From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>, Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, "selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>, "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" <intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>, "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, linux-man@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 12:48:25 +0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <0d2e2306-22b2-a730-dc3f-edb3538b6561@linux.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200710170911.GD7487@kernel.org> On 10.07.2020 20:09, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote: > Em Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 05:30:50PM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu: >> On 10.07.2020 16:31, Ravi Bangoria wrote: >>>> Currently access to perf_events, i915_perf and other performance >>>> monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel is open only for >>>> a privileged process [1] with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability enabled in the >>>> process effective set [2]. > >>>> This patch set introduces CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure >>>> system performance monitoring and observability operations so that >>>> CAP_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role >>>> for performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel. > >>> I'm seeing an issue with CAP_PERFMON when I try to record data for a >>> specific target. I don't know whether this is sort of a regression or >>> an expected behavior. > >> Thanks for reporting and root causing this case. The behavior looks like >> kind of expected since currently CAP_PERFMON takes over the related part >> of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials only. Actually Perf security docs [1] say >> that access control is also subject to CAP_SYS_PTRACE credentials. > > I think that stating that in the error message would be helpful, after > all, who reads docs? 8-) At least those who write it :D ... > > I.e., this: > > $ ./perf stat ls > Error: > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > $ > > Could become: > > $ ./perf stat ls > Error: > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > Right now only CAP_PERFMON is granted, you may need CAP_SYS_PTRACE. > $ It would better provide reference to perf security docs in the tool output. Looks like extending ptrace_may_access() check for perf_events with CAP_PERFMON makes monitoring simpler and even more secure to use since Perf tool need not to start/stop/single-step and read/write registers and memory and so on like a debugger or strace-like tool. What do you think? Alexei > > - Arnaldo > >> CAP_PERFMON could be used to extend and substitute ptrace_may_access() >> check in perf_events subsystem to simplify user experience at least in >> this specific case. >> >> Alexei >> >> [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html >> >>> >>> Without setting CAP_PERFMON: >>> >>> $ getcap ./perf >>> $ ./perf stat -a ls >>> Error: >>> Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. >>> $ ./perf stat ls >>> Performance counter stats for 'ls': >>> 2.06 msec task-clock:u # 0.418 CPUs utilized >>> 0 context-switches:u # 0.000 K/sec >>> 0 cpu-migrations:u # 0.000 K/sec >>> >>> With CAP_PERFMON: >>> >>> $ getcap ./perf >>> ./perf = cap_perfmon+ep >>> $ ./perf stat -a ls >>> Performance counter stats for 'system wide': >>> 142.42 msec cpu-clock # 25.062 CPUs utilized >>> 182 context-switches # 0.001 M/sec >>> 48 cpu-migrations # 0.337 K/sec >>> $ ./perf stat ls >>> Error: >>> Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. >>> >>> Am I missing something silly? >>> >>> Analysis: >>> --------- >>> A bit more analysis lead me to below kernel code fs/exec.c: >>> >>> begin_new_exec() >>> { >>> ... >>> if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP || >>> !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && >>> gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))) >>> set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); >>> else >>> set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER); >>> >>> ... >>> commit_creds(bprm->cred); >>> } >>> >>> When I execute './perf stat ls', it's going into else condition and thus sets >>> dumpable flag as SUID_DUMP_USER. Then in commit_creds(): >>> >>> int commit_creds(struct cred *new) >>> { >>> ... >>> /* dumpability changes */ >>> if (... >>> !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) { >>> if (task->mm) >>> set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable); >>> } >>> >>> !cred_cap_issubset(old, new) fails for perf without any capability and thus >>> it doesn't execute set_dumpable(). Whereas that condition passes for perf >>> with CAP_PERFMON and thus it overwrites old value (SUID_DUMP_USER) with >>> suid_dumpable in mm_flags. On an Ubuntu, suid_dumpable default value is >>> SUID_DUMP_ROOT. On Fedora, it's SUID_DUMP_DISABLE. (/proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable). >>> >>> Now while opening an event: >>> >>> perf_event_open() >>> ptrace_may_access() >>> __ptrace_may_access() { >>> ... >>> if (mm && >>> ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) && >>> !ptrace_has_cap(cred, mm->user_ns, mode))) >>> return -EPERM; >>> } >>> >>> This if condition passes for perf with CAP_PERFMON and thus it returns -EPERM. >>> But it fails for perf without CAP_PERFMON and thus it goes ahead and returns >>> success. So opening an event fails when perf has CAP_PREFMON and tries to open >>> process specific event as normal user. >>> >>> Workarounds: >>> ------------ >>> Based on above analysis, I found couple of workarounds (examples are on >>> Ubuntu 18.04.4 powerpc): >>> >>> Workaround1: >>> Setting SUID_DUMP_USER as default (in /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable) solves the >>> issue. >>> >>> # echo 1 > /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable >>> $ getcap ./perf >>> ./perf = cap_perfmon+ep >>> $ ./perf stat ls >>> Performance counter stats for 'ls': >>> 1.47 msec task-clock # 0.806 CPUs utilized >>> 0 context-switches # 0.000 K/sec >>> 0 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec >>> >>> Workaround2: >>> Using CAP_SYS_PTRACE along with CAP_PERFMON solves the issue. >>> >>> $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable >>> 2 >>> # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace=ep" ./perf >>> $ ./perf stat ls >>> Performance counter stats for 'ls': >>> 1.41 msec task-clock # 0.826 CPUs utilized >>> 0 context-switches # 0.000 K/sec >>> 0 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec >>> >>> Workaround3: >>> Adding CAP_PERFMON to parent of perf (/bin/bash) also solves the issue. >>> >>> $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable >>> 2 >>> # setcap "cap_perfmon=ep" /bin/bash >>> # setcap "cap_perfmon=ep" ./perf >>> $ bash >>> $ ./perf stat ls >>> Performance counter stats for 'ls': >>> 1.47 msec task-clock # 0.806 CPUs utilized >>> 0 context-switches # 0.000 K/sec >>> 0 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec >>> >>> - Ravi >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" <intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>, Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, "selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Subject: Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 12:48:25 +0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <0d2e2306-22b2-a730-dc3f-edb3538b6561@linux.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200710170911.GD7487@kernel.org> On 10.07.2020 20:09, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote: > Em Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 05:30:50PM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu: >> On 10.07.2020 16:31, Ravi Bangoria wrote: >>>> Currently access to perf_events, i915_perf and other performance >>>> monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel is open only for >>>> a privileged process [1] with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability enabled in the >>>> process effective set [2]. > >>>> This patch set introduces CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure >>>> system performance monitoring and observability operations so that >>>> CAP_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role >>>> for performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel. > >>> I'm seeing an issue with CAP_PERFMON when I try to record data for a >>> specific target. I don't know whether this is sort of a regression or >>> an expected behavior. > >> Thanks for reporting and root causing this case. The behavior looks like >> kind of expected since currently CAP_PERFMON takes over the related part >> of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials only. Actually Perf security docs [1] say >> that access control is also subject to CAP_SYS_PTRACE credentials. > > I think that stating that in the error message would be helpful, after > all, who reads docs? 8-) At least those who write it :D ... > > I.e., this: > > $ ./perf stat ls > Error: > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > $ > > Could become: > > $ ./perf stat ls > Error: > Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. > Right now only CAP_PERFMON is granted, you may need CAP_SYS_PTRACE. > $ It would better provide reference to perf security docs in the tool output. Looks like extending ptrace_may_access() check for perf_events with CAP_PERFMON makes monitoring simpler and even more secure to use since Perf tool need not to start/stop/single-step and read/write registers and memory and so on like a debugger or strace-like tool. What do you think? Alexei > > - Arnaldo > >> CAP_PERFMON could be used to extend and substitute ptrace_may_access() >> check in perf_events subsystem to simplify user experience at least in >> this specific case. >> >> Alexei >> >> [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html >> >>> >>> Without setting CAP_PERFMON: >>> >>> $ getcap ./perf >>> $ ./perf stat -a ls >>> Error: >>> Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. >>> $ ./perf stat ls >>> Performance counter stats for 'ls': >>> 2.06 msec task-clock:u # 0.418 CPUs utilized >>> 0 context-switches:u # 0.000 K/sec >>> 0 cpu-migrations:u # 0.000 K/sec >>> >>> With CAP_PERFMON: >>> >>> $ getcap ./perf >>> ./perf = cap_perfmon+ep >>> $ ./perf stat -a ls >>> Performance counter stats for 'system wide': >>> 142.42 msec cpu-clock # 25.062 CPUs utilized >>> 182 context-switches # 0.001 M/sec >>> 48 cpu-migrations # 0.337 K/sec >>> $ ./perf stat ls >>> Error: >>> Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. >>> >>> Am I missing something silly? >>> >>> Analysis: >>> --------- >>> A bit more analysis lead me to below kernel code fs/exec.c: >>> >>> begin_new_exec() >>> { >>> ... >>> if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP || >>> !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && >>> gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))) >>> set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); >>> else >>> set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER); >>> >>> ... >>> commit_creds(bprm->cred); >>> } >>> >>> When I execute './perf stat ls', it's going into else condition and thus sets >>> dumpable flag as SUID_DUMP_USER. Then in commit_creds(): >>> >>> int commit_creds(struct cred *new) >>> { >>> ... >>> /* dumpability changes */ >>> if (... >>> !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) { >>> if (task->mm) >>> set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable); >>> } >>> >>> !cred_cap_issubset(old, new) fails for perf without any capability and thus >>> it doesn't execute set_dumpable(). Whereas that condition passes for perf >>> with CAP_PERFMON and thus it overwrites old value (SUID_DUMP_USER) with >>> suid_dumpable in mm_flags. On an Ubuntu, suid_dumpable default value is >>> SUID_DUMP_ROOT. On Fedora, it's SUID_DUMP_DISABLE. (/proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable). >>> >>> Now while opening an event: >>> >>> perf_event_open() >>> ptrace_may_access() >>> __ptrace_may_access() { >>> ... >>> if (mm && >>> ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) && >>> !ptrace_has_cap(cred, mm->user_ns, mode))) >>> return -EPERM; >>> } >>> >>> This if condition passes for perf with CAP_PERFMON and thus it returns -EPERM. >>> But it fails for perf without CAP_PERFMON and thus it goes ahead and returns >>> success. So opening an event fails when perf has CAP_PREFMON and tries to open >>> process specific event as normal user. >>> >>> Workarounds: >>> ------------ >>> Based on above analysis, I found couple of workarounds (examples are on >>> Ubuntu 18.04.4 powerpc): >>> >>> Workaround1: >>> Setting SUID_DUMP_USER as default (in /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable) solves the >>> issue. >>> >>> # echo 1 > /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable >>> $ getcap ./perf >>> ./perf = cap_perfmon+ep >>> $ ./perf stat ls >>> Performance counter stats for 'ls': >>> 1.47 msec task-clock # 0.806 CPUs utilized >>> 0 context-switches # 0.000 K/sec >>> 0 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec >>> >>> Workaround2: >>> Using CAP_SYS_PTRACE along with CAP_PERFMON solves the issue. >>> >>> $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable >>> 2 >>> # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace=ep" ./perf >>> $ ./perf stat ls >>> Performance counter stats for 'ls': >>> 1.41 msec task-clock # 0.826 CPUs utilized >>> 0 context-switches # 0.000 K/sec >>> 0 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec >>> >>> Workaround3: >>> Adding CAP_PERFMON to parent of perf (/bin/bash) also solves the issue. >>> >>> $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable >>> 2 >>> # setcap "cap_perfmon=ep" /bin/bash >>> # setcap "cap_perfmon=ep" ./perf >>> $ bash >>> $ ./perf stat ls >>> Performance counter stats for 'ls': >>> 1.47 msec task-clock # 0.806 CPUs utilized >>> 0 context-switches # 0.000 K/sec >>> 0 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec >>> >>> - Ravi > _______________________________________________ Intel-gfx mailing list Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-13 9:48 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-04-02 8:42 [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:42 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:45 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:45 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] capabilities: Introduce " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:46 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:46 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf/core: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-03 11:08 ` Jiri Olsa 2020-04-03 11:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Jiri Olsa 2020-04-03 13:08 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-03 13:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-04 2:18 ` Namhyung Kim 2020-04-04 2:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Namhyung Kim 2020-04-04 8:18 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-04 8:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drm/i915/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:49 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] powerpc/perf: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:49 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:50 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:50 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:51 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:53 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:53 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/oprofile: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] doc/admin-guide: Update " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:10 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 14:10 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 14:41 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:41 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 15:05 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 15:05 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 15:51 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 15:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 9:37 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev5) Patchwork 2020-04-02 10:02 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork 2020-04-03 11:24 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.IGT: failure " Patchwork 2020-04-05 16:00 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev6) Patchwork 2020-04-07 14:30 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:35 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:35 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:36 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:36 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:40 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:40 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:17 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:52 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:52 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:02 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:02 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:32 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:32 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:56 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:56 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:23 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:23 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-22 19:18 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev18) Patchwork 2020-04-22 19:43 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork 2020-07-10 13:31 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Ravi Bangoria 2020-07-10 13:31 ` [Intel-gfx] " Ravi Bangoria 2020-07-10 14:30 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-10 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-10 17:09 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-10 17:09 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 9:48 ` Alexey Budankov [this message] 2020-07-13 9:48 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 12:17 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 12:37 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 12:37 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 18:51 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 18:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-14 10:59 ` Peter Zijlstra 2020-07-14 10:59 ` [Intel-gfx] " Peter Zijlstra 2020-07-14 15:27 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-14 15:27 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-21 13:06 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-21 13:06 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-22 11:30 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-22 11:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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