From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 15:19:46 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <87sfc1bsb1.ffs@tglx> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20230504145023.835096-3-ross.philipson@oracle.com> On Thu, May 04 2023 at 14:50, Ross Philipson wrote: > +KASLR Configuration > +------------------- > + > +Secure Launch does not interoperate with KASLR. If possible, the MLE should be > +built with KASLR disabled:: Why? > + "Processor type and features" --> > + "Build a relocatable kernel" --> > + "Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR) [ ]" > + > +This unsets the Kconfig value CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE. > + > +If not possible, KASLR must be disabled on the kernel command line when doing > +a Secure Launch as follows:: > + > + nokaslr So what happens if KASLR is enabled in Kconfig and not disabled on the command line? > +IOMMU Configuration > +------------------- > + > +When doing a Secure Launch, the IOMMU should always be enabled and the drivers > +loaded. However, IOMMU passthrough mode should never be used. This leaves the > +MLE completely exposed to DMA after the PMR's [2]_ are disabled. The current default > +mode is to use IOMMU in lazy translated mode but strict translated mode is the preferred > +IOMMU mode and this should be selected in the build configuration:: > + > + "Device Drivers" --> > + "IOMMU Hardware Support" --> > + "IOMMU default domain type" --> > + "(X) Translated - Strict" > + > +In addition, the Intel IOMMU should be on by default. The following sets this as the > +default in the build configuration:: > + > + "Device Drivers" --> > + "IOMMU Hardware Support" --> > + "Support for Intel IOMMU using DMA Remapping Devices [*]" > + > +and:: > + > + "Device Drivers" --> > + "IOMMU Hardware Support" --> > + "Support for Intel IOMMU using DMA Remapping Devices [*]" --> > + "Enable Intel DMA Remapping Devices by default [*]" > + > +It is recommended that no other command line options should be set to override > +the defaults above. Is any of this validated and are proper warnings emitted or is it just recommended and left to the user to do the right thing? Thanks, tglx
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 15:19:46 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <87sfc1bsb1.ffs@tglx> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20230504145023.835096-3-ross.philipson@oracle.com> On Thu, May 04 2023 at 14:50, Ross Philipson wrote: > +KASLR Configuration > +------------------- > + > +Secure Launch does not interoperate with KASLR. If possible, the MLE should be > +built with KASLR disabled:: Why? > + "Processor type and features" --> > + "Build a relocatable kernel" --> > + "Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR) [ ]" > + > +This unsets the Kconfig value CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE. > + > +If not possible, KASLR must be disabled on the kernel command line when doing > +a Secure Launch as follows:: > + > + nokaslr So what happens if KASLR is enabled in Kconfig and not disabled on the command line? > +IOMMU Configuration > +------------------- > + > +When doing a Secure Launch, the IOMMU should always be enabled and the drivers > +loaded. However, IOMMU passthrough mode should never be used. This leaves the > +MLE completely exposed to DMA after the PMR's [2]_ are disabled. The current default > +mode is to use IOMMU in lazy translated mode but strict translated mode is the preferred > +IOMMU mode and this should be selected in the build configuration:: > + > + "Device Drivers" --> > + "IOMMU Hardware Support" --> > + "IOMMU default domain type" --> > + "(X) Translated - Strict" > + > +In addition, the Intel IOMMU should be on by default. The following sets this as the > +default in the build configuration:: > + > + "Device Drivers" --> > + "IOMMU Hardware Support" --> > + "Support for Intel IOMMU using DMA Remapping Devices [*]" > + > +and:: > + > + "Device Drivers" --> > + "IOMMU Hardware Support" --> > + "Support for Intel IOMMU using DMA Remapping Devices [*]" --> > + "Enable Intel DMA Remapping Devices by default [*]" > + > +It is recommended that no other command line options should be set to override > +the defaults above. Is any of this validated and are proper warnings emitted or is it just recommended and left to the user to do the right thing? Thanks, tglx _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-12 13:20 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 200+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2023-05-04 14:50 [PATCH v6 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 01/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 16:19 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 16:19 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 17:32 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 17:32 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-06 8:48 ` Bagas Sanjaya 2023-05-06 8:48 ` Bagas Sanjaya 2023-05-10 15:41 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-10 15:41 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 10:47 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 10:47 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-06-16 16:44 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-06-16 16:44 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-06-16 16:54 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-06-16 16:54 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-06-16 18:21 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-06-16 18:21 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-12 13:19 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message] 2023-05-12 13:19 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 03/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 04/14] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 16:22 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 16:22 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 17:34 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 17:34 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-10 23:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-10 23:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-15 20:58 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-15 20:58 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-12 10:55 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 10:55 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-15 21:15 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-15 21:15 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-15 21:22 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-15 21:22 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-16 0:41 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 0:41 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 1:43 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-16 1:43 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-06-16 20:01 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-06-16 20:01 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-06-16 20:15 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-06-16 20:15 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-07-07 19:31 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-07-07 19:31 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 05/14] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 16:25 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 16:25 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 17:37 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 17:37 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 11:00 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:00 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 16:10 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 16:10 ` Ross Philipson 2023-10-31 21:37 ` ross.philipson 2023-10-31 21:37 ` ross.philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 16:34 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 16:34 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-09 16:09 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-09 16:09 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-10 1:21 ` Eric Biggers 2023-05-10 1:21 ` Eric Biggers 2023-05-10 22:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-10 22:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-12 11:04 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:04 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2023-05-12 11:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2023-05-12 11:28 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:28 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:58 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2023-05-12 11:58 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2023-05-12 12:24 ` Andrew Cooper 2023-05-12 12:24 ` Andrew Cooper 2023-05-14 18:18 ` Eric Biggers 2023-05-14 18:18 ` Eric Biggers 2023-05-14 19:11 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-14 19:11 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 13:24 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 13:24 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 16:13 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 16:13 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 18:17 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 18:17 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 19:12 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 19:12 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 19:42 ` Andrew Cooper 2023-05-12 19:42 ` Andrew Cooper 2023-05-15 21:23 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-15 21:23 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-11 3:33 ` Herbert Xu 2023-05-11 3:33 ` Herbert Xu 2023-05-16 0:50 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 0:50 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 07/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 17:47 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 17:47 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 18:58 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 18:58 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 19:46 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 19:46 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-12 11:26 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:26 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 16:17 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 16:17 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 16:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 16:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-16 1:11 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 1:11 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 1:45 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-16 1:45 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-06-15 18:00 ` Ross Philipson 2023-06-15 18:00 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 18:04 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 18:04 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-15 20:13 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-15 20:13 ` Ross Philipson 2023-09-20 21:40 ` ross.philipson 2023-09-20 21:40 ` ross.philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 17:52 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 17:52 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 18:59 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 18:59 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-10 23:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-10 23:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-12 15:58 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 15:58 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-24 2:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-24 2:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-12 15:44 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 15:44 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-15 20:06 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-15 20:06 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 09/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 17:54 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 17:54 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 18:59 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 18:59 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-10 22:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-10 22:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-11 16:21 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-11 16:21 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 18:02 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-12 18:02 ` Thomas Gleixner 2023-05-15 20:19 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-15 20:19 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 10/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 11/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 11:40 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:40 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-15 18:16 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-15 18:16 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-16 1:23 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 1:23 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 12/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 19:42 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-05 19:42 ` Simon Horman 2023-05-08 15:07 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-08 15:07 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-10 22:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-10 22:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-12 15:53 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 15:53 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-10 22:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-10 22:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2023-05-12 15:54 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 15:54 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 13/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 11:43 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 11:43 ` Matthew Garrett 2023-05-12 16:22 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-12 16:22 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-16 1:37 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-16 1:37 ` Daniel P. Smith 2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 14/14] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support " Ross Philipson 2023-05-04 14:50 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 8:39 ` [PATCH v6 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Bagas Sanjaya 2023-05-05 8:39 ` Bagas Sanjaya 2023-05-05 15:45 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-05 15:45 ` Ross Philipson 2023-05-06 7:56 ` Bagas Sanjaya 2023-05-06 7:56 ` Bagas Sanjaya
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=87sfc1bsb1.ffs@tglx \ --to=tglx@linutronix.de \ --cc=James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \ --cc=ardb@kernel.org \ --cc=bp@alien8.de \ --cc=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com \ --cc=hpa@zytor.com \ --cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \ --cc=kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com \ --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \ --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=luto@amacapital.net \ --cc=mingo@redhat.com \ --cc=mjg59@srcf.ucam.org \ --cc=nivedita@alum.mit.edu \ --cc=ross.philipson@oracle.com \ --cc=trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com \ --cc=x86@kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.