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From: "tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>,
	James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>, x86 <x86@kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 12:17:34 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <158755785479.28353.3276810534081033612.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c0a0ae47-8b6e-ff3e-416b-3cd1faaf71c0@linux.intel.com>

The following commit has been merged into the perf/core branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     031258da05956646c5606023ab0abe10a7e68ea1
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/031258da05956646c5606023ab0abe10a7e68ea1
Author:        Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
AuthorDate:    Thu, 02 Apr 2020 11:48:54 +03:00
Committer:     Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
CommitterDate: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 12:19:08 -03:00

trace/bpf_trace: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring
remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to
CAP_PERFMON capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c0a0ae47-8b6e-ff3e-416b-3cd1faaf71c0@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index ca17967..d7d8800 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info)
 	u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT)
 		return -EINVAL;

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, x86 <x86@kernel.org>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: [Intel-gfx] [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 12:17:34 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <158755785479.28353.3276810534081033612.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c0a0ae47-8b6e-ff3e-416b-3cd1faaf71c0@linux.intel.com>

The following commit has been merged into the perf/core branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     031258da05956646c5606023ab0abe10a7e68ea1
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/031258da05956646c5606023ab0abe10a7e68ea1
Author:        Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
AuthorDate:    Thu, 02 Apr 2020 11:48:54 +03:00
Committer:     Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
CommitterDate: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 12:19:08 -03:00

trace/bpf_trace: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring
remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to
CAP_PERFMON capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c0a0ae47-8b6e-ff3e-416b-3cd1faaf71c0@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index ca17967..d7d8800 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info)
 	u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT)
 		return -EINVAL;
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx

  reply	other threads:[~2020-04-22 12:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-02  8:42 [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:42 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:45 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:45   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] capabilities: Introduce " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:46 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:46   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] perf/core: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:47 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:47   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:47 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:47   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 11:08   ` Jiri Olsa
2020-04-03 11:08     ` [Intel-gfx] " Jiri Olsa
2020-04-03 13:08     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 13:08       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-04  2:18   ` Namhyung Kim
2020-04-04  2:18     ` [Intel-gfx] " Namhyung Kim
2020-04-04  8:18     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-04  8:18       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:48 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:48   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] drm/i915/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:48 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:48   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov [this message]
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:49 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] powerpc/perf: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:49   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:50 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:50   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:51 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:51   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:53 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:53   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/oprofile: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:54 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:54   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] doc/admin-guide: Update " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:54 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:54   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:10   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 14:10     ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 14:41     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:41       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:54       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:54         ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 15:05         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 15:05           ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 15:51           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 15:51             ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  9:37 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev5) Patchwork
2020-04-02 10:02 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork
2020-04-03 11:24 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.IGT: failure " Patchwork
2020-04-05 16:00 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev6) Patchwork
2020-04-07 14:30 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:30   ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:35   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:35     ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:54     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 14:54       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:36       ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:36         ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:40         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:40           ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:17           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:17             ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:52         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:52           ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:02           ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:02             ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:32             ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:32               ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:56         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:56           ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:23           ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:23             ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-22 19:18 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev18) Patchwork
2020-04-22 19:43 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork
2020-07-10 13:31 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Ravi Bangoria
2020-07-10 13:31   ` [Intel-gfx] " Ravi Bangoria
2020-07-10 14:30   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-10 14:30     ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-10 17:09     ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-10 17:09       ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13  9:48       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13  9:48         ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 12:17         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 12:17           ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 12:37           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 12:37             ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 18:51             ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 18:51               ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-14 10:59               ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-14 10:59                 ` [Intel-gfx] " Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-14 15:27                 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-14 15:27                   ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-21 13:06               ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-21 13:06                 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-22 11:30                 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-22 11:30                   ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

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