From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v8 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2020 11:47:01 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3c129d9a-ba8a-3483-ecc5-ad6c8e7c203f@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f96f8f8a-e65c-3f36-dc85-fc3f5191e8c5@linux.intel.com>
Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses
ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface
and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or
program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to
accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges
are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
---
kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 2af0f4557b63..364c233c3f25 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -9259,7 +9259,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)
return -ENOENT;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
/*
@@ -9319,7 +9319,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)
return -ENOENT;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
/*
--
2.24.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v8 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2020 11:47:01 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3c129d9a-ba8a-3483-ecc5-ad6c8e7c203f@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f96f8f8a-e65c-3f36-dc85-fc3f5191e8c5@linux.intel.com>
Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses
ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface
and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or
program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to
accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges
are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
---
kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 2af0f4557b63..364c233c3f25 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -9259,7 +9259,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)
return -ENOENT;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
/*
@@ -9319,7 +9319,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)
return -ENOENT;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
/*
--
2.24.1
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-02 8:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-02 8:42 [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:42 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:45 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:45 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] capabilities: Introduce " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:46 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:46 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf/core: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:47 ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v8 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 11:08 ` Jiri Olsa
2020-04-03 11:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Jiri Olsa
2020-04-03 13:08 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 13:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-04 2:18 ` Namhyung Kim
2020-04-04 2:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Namhyung Kim
2020-04-04 8:18 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-04 8:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drm/i915/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:49 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] powerpc/perf: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:49 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:50 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:50 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:51 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:53 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:53 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/oprofile: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] doc/admin-guide: Update " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:10 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 14:10 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 14:41 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:41 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 15:05 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 15:05 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 15:51 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 15:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02 9:37 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev5) Patchwork
2020-04-02 10:02 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork
2020-04-03 11:24 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.IGT: failure " Patchwork
2020-04-05 16:00 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev6) Patchwork
2020-04-07 14:30 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:35 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:35 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:36 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:36 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:40 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:40 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:17 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:52 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:52 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:02 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:02 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:32 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:32 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:56 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:56 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:23 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:23 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-22 19:18 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev18) Patchwork
2020-04-22 19:43 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork
2020-07-10 13:31 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Ravi Bangoria
2020-07-10 13:31 ` [Intel-gfx] " Ravi Bangoria
2020-07-10 14:30 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-10 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-10 17:09 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-10 17:09 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 9:48 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 9:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 12:17 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 12:37 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 12:37 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 18:51 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 18:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-14 10:59 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-14 10:59 ` [Intel-gfx] " Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-14 15:27 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-14 15:27 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-21 13:06 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-21 13:06 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-22 11:30 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-22 11:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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