From: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>, Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, "selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>, "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" <intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>, "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, linux-man@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2020 13:08:28 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200403110828.GL2784502@krava> (raw) In-Reply-To: <a66d5648-2b8e-577e-e1f2-1d56c017ab5e@linux.intel.com> On Thu, Apr 02, 2020 at 11:47:35AM +0300, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Extend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option > to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance > monitoring and observability operations. Make perf_event_paranoid_check() > and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of CAP_PERFMON capability. > > CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance > monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 > principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states > that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., > capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only > for the time that such privileges are actually required) > > For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains > open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for > secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON > capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> > Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> thanks, jirka > --- > tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +++-- > tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- > tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ > tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- > tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + > 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c b/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c > index d5adc417a4ca..55eda54240fb 100644 > --- a/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c > +++ b/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c > @@ -284,10 +284,11 @@ static int __cmd_ftrace(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace, int argc, const char **argv) > .events = POLLIN, > }; > > - if (!perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { > + if (!(perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) || > + perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) { > pr_err("ftrace only works for %s!\n", > #ifdef HAVE_LIBCAP_SUPPORT > - "users with the SYS_ADMIN capability" > + "users with the CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability" > #else > "root" > #endif > diff --git a/tools/perf/design.txt b/tools/perf/design.txt > index 0453ba26cdbd..a42fab308ff6 100644 > --- a/tools/perf/design.txt > +++ b/tools/perf/design.txt > @@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for > their own tasks. > > A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts > -all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. > +all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN > +privilege. > > The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero. > > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cap.h b/tools/perf/util/cap.h > index 051dc590ceee..ae52878c0b2e 100644 > --- a/tools/perf/util/cap.h > +++ b/tools/perf/util/cap.h > @@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused) > #define CAP_SYSLOG 34 > #endif > > +#ifndef CAP_PERFMON > +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 > +#endif > + > #endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */ > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > index 816d930d774e..2696922f06bc 100644 > --- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > +++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > @@ -2507,14 +2507,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target, > "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" > "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" > "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" > - "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" > + "unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" > "The current value is %d:\n\n" > " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" > " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" > - ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > - " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > - ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > - ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" > + ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > + " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > + ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > + ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" > "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" > " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , > target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "", > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/util.c b/tools/perf/util/util.c > index d707c9624dd9..37a9492edb3e 100644 > --- a/tools/perf/util/util.c > +++ b/tools/perf/util/util.c > @@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void) > bool perf_event_paranoid_check(int max_level) > { > return perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || > + perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) || > perf_event_paranoid() <= max_level; > } > > -- > 2.24.1 >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" <intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>, Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, "selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Subject: Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2020 13:08:28 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200403110828.GL2784502@krava> (raw) In-Reply-To: <a66d5648-2b8e-577e-e1f2-1d56c017ab5e@linux.intel.com> On Thu, Apr 02, 2020 at 11:47:35AM +0300, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Extend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option > to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance > monitoring and observability operations. Make perf_event_paranoid_check() > and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of CAP_PERFMON capability. > > CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance > monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 > principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states > that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., > capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only > for the time that such privileges are actually required) > > For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains > open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for > secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON > capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> > Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> thanks, jirka > --- > tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +++-- > tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- > tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ > tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- > tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + > 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c b/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c > index d5adc417a4ca..55eda54240fb 100644 > --- a/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c > +++ b/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c > @@ -284,10 +284,11 @@ static int __cmd_ftrace(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace, int argc, const char **argv) > .events = POLLIN, > }; > > - if (!perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { > + if (!(perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) || > + perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) { > pr_err("ftrace only works for %s!\n", > #ifdef HAVE_LIBCAP_SUPPORT > - "users with the SYS_ADMIN capability" > + "users with the CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability" > #else > "root" > #endif > diff --git a/tools/perf/design.txt b/tools/perf/design.txt > index 0453ba26cdbd..a42fab308ff6 100644 > --- a/tools/perf/design.txt > +++ b/tools/perf/design.txt > @@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for > their own tasks. > > A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts > -all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. > +all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN > +privilege. > > The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero. > > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cap.h b/tools/perf/util/cap.h > index 051dc590ceee..ae52878c0b2e 100644 > --- a/tools/perf/util/cap.h > +++ b/tools/perf/util/cap.h > @@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused) > #define CAP_SYSLOG 34 > #endif > > +#ifndef CAP_PERFMON > +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 > +#endif > + > #endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */ > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > index 816d930d774e..2696922f06bc 100644 > --- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > +++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c > @@ -2507,14 +2507,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target, > "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" > "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" > "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" > - "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" > + "unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" > "The current value is %d:\n\n" > " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" > " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" > - ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > - " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > - ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > - ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" > + ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > + " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > + ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" > + ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" > "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" > " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , > target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "", > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/util.c b/tools/perf/util/util.c > index d707c9624dd9..37a9492edb3e 100644 > --- a/tools/perf/util/util.c > +++ b/tools/perf/util/util.c > @@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void) > bool perf_event_paranoid_check(int max_level) > { > return perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || > + perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) || > perf_event_paranoid() <= max_level; > } > > -- > 2.24.1 > _______________________________________________ Intel-gfx mailing list Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-03 11:08 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-04-02 8:42 [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:42 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:45 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:45 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] capabilities: Introduce " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:46 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:46 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf/core: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-03 11:08 ` Jiri Olsa [this message] 2020-04-03 11:08 ` Jiri Olsa 2020-04-03 13:08 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-03 13:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-04 2:18 ` Namhyung Kim 2020-04-04 2:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Namhyung Kim 2020-04-04 8:18 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-04 8:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drm/i915/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:49 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] powerpc/perf: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:49 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:50 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:50 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:51 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:53 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:53 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/oprofile: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] doc/admin-guide: Update " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:10 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 14:10 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 14:41 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:41 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 15:05 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 15:05 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 15:51 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 15:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 9:37 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev5) Patchwork 2020-04-02 10:02 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork 2020-04-03 11:24 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.IGT: failure " Patchwork 2020-04-05 16:00 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev6) Patchwork 2020-04-07 14:30 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:35 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:35 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:36 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:36 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:40 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:40 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:17 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:52 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:52 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:02 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:02 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:32 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:32 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:56 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:56 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:23 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:23 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-22 19:18 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev18) Patchwork 2020-04-22 19:43 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork 2020-07-10 13:31 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Ravi Bangoria 2020-07-10 13:31 ` [Intel-gfx] " Ravi Bangoria 2020-07-10 14:30 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-10 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-10 17:09 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-10 17:09 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 9:48 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 9:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 12:17 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 12:37 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 12:37 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 18:51 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 18:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-14 10:59 ` Peter Zijlstra 2020-07-14 10:59 ` [Intel-gfx] " Peter Zijlstra 2020-07-14 15:27 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-14 15:27 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-21 13:06 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-21 13:06 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-22 11:30 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-22 11:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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