From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>,
Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 12:59:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200714105934.GU10769@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200713185152.GA18094@kernel.org>
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 03:51:52PM -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:
> > > diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> > > index 856d98c36f56..a2397f724c10 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> > > @@ -11595,7 +11595,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
> > > * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
> > > */
> > > err = -EACCES;
> > > - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
> > > + if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
> > > goto err_cred;
> > > }
> > >
> > >> makes monitoring simpler and even more secure to use since Perf tool need
> > >> not to start/stop/single-step and read/write registers and memory and so on
> > >> like a debugger or strace-like tool. What do you think?
> > >
> > > I tend to agree, Peter?
So this basically says that if CAP_PERFMON, we don't care about the
ptrace() permissions? Just like how CAP_SYS_PTRACE would always allow
the ptrace checks?
I suppose that makes sense.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 12:59:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200714105934.GU10769@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200713185152.GA18094@kernel.org>
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 03:51:52PM -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:
> > > diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> > > index 856d98c36f56..a2397f724c10 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> > > @@ -11595,7 +11595,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
> > > * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
> > > */
> > > err = -EACCES;
> > > - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
> > > + if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
> > > goto err_cred;
> > > }
> > >
> > >> makes monitoring simpler and even more secure to use since Perf tool need
> > >> not to start/stop/single-step and read/write registers and memory and so on
> > >> like a debugger or strace-like tool. What do you think?
> > >
> > > I tend to agree, Peter?
So this basically says that if CAP_PERFMON, we don't care about the
ptrace() permissions? Just like how CAP_SYS_PTRACE would always allow
the ptrace checks?
I suppose that makes sense.
_______________________________________________
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Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-14 11:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-02 8:42 [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:42 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:45 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:45 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] capabilities: Introduce " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:46 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:46 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf/core: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 11:08 ` Jiri Olsa
2020-04-03 11:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Jiri Olsa
2020-04-03 13:08 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 13:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-04 2:18 ` Namhyung Kim
2020-04-04 2:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Namhyung Kim
2020-04-04 8:18 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-04 8:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drm/i915/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:49 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] powerpc/perf: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:49 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:50 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:50 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:51 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:53 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:53 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/oprofile: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] doc/admin-guide: Update " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:10 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 14:10 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 14:41 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:41 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 15:05 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 15:05 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 15:51 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 15:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 9:37 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev5) Patchwork
2020-04-02 10:02 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork
2020-04-03 11:24 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.IGT: failure " Patchwork
2020-04-05 16:00 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev6) Patchwork
2020-04-07 14:30 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:35 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:35 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:36 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:36 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:40 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:40 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:17 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:52 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:52 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:02 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:02 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:32 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:32 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:56 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:56 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:23 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:23 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-22 19:18 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev18) Patchwork
2020-04-22 19:43 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork
2020-07-10 13:31 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Ravi Bangoria
2020-07-10 13:31 ` [Intel-gfx] " Ravi Bangoria
2020-07-10 14:30 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-10 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-10 17:09 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-10 17:09 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 9:48 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 9:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 12:17 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 12:37 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 12:37 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 18:51 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 18:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-14 10:59 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2020-07-14 10:59 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-14 15:27 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-14 15:27 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-21 13:06 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-21 13:06 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-22 11:30 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-22 11:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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