19 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 13:19 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 03/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 04/14] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 16:22 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 16:22 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 17:34 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 17:34 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-10 23:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-10 23:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-15 20:58 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-15 20:58 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-12 10:55 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 10:55 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-15 21:15 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-15 21:15 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-15 21:22 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-15 21:22 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-16 0:41 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 0:41 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 1:43 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-16 1:43 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-06-16 20:01 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-06-16 20:01 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-06-16 20:15 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-06-16 20:15 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-07-07 19:31 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-07-07 19:31 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 05/14] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 16:25 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 16:25 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 17:37 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 17:37 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 11:00 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:00 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 16:10 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 16:10 ` Ross Philipson 2023-10-31 21:37 ` ross.philipson 2023-10-31 21:37 ` ross.philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 16:34 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 16:34 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-09 16:09 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-09 16:09 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-10 1:21 ` Eric Biggers 2023-05-10 1:21 ` Eric Biggers 2023-05-10 22:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-10 22:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-12 11:04 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:04 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2023-05-12 11:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2023-05-12 11:28 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:28 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:58 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2023-05-12 11:58 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2023-05-12 12:24 ` Andrew Cooper 2023-05-12 12:24 ` Andrew Cooper 2023-05-14 18:18 ` Eric Biggers 2023-05-14 18:18 ` Eric Biggers 2023-05-14 19:11 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-14 19:11 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 13:24 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 13:24 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 16:13 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 16:13 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 18:17 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 18:17 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 19:12 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 19:12 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 19:42 ` Andrew Cooper 2023-05-12 19:42 ` Andrew Cooper 2023-05-15 21:23 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-15 21:23 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-11 3:33 ` Herbert Xu 2023-05-11 3:33 ` Herbert Xu 2023-05-16 0:50 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 0:50 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 07/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 17:47 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 17:47 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 18:58 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 18:58 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 19:46 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 19:46 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-12 11:26 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:26 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 16:17 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 16:17 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 16:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 16:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-16 1:11 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 1:11 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 1:45 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-16 1:45 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-06-15 18:00 ` Ross Philipson 2023-06-15 18:00 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 18:04 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 18:04 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-15 20:13 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-15 20:13 ` Ross Philipson 2023-09-20 21:40 ` ross.philipson 2023-09-20 21:40 ` ross.philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 17:52 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 17:52 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 18:59 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 18:59 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-10 23:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-10 23:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-12 15:58 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 15:58 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-24 2:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-24 2:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-12 15:44 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 15:44 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-15 20:06 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-15 20:06 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 09/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 17:54 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 17:54 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 18:59 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 18:59 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-10 22:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-10 22:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-11 16:21 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-11 16:21 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 18:02 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 18:02 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-15 20:19 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-15 20:19 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson [this message] 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 10/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 11/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 11:40 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:40 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-15 18:16 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-15 18:16 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-16 1:23 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 1:23 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 12/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 19:42 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 19:42 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-08 15:07 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-08 15:07 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-10 22:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-10 22:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-12 15:53 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 15:53 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-10 22:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-10 22:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-12 15:54 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 15:54 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 13/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 11:43 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:43 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 16:22 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 16:22 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-16 1:37 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 1:37 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 14/14] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support " Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 8:39 ` [PATCH v6 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Bagas Sanjaya 2023-05-05 8:39 ` Bagas Sanjaya 2023-05-05 15:45 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 15:45 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-06 7:56 ` Bagas Sanjaya 2023-05-06 7:56 ` Bagas Sanjaya
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=20230504145023.835096-11-ross.philipson@oracle.com \ --to=ross.philipson@oracle.com \ --cc=James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \ --cc=ardb@kernel.org \ --cc=bp@alien8.de \ --cc=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com \ --cc=hpa@zytor.com \ --cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \ --cc=kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com \ --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \ --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=luto@amacapital.net \ --cc=mingo@redhat.com \ --cc=mjg59@srcf.ucam.org \ --cc=nivedita@alum.mit.edu \ --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \ --cc=trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com \ --cc=x86@kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.