From: "tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de> To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>, James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>, x86 <x86@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 12:17:34 -0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <158755785479.28353.3276810534081033612.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw) In-Reply-To: <c0a0ae47-8b6e-ff3e-416b-3cd1faaf71c0@linux.intel.com> The following commit has been merged into the perf/core branch of tip: Commit-ID: 031258da05956646c5606023ab0abe10a7e68ea1 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/031258da05956646c5606023ab0abe10a7e68ea1 Author: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> AuthorDate: Thu, 02 Apr 2020 11:48:54 +03:00 Committer: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> CommitterDate: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 12:19:08 -03:00 trace/bpf_trace: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c0a0ae47-8b6e-ff3e-416b-3cd1faaf71c0@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> --- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index ca17967..d7d8800 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info) u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len; int ret; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!perfmon_capable()) return -EPERM; if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT) return -EINVAL;
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de> To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, x86 <x86@kernel.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Subject: [Intel-gfx] [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 12:17:34 -0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <158755785479.28353.3276810534081033612.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw) In-Reply-To: <c0a0ae47-8b6e-ff3e-416b-3cd1faaf71c0@linux.intel.com> The following commit has been merged into the perf/core branch of tip: Commit-ID: 031258da05956646c5606023ab0abe10a7e68ea1 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/031258da05956646c5606023ab0abe10a7e68ea1 Author: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> AuthorDate: Thu, 02 Apr 2020 11:48:54 +03:00 Committer: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> CommitterDate: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 12:19:08 -03:00 trace/bpf_trace: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c0a0ae47-8b6e-ff3e-416b-3cd1faaf71c0@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> --- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index ca17967..d7d8800 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info) u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len; int ret; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!perfmon_capable()) return -EPERM; if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT) return -EINVAL; _______________________________________________ Intel-gfx mailing list Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-22 12:19 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-04-02 8:42 [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:42 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:45 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:45 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] capabilities: Introduce " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:46 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:46 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf/core: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-03 11:08 ` Jiri Olsa 2020-04-03 11:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Jiri Olsa 2020-04-03 13:08 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-03 13:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-04 2:18 ` Namhyung Kim 2020-04-04 2:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Namhyung Kim 2020-04-04 8:18 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-04 8:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drm/i915/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov [this message] 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:49 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] powerpc/perf: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:49 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:50 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:50 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:51 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:53 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:53 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/oprofile: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] doc/admin-guide: Update " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:10 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 14:10 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 14:41 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:41 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 15:05 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 15:05 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 15:51 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 15:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 9:37 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev5) Patchwork 2020-04-02 10:02 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork 2020-04-03 11:24 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.IGT: failure " Patchwork 2020-04-05 16:00 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev6) Patchwork 2020-04-07 14:30 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:35 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:35 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:36 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:36 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:40 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:40 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:17 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:52 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:52 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:02 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:02 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:32 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:32 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:56 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:56 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:23 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:23 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-22 19:18 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev18) Patchwork 2020-04-22 19:43 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork 2020-07-10 13:31 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Ravi Bangoria 2020-07-10 13:31 ` [Intel-gfx] " Ravi Bangoria 2020-07-10 14:30 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-10 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-10 17:09 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-10 17:09 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 9:48 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 9:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 12:17 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 12:37 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 12:37 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 18:51 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 18:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-14 10:59 ` Peter Zijlstra 2020-07-14 10:59 ` [Intel-gfx] " Peter Zijlstra 2020-07-14 15:27 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-14 15:27 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-21 13:06 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-21 13:06 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-22 11:30 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-22 11:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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