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From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support
Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2020 11:18:01 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ab15a8af-26a6-f8e7-cd7a-6b3fde99eaf9@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAM9d7cgRczLcyUi1y96a=87Hh3BhFgRUS8Kw=DBg4C0hVYj2HQ@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Namhyung,

On 04.04.2020 5:18, Namhyung Kim wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> On Thu, Apr 2, 2020 at 5:47 PM Alexey Budankov
> <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Extend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option
>> to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance
>> monitoring and observability operations. Make perf_event_paranoid_check()
>> and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of CAP_PERFMON capability.
>>
>> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
>> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
>> principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
>> that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
>> capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
>> for the time that such privileges are actually required)
>>
>> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
>> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
>> secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
>> capability.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
>> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
> 
> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>

Thanks! I appreciate you involvement and effort.

~Alexey

> 
> Thanks
> Namhyung
> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support
Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2020 11:18:01 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ab15a8af-26a6-f8e7-cd7a-6b3fde99eaf9@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAM9d7cgRczLcyUi1y96a=87Hh3BhFgRUS8Kw=DBg4C0hVYj2HQ@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Namhyung,

On 04.04.2020 5:18, Namhyung Kim wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> On Thu, Apr 2, 2020 at 5:47 PM Alexey Budankov
> <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Extend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option
>> to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance
>> monitoring and observability operations. Make perf_event_paranoid_check()
>> and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of CAP_PERFMON capability.
>>
>> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
>> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
>> principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
>> that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
>> capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
>> for the time that such privileges are actually required)
>>
>> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
>> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
>> secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
>> capability.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
>> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
> 
> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>

Thanks! I appreciate you involvement and effort.

~Alexey

> 
> Thanks
> Namhyung
> 
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx

  reply	other threads:[~2020-04-04  8:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-02  8:42 [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:42 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:45 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:45   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] capabilities: Introduce " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:46 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:46   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] perf/core: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:47 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:47   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:47 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:47   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 11:08   ` Jiri Olsa
2020-04-03 11:08     ` [Intel-gfx] " Jiri Olsa
2020-04-03 13:08     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 13:08       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-04  2:18   ` Namhyung Kim
2020-04-04  2:18     ` [Intel-gfx] " Namhyung Kim
2020-04-04  8:18     ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2020-04-04  8:18       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:48 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:48   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] drm/i915/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:48 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:48   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:49 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] powerpc/perf: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:49   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:50 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:50   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:51 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:51   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:53 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:53   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/oprofile: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:54 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:54   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] doc/admin-guide: Update " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:54 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  8:54   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:10   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 14:10     ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 14:41     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:41       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:54       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 14:54         ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 15:05         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 15:05           ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-05 15:51           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-05 15:51             ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-22 12:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov
2020-04-02  9:37 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev5) Patchwork
2020-04-02 10:02 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork
2020-04-03 11:24 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.IGT: failure " Patchwork
2020-04-05 16:00 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev6) Patchwork
2020-04-07 14:30 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:30   ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:35   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:35     ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 14:54     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 14:54       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:36       ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:36         ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:40         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:40           ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:17           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:17             ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:52         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:52           ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:02           ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:02             ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:32             ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 17:32               ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-04-07 16:56         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 16:56           ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:23           ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-07 17:23             ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-04-22 19:18 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev18) Patchwork
2020-04-22 19:43 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork
2020-07-10 13:31 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Ravi Bangoria
2020-07-10 13:31   ` [Intel-gfx] " Ravi Bangoria
2020-07-10 14:30   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-10 14:30     ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-10 17:09     ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-10 17:09       ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13  9:48       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13  9:48         ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 12:17         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 12:17           ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 12:37           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 12:37             ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-13 18:51             ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-13 18:51               ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-14 10:59               ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-14 10:59                 ` [Intel-gfx] " Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-14 15:27                 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-14 15:27                   ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-21 13:06               ` Alexey Budankov
2020-07-21 13:06                 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-07-22 11:30                 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-07-22 11:30                   ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

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