From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <arnaldo.melo@gmail.com> To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <arnaldo.melo@gmail.com> Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>, Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, "selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>, "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" <intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>, "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, linux-man@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2020 13:40:50 -0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200407164050.GC12003@kernel.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200407163654.GB12003@kernel.org> Em Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 01:36:54PM -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo escreveu: > Em Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 05:54:27PM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu: > > On 07.04.2020 17:35, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote: > > > Em Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 11:30:14AM -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo escreveu: > > >> [perf@five ~]$ type perf > > >> perf is hashed (/home/perf/bin/perf) > > >> [perf@five ~]$ getcap /home/perf/bin/perf > > >> /home/perf/bin/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,38+ep > > >> [perf@five ~]$ groups > > >> perf perf_users > > >> [perf@five ~]$ id > > >> uid=1002(perf) gid=1002(perf) groups=1002(perf),1003(perf_users) context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 > > >> [perf@five ~]$ perf top --stdio > > >> Error: > > >> Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) > > >> [perf@five ~]$ perf record -a > > >> ^C[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] > > >> [ perf record: Captured and wrote 1.177 MB perf.data (1552 samples) ] > > >> > > >> [perf@five ~]$ perf evlist > > >> cycles:u > > >> [perf@five ~]$ > > > > > > Humm, perf record falls back to cycles:u after initially trying cycles > > > (i.e. kernel and userspace), lemme see trying 'perf top -e cycles:u', > > > lemme test, humm not really: > > > > > > [perf@five ~]$ perf top --stdio -e cycles:u > > > Error: > > > Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) > > > [perf@five ~]$ perf record -e cycles:u -a sleep 1 > > > [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] > > > [ perf record: Captured and wrote 1.123 MB perf.data (132 samples) ] > > > [perf@five ~]$ > > > > > > Back to debugging this. > > > > Could makes sense adding cap_ipc_lock to the binary to isolate from this: > > > > kernel/events/core.c: 6101 > > if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_is_paranoid() && > > !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) { > > ret = -EPERM; > > goto unlock; > > } > > > That did the trick, I'll update the documentation and include in my > "Committer testing" section: I ammended this to that patch, please check the wording: - Arnaldo diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst index c0ca0c1a6804..ed33682e26b0 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst @@ -127,12 +127,19 @@ taken to create such groups of privileged Perf users. :: - # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf - # setcap -v "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf + # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf + # setcap -v "cap_perfmon,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf perf: OK # getcap perf perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep +If the libcap installed doesn't yet support "cap_perfmon", use "38" instead, +i.e.: + +:: + + # setcap "38,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf + As a result, members of perf_users group are capable of conducting performance monitoring and observability by using functionality of the configured Perf tool executable that, when executes, passes perf_events
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From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <arnaldo.melo@gmail.com> To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <arnaldo.melo@gmail.com> Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, "selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" <intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Subject: Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2020 13:40:50 -0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200407164050.GC12003@kernel.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200407163654.GB12003@kernel.org> Em Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 01:36:54PM -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo escreveu: > Em Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 05:54:27PM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu: > > On 07.04.2020 17:35, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote: > > > Em Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 11:30:14AM -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo escreveu: > > >> [perf@five ~]$ type perf > > >> perf is hashed (/home/perf/bin/perf) > > >> [perf@five ~]$ getcap /home/perf/bin/perf > > >> /home/perf/bin/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,38+ep > > >> [perf@five ~]$ groups > > >> perf perf_users > > >> [perf@five ~]$ id > > >> uid=1002(perf) gid=1002(perf) groups=1002(perf),1003(perf_users) context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 > > >> [perf@five ~]$ perf top --stdio > > >> Error: > > >> Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) > > >> [perf@five ~]$ perf record -a > > >> ^C[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] > > >> [ perf record: Captured and wrote 1.177 MB perf.data (1552 samples) ] > > >> > > >> [perf@five ~]$ perf evlist > > >> cycles:u > > >> [perf@five ~]$ > > > > > > Humm, perf record falls back to cycles:u after initially trying cycles > > > (i.e. kernel and userspace), lemme see trying 'perf top -e cycles:u', > > > lemme test, humm not really: > > > > > > [perf@five ~]$ perf top --stdio -e cycles:u > > > Error: > > > Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) > > > [perf@five ~]$ perf record -e cycles:u -a sleep 1 > > > [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] > > > [ perf record: Captured and wrote 1.123 MB perf.data (132 samples) ] > > > [perf@five ~]$ > > > > > > Back to debugging this. > > > > Could makes sense adding cap_ipc_lock to the binary to isolate from this: > > > > kernel/events/core.c: 6101 > > if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_is_paranoid() && > > !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) { > > ret = -EPERM; > > goto unlock; > > } > > > That did the trick, I'll update the documentation and include in my > "Committer testing" section: I ammended this to that patch, please check the wording: - Arnaldo diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst index c0ca0c1a6804..ed33682e26b0 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst @@ -127,12 +127,19 @@ taken to create such groups of privileged Perf users. :: - # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf - # setcap -v "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf + # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf + # setcap -v "cap_perfmon,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf perf: OK # getcap perf perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep +If the libcap installed doesn't yet support "cap_perfmon", use "38" instead, +i.e.: + +:: + + # setcap "38,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf + As a result, members of perf_users group are capable of conducting performance monitoring and observability by using functionality of the configured Perf tool executable that, when executes, passes perf_events _______________________________________________ Intel-gfx mailing list Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-07 16:40 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-04-02 8:42 [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:42 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:45 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:45 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] capabilities: Introduce " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:46 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:46 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf/core: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-03 11:08 ` Jiri Olsa 2020-04-03 11:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Jiri Olsa 2020-04-03 13:08 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-03 13:08 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-04 2:18 ` Namhyung Kim 2020-04-04 2:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Namhyung Kim 2020-04-04 8:18 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-04 8:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] perf tools: Support CAP_PERFMON capability tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drm/i915/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] trace/bpf_trace: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:49 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] powerpc/perf: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:49 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:50 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:50 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:51 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/perf: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:53 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:53 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] drivers/oprofile: Open " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] doc/admin-guide: Update " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 8:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:10 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 14:10 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 14:41 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:41 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 15:05 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 15:05 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-05 15:51 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-05 15:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-22 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov 2020-04-02 9:37 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev5) Patchwork 2020-04-02 10:02 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork 2020-04-03 11:24 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.IGT: failure " Patchwork 2020-04-05 16:00 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev6) Patchwork 2020-04-07 14:30 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:35 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:35 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 14:54 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 14:54 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:36 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:36 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:40 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo [this message] 2020-04-07 16:40 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:17 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:52 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:52 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:02 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:02 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:32 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 17:32 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-04-07 16:56 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 16:56 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:23 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-07 17:23 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-04-22 19:18 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev18) Patchwork 2020-04-22 19:43 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork 2020-07-10 13:31 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Ravi Bangoria 2020-07-10 13:31 ` [Intel-gfx] " Ravi Bangoria 2020-07-10 14:30 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-10 14:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-10 17:09 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-10 17:09 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 9:48 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 9:48 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 12:17 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 12:17 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 12:37 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 12:37 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-13 18:51 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-13 18:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-14 10:59 ` Peter Zijlstra 2020-07-14 10:59 ` [Intel-gfx] " Peter Zijlstra 2020-07-14 15:27 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-14 15:27 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-21 13:06 ` Alexey Budankov 2020-07-21 13:06 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov 2020-07-22 11:30 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2020-07-22 11:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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