From: "tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de> To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>, James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, x86 <x86@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: [tip: perf/core] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 12:17:35 -0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <158755785587.28353.3215429182209964022.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw) In-Reply-To: <a66d5648-2b8e-577e-e1f2-1d56c017ab5e@linux.intel.com> The following commit has been merged into the perf/core branch of tip: Commit-ID: 6b3e0e2e04615df128b2d38fa1dd1fcb84f2504c Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/6b3e0e2e04615df128b2d38fa1dd1fcb84f2504c Author: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> AuthorDate: Thu, 02 Apr 2020 11:47:35 +03:00 Committer: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> CommitterDate: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 12:19:08 -03:00 perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability Extend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations. Make perf_event_paranoid_check() and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of CAP_PERFMON capability. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Committer testing: Using a libcap with this patch: diff --git a/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h index 78b2fd4c8a95..89b5b0279b60 100644 --- a/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h +++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h @@ -366,8 +366,9 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data { #define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_PERFMON #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) Note that using '38' in place of 'cap_perfmon' works to some degree with an old libcap, its only when cap_get_flag() is called that libcap performs an error check based on the maximum value known for capabilities that it will fail. This makes determining the default of perf_event_attr.exclude_kernel to fail, as it can't determine if CAP_PERFMON is in place. Using 'perf top -e cycles' avoids the default check and sets perf_event_attr.exclude_kernel to 1. As root, with a libcap supporting CAP_PERFMON: # groupadd perf_users # adduser perf -g perf_users # mkdir ~perf/bin # cp ~acme/bin/perf ~perf/bin/ # chgrp perf_users ~perf/bin/perf # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" ~perf/bin/perf # getcap ~perf/bin/perf /home/perf/bin/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep # ls -la ~perf/bin/perf -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root perf_users 16968552 Apr 9 13:10 /home/perf/bin/perf As the 'perf' user in the 'perf_users' group: $ perf top -a --stdio Error: Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) $ Either add the cap_ipc_lock capability to the perf binary or reduce the ring buffer size to some smaller value: $ perf top -m10 -a --stdio rounding mmap pages size to 64K (16 pages) Error: Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) $ perf top -m4 -a --stdio Error: Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) $ perf top -m2 -a --stdio PerfTop: 762 irqs/sec kernel:49.7% exact: 100.0% lost: 0/0 drop: 0/0 [4000Hz cycles], (all, 4 CPUs) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9.83% perf [.] __symbols__insert 8.58% perf [.] rb_next 5.91% [kernel] [k] module_get_kallsym 5.66% [kernel] [k] kallsyms_expand_symbol.constprop.0 3.98% libc-2.29.so [.] __GI_____strtoull_l_internal 3.66% perf [.] rb_insert_color 2.34% [kernel] [k] vsnprintf 2.30% [kernel] [k] string_nocheck 2.16% libc-2.29.so [.] _IO_getdelim 2.15% [kernel] [k] number 2.13% [kernel] [k] format_decode 1.58% libc-2.29.so [.] _IO_feof 1.52% libc-2.29.so [.] __strcmp_avx2 1.50% perf [.] rb_set_parent_color 1.47% libc-2.29.so [.] __libc_calloc 1.24% [kernel] [k] do_syscall_64 1.17% [kernel] [k] __x86_indirect_thunk_rax $ perf record -a sleep 1 [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.552 MB perf.data (74 samples) ] $ perf evlist cycles $ perf evlist -v cycles: size: 120, { sample_period, sample_freq }: 4000, sample_type: IP|TID|TIME|CPU|PERIOD, read_format: ID, disabled: 1, inherit: 1, mmap: 1, comm: 1, freq: 1, task: 1, precise_ip: 3, sample_id_all: 1, exclude_guest: 1, mmap2: 1, comm_exec: 1, ksymbol: 1, bpf_event: 1 $ perf report | head -20 # To display the perf.data header info, please use --header/--header-only options. # # # Total Lost Samples: 0 # # Samples: 74 of event 'cycles' # Event count (approx.): 15694834 # # Overhead Command Shared Object Symbol # ........ ............... .......................... ...................................... # 19.62% perf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] strnlen_user 13.88% swapper [kernel.vmlinux] [k] intel_idle 13.83% ksoftirqd/0 [kernel.vmlinux] [k] pfifo_fast_dequeue 13.51% swapper [kernel.vmlinux] [k] kmem_cache_free 6.31% gnome-shell [kernel.vmlinux] [k] kmem_cache_free 5.66% kworker/u8:3+ix [kernel.vmlinux] [k] delay_tsc 4.42% perf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] __set_cpus_allowed_ptr 3.45% kworker/2:1-eve [kernel.vmlinux] [k] shmem_truncate_range 2.29% gnome-shell libgobject-2.0.so.0.6000.7 [.] g_closure_ref $ Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a66d5648-2b8e-577e-e1f2-1d56c017ab5e@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> --- tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +++-- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c b/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c index d5adc41..55eda54 100644 --- a/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c +++ b/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c @@ -284,10 +284,11 @@ static int __cmd_ftrace(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace, int argc, const char **argv) .events = POLLIN, }; - if (!perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (!(perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) || + perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) { pr_err("ftrace only works for %s!\n", #ifdef HAVE_LIBCAP_SUPPORT - "users with the SYS_ADMIN capability" + "users with the CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability" #else "root" #endif diff --git a/tools/perf/design.txt b/tools/perf/design.txt index 0453ba2..a42fab3 100644 --- a/tools/perf/design.txt +++ b/tools/perf/design.txt @@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for their own tasks. A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts -all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. +all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN +privilege. The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero. diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cap.h b/tools/perf/util/cap.h index 051dc59..ae52878 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/cap.h +++ b/tools/perf/util/cap.h @@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused) #define CAP_SYSLOG 34 #endif +#ifndef CAP_PERFMON +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 +#endif + #endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */ diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c index eb880ef..d23db67 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c @@ -2523,14 +2523,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target, "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" - "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" + "unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" "The current value is %d:\n\n" " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" - ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" - " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" - ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" - ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" + ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" + " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" + ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" + ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "", diff --git a/tools/perf/util/util.c b/tools/perf/util/util.c index d707c96..37a9492 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/util.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/util.c @@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void) bool perf_event_paranoid_check(int max_level) { return perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) || perf_event_paranoid() <= max_level; }
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de> To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, x86 <x86@kernel.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Subject: [Intel-gfx] [tip: perf/core] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 12:17:35 -0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <158755785587.28353.3215429182209964022.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw) In-Reply-To: <a66d5648-2b8e-577e-e1f2-1d56c017ab5e@linux.intel.com> The following commit has been merged into the perf/core branch of tip: Commit-ID: 6b3e0e2e04615df128b2d38fa1dd1fcb84f2504c Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/6b3e0e2e04615df128b2d38fa1dd1fcb84f2504c Author: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> AuthorDate: Thu, 02 Apr 2020 11:47:35 +03:00 Committer: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> CommitterDate: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 12:19:08 -03:00 perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability Extend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations. Make perf_event_paranoid_check() and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of CAP_PERFMON capability. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Committer testing: Using a libcap with this patch: diff --git a/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h index 78b2fd4c8a95..89b5b0279b60 100644 --- a/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h +++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h @@ -366,8 +366,9 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data { #define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_PERFMON #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) Note that using '38' in place of 'cap_perfmon' works to some degree with an old libcap, its only when cap_get_flag() is called that libcap performs an error check based on the maximum value known for capabilities that it will fail. This makes determining the default of perf_event_attr.exclude_kernel to fail, as it can't determine if CAP_PERFMON is in place. Using 'perf top -e cycles' avoids the default check and sets perf_event_attr.exclude_kernel to 1. As root, with a libcap supporting CAP_PERFMON: # groupadd perf_users # adduser perf -g perf_users # mkdir ~perf/bin # cp ~acme/bin/perf ~perf/bin/ # chgrp perf_users ~perf/bin/perf # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" ~perf/bin/perf # getcap ~perf/bin/perf /home/perf/bin/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep # ls -la ~perf/bin/perf -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root perf_users 16968552 Apr 9 13:10 /home/perf/bin/perf As the 'perf' user in the 'perf_users' group: $ perf top -a --stdio Error: Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) $ Either add the cap_ipc_lock capability to the perf binary or reduce the ring buffer size to some smaller value: $ perf top -m10 -a --stdio rounding mmap pages size to 64K (16 pages) Error: Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) $ perf top -m4 -a --stdio Error: Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) $ perf top -m2 -a --stdio PerfTop: 762 irqs/sec kernel:49.7% exact: 100.0% lost: 0/0 drop: 0/0 [4000Hz cycles], (all, 4 CPUs) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9.83% perf [.] __symbols__insert 8.58% perf [.] rb_next 5.91% [kernel] [k] module_get_kallsym 5.66% [kernel] [k] kallsyms_expand_symbol.constprop.0 3.98% libc-2.29.so [.] __GI_____strtoull_l_internal 3.66% perf [.] rb_insert_color 2.34% [kernel] [k] vsnprintf 2.30% [kernel] [k] string_nocheck 2.16% libc-2.29.so [.] _IO_getdelim 2.15% [kernel] [k] number 2.13% [kernel] [k] format_decode 1.58% libc-2.29.so [.] _IO_feof 1.52% libc-2.29.so [.] __strcmp_avx2 1.50% perf [.] rb_set_parent_color 1.47% libc-2.29.so [.] __libc_calloc 1.24% [kernel] [k] do_syscall_64 1.17% [kernel] [k] __x86_indirect_thunk_rax $ perf record -a sleep 1 [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.552 MB perf.data (74 samples) ] $ perf evlist cycles $ perf evlist -v cycles: size: 120, { sample_period, sample_freq }: 4000, sample_type: IP|TID|TIME|CPU|PERIOD, read_format: ID, disabled: 1, inherit: 1, mmap: 1, comm: 1, freq: 1, task: 1, precise_ip: 3, sample_id_all: 1, exclude_guest: 1, mmap2: 1, comm_exec: 1, ksymbol: 1, bpf_event: 1 $ perf report | head -20 # To display the perf.data header info, please use --header/--header-only options. # # # Total Lost Samples: 0 # # Samples: 74 of event 'cycles' # Event count (approx.): 15694834 # # Overhead Command Shared Object Symbol # ........ ............... .......................... ...................................... # 19.62% perf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] strnlen_user 13.88% swapper [kernel.vmlinux] [k] intel_idle 13.83% ksoftirqd/0 [kernel.vmlinux] [k] pfifo_fast_dequeue 13.51% swapper [kernel.vmlinux] [k] kmem_cache_free 6.31% gnome-shell [kernel.vmlinux] [k] kmem_cache_free 5.66% kworker/u8:3+ix [kernel.vmlinux] [k] delay_tsc 4.42% perf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] __set_cpus_allowed_ptr 3.45% kworker/2:1-eve [kernel.vmlinux] [k] shmem_truncate_range 2.29% gnome-shell libgobject-2.0.so.0.6000.7 [.] g_closure_ref $ Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a66d5648-2b8e-577e-e1f2-1d56c017ab5e@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> --- tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +++-- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c b/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c index d5adc41..55eda54 100644 --- a/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c +++ b/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c @@ -284,10 +284,11 @@ static int __cmd_ftrace(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace, int argc, const char **argv) .events = POLLIN, }; - if (!perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (!(perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) || + perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) { pr_err("ftrace only works for %s!\n", #ifdef HAVE_LIBCAP_SUPPORT - "users with the SYS_ADMIN capability" + "users with the CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability" #else "root" #endif diff --git a/tools/perf/design.txt b/tools/perf/design.txt index 0453ba2..a42fab3 100644 --- a/tools/perf/design.txt +++ b/tools/perf/design.txt @@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for their own tasks. A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts -all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. +all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN +privilege. The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero. diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cap.h b/tools/perf/util/cap.h index 051dc59..ae52878 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/cap.h +++ b/tools/perf/util/cap.h @@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused) #define CAP_SYSLOG 34 #endif +#ifndef CAP_PERFMON +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 +#endif + #endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */ diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c index eb880ef..d23db67 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c @@ -2523,14 +2523,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target, "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" - "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" + "unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" "The current value is %d:\n\n" " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" - ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" - " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" - ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" - ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" + ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" + " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" + ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" + ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "", diff --git a/tools/perf/util/util.c b/tools/perf/util/util.c index d707c96..37a9492 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/util.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/util.c @@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void) bool perf_event_paranoid_check(int max_level) { return perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) || perf_event_paranoid() <= max_level; } _______________________________________________ Intel-gfx mailing list Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-22 12:19 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-04-02 8:42 [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:42 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:45 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:45 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] capabilities: Introduce " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:46 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:46 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf/core: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-03 11:08 ` Jiri Olsa 2020-04-03 11:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Jiri Olsa 2020-04-03 13:08 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-03 13:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-04 2:18 ` Namhyung Kim 2020-04-04 2:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Namhyung Kim 2020-04-04 8:18 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-04 8:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov [this message] 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] [tip: perf/core] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drm/i915/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:49 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] powerpc/perf: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:49 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:50 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:50 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:51 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:53 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:53 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/oprofile: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] doc/admin-guide: Update " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:10 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 14:10 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 14:41 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:41 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 15:05 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 15:05 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 15:51 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 15:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 9:37 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev5) Patchwork 2020-04-02 10:02 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork 2020-04-03 11:24 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.IGT: failure " Patchwork 2020-04-05 16:00 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev6) Patchwork 2020-04-07 14:30 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:35 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:35 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:36 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:36 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:40 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:40 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:17 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:52 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:52 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:02 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:02 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:32 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:32 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:56 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:56 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:23 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:23 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-22 19:18 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev18) Patchwork 2020-04-22 19:43 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork 2020-07-10 13:31 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Ravi Bangoria 2020-07-10 13:31 ` [Intel-gfx] " Ravi Bangoria 2020-07-10 14:30 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-10 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-10 17:09 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-10 17:09 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 9:48 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 9:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 12:17 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 12:37 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 12:37 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 18:51 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 18:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-14 10:59 ` Peter Zijlstra 2020-07-14 10:59 ` [Intel-gfx] " Peter Zijlstra 2020-07-14 15:27 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-14 15:27 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-21 13:06 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-21 13:06 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-22 11:30 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-22 11:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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